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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Summons Issued (11) 
Other Claims 
Judge 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Filjng: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 I\Jo Prior Appearance Paid James C. Morfitt 
by: Lojek, Donald W (attorney for Farber, Randolph E) Receipt number: 
0194411 Dated: 7/21/2006 Amount: $88.00 (Check) 
Acceptance of Service for James Alcorn, Manager Idaho State Insurance James C. Morfitt 
Fund 
Acceptance of Service for The Idaho State Insurance Fund James C. Morfitt 
Filing: 11A- Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior James C. Morfitt 
Appearance Paid by: Hall, Richard E (attorney for Alcorn, James M) 
Receipt number: 0198805 Dated: 8/14/2006 Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Appearance for all Def James C. Morfitt 
Stipulated Motion for extension of time to respond to Pit comp & James C. Morfitt 
Propounded Discovery 
Order for Stipulated mo for extension of time to respond to Pit comp and James C. Morfitt 
propounded Discovery 
Notice Of Service of Pit 3rd set of Discovery (fax James C. Morfitt 
Filing: 11A- Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than $1000 No Prior James C. Morfitt 
Appearance Paid by: Hall, Richard E (attorney for Idaho State Insurance 
Fund) Receipt number: 0207355 Dated: 10/2/2006 Amount: $58.00 
(Check) 
Answer 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery (7) 
Pit Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek Relative to Pit mo for PArtial Sum Judgment 
Affidavit of Philip Gordon Relative to Pit mo for Partial Sum Judg 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline Relative to Pit mo for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Memorandum in support of Pit mo for Partial Sum Judg 
Notice Of Hearing 2-15-07 9:00 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/15/2007 09:00 AM) 
Motion to vacate hearing on Pit mo for partial sum judgment (fax 
Affidavit of Keely E Duke in support of def mo vacate hear'1ng (fax 
Memorandum in support of mo vacate hrg (fax 
Motion to shorten time for hrg def mo to vacate hrg (fax 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/15/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Held 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/15/2007 09:00 AM: Motion James C. Morfitt 
Granted - defendant's motion to vacate plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/06/2007 01 :30 PM) plaintiff mot James C. Morfitt 
for part summary jdmt 
Notice of hearing on motion to vacate 
000001 
James C. Morfitt 
Date: 12/13/2010 
Time: 04:40 PM 
Page 2 of 15 
T udicial District Court - Canyon Count(';t,r 
ROA Report 74"4,/,, 












Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Order granting motion to shorten time 
Order Resheduling Hearing & Scheduling Deadlines 
Motion for leave to file plaintiffs' first amended class action complaint and 
demand for jury trial 
Affidavit of Bruce Bistline in support of motion for leave to file plaintiffs' first 
amended class action complaint and demand for jury trial 
Notice Of Hearing Re: motion for leave to file plaintiffs' first amended class 
action complaint and demand for jury trial 4-6-07 
Defendants' Motion for summary judgment 
Memorandum in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment 
Affidavit of Michael Camiller 
Affidavit of James Alcorn 
Notice Of Hearing on defendants' motion for summary judgment 4-6-07 
Plaintiffs motion for certification of class 
Affidavit in support of motion for class cert 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in support of pl motion for class cert 
Memorandum in support of pl motn for class cert 
Memorandum in support of motion to continue summary judgment 
proceedings {fax) 
Motion to strike affidavit of Michael Camilleri 
Memorandum in support of motion to strike affidavit of Michael Camilleri 
Memorandum in opposition to defendants motion for summary judgment 
Judge 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Motion to Continue defendants summary judgment proceedings James C. Morfitt 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in support of memo in support of motion to cont James C. Morfitt 
defs summ judgment proceedings 
Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiffs motion to continue summary judgment 
proceedings to permit discovery 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of Keely E Duke in Support of Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Notice Of Hearing on Pit mo to strike Affidavit of Michael Camilleri 4-6-07 James C. Morfitt 
1 :30(fax 
Transcript Filed motion to continue partial summary judgment held January James C. Morfitt 
30,2007 
Suppl Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in support of memo in support of mo to James C. Morfitt 
continue def summary judg proceedings pursuant to rule 56 f (fax 
Amended Memorandum in support of mo to continue sum judg James C. Morfitt 
proceedings pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
Response to Def memo in oppose to Pit mo for Partial sum judg (fax James C. Morfitt 
Defendants Reply to Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
000002 
James C. Morfitt 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Affidavit/Keely E Duke in supp of defs memo in opposition to plaintiffs 
motion to cont summ judgment proceedings pursuant to rule 56(f) 
Judge 
James C. Morfitt 
Memorandum/opposition to plaintiffs motion to cont summ judgment James C. Morfitt 
Defs Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motio to strike the affd of James C. Morfitt 
Michael Camilleri 
Affidavit of George M Parham James C. Morfitt 
Affidavit of Keely E Duke in supp of defs memo in opposition to plaintiffs James C. Morfitt 
motion to certify class 
Defs Idaho State Ins Fund and James M Alcorns opposition to Motion to James C. Morfitt 
Certify Class 
Pit Reply Memorandum RE: Pit mo to cont summary Judgment 
Proceedings pursuant to rule 56 (f) Fax 
Pit Reply Memorandum RE: Pit mo to strike the affidavit of Michael 
Camilleri (fax 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Suppl Affidavit of Bruce Bistline in support of mo to cont Def sum judgment James C. Morfitt 
Proceedings pursuant to rule 56 (f) Fax 
Notice Of Hearing on Pit mo for class certiifcation 4-19-07 9:00 (fax James C. Morfitt 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/19/2007 09:00 AM) mo for class James C. Morfitt 
certification 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/06/2007 01 :30 PM: Hearing James C. Morfitt 
Held plaintiff mot for part summ jdmt - mo to cont summ judgment & Pit 
mo to strike Affd of Michael Camilleri 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/19/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing James C. Morfitt 
Vacated mo for class certification 
Notice of vacating hearing (fax) James C. Morfitt 
Notice Of Taking Deposition randolph farber 
Notice Of Taking Deposition scott becker 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Order vacating hearing on plaintiffs' motion to strike the affidavit of Michael James C. Morfitt 
Camilleri 
Order granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to file plaintiffs' first amended James C. Morfitt 
class action complaint and demand for jury trial 
Notice Of Taking Deposition debbie hiatt James C. Morfitt 
Order granting pltfs rule 56(f) motion and order vacating hearing on pltfs James C. Morfitt 
motion for partial summary judgment 
Order denying defs motion for summary judgment on the issues of James C. Morfitt 
standing and waiver 
Order granting defs motion for summary judgment on the isue of statute of James C. Morfitt 
limitation 
Transcript Filed - for motion hearing held on April 6, 2007 James C. Morfitt 
Seconded Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Rar.idolph Farber James C. Morfitt 
Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Scott Becker James C. Morfitt 
Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs' Fourth Set of Discovery Requests: James C. Morfitt 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Notice Of Taking Deposition jam es alcorn 
Notice Of Taking Deposition debbie hiatt 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery_ 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery_ 
Change Assigned Judge {batch process) 
First Amended class action complaint and demand for jury trial 
Objection to notice of deposition of debbie hiatt {fax) 
Notice Of Service {fax) 
Judge 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
James C. Morfitt 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Answer to pit first amended class action complaint and demand for jury trial Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Service {fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Service of Pit Randolph Farbers responses to def State 
Insurance 1st set interr 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery (fax 
Pit second Motion for PArtial Summary Judgment {fax 
Notice Of Hearing 8-31-07 11 :00 (fax 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/31/2007 11 :00 AM) sum judgment Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in support of Pit second mo for PArtial sum judgment Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/31/2007 11 :00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated sum judgment per phone call from attorneys office 
Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Thomas J Ryan 
Summary Judgment {fax) 9-20-07 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/20/2007 09:00 AM) summ judg Thomas J Ryan 
Notice of hearing RE: Pit mo for certification of class 9-10-07 1 :30 {fax 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/10/2007 01 :30 PM) mo 
certification of class 
Defendants Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Keely E Duke in support of Defendants Motion for Summary Thomas J Ryan 
Judgment 
Memorandum in support of Defendants Second Motion for Summary Thomas J Ryan 
Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendants Second Motion for Summary Judgment Thomas J Ryan 
09-20-07 
Reply Memorandum in support of plaintiffs' motion for class certification 
Pit Motion to shorten time RE: Pit renewed mo to cont def summary judg 
proceedings pursuant to rule 56 {f) or alternatively to reset such mo to a 
later date 9-10-07 1 :30 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Bruce Bistline in support of Pit mo shorten time RE: Renewed Thomas J Ryan 
mo to cont def sum judgment pursuant to rule 56 (f) or alternatively to reset 
such motion to a later date 
Pit Renewed Motion to cont def sum judgment proceedings pursuant to rule Thomas J Ryan 
56 f 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in support of Pit renewed mo to cont def sum Thomas J Ryan 
judgment 000004 
Date: 12/13/201 O 
Time: 04:40 PM 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Memorandum in support of Pit renewed mo to cont def sum judgment 
Notice Of Hearing 09/10/2007 (fax) 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
defendant's supplemental Memorandum opposing motion to certify class Thomas J Ryan 
(fax) 
Affidavit of Keely Duke in support of defendants' memorandum in 
opposition to plaintiffs' second motion for partial summary juqgment 
Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' second motion for partial summary Thomas J Ryan 
judgment 
Pit Memorandum in Response to Def memo in support of def 2nd mo for Thomas J Ryan 
sum judgment 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/10/2007 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held mo certification of class & Pit mo sum judgment 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/10/2007 01 :30 PM: Motion Thomas J Ryan 
Granted mo certification of class 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/05/2007 01 :30 PM) Thomas J Ryan 
Estimated costs on appeal Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/20/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated summ judg 
Order on Pit mo for class certification 
Order vacating & Resetting hearing & setting out Briefing schedule 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/09/2007 02:30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/27/2007 01 :30 PM) sum judg 
Memorandum regarding process for statutory construction (fax) 
Bench brief regarding the proper method of statutory construction 
reporter's transcript of proceedings 
Pit opposition Memorandum to def Bench Brief regarding the proper 
method of statutory construction 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
def idaho state insurance fund reply to pltfs memorandum re: statutory Thomas J Ryan 
construction process (fax) 
Idaho State Insurance Fund Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum Thomas J Ryan 
Re: Statutory Construction (fax) 
I\Jotice of Errata to Idaho State Insurance Fund def Bench Brief regarding Thomas J Ryan 
the proper method of construction 
Amended Bench Brief Regarding the proper method of statutory 
construction 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 10/09/2007 02:30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held 
Pit revised second motion for partial sum judg Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in support of plaintiffs' revised second motion for partial sum Thomas J Ryan 
judg 
Def motion for surn juqg on the meaning of Idaho code section 72-915 Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in support of def motn for sum judg on the meaning of Idaho Thomas J Ryan 
code section 72-915 
000005 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Hearing Vacated 
Affidavit of George Bambauer (fax 
Pit objection to Def mo for summary judgment 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in support of Pit memo in reponse to memo of Thomas J Ryan 
state Insurance Fund in support of mo for sum judg 
Pit Memorandum in response to the memo of the state Insurance fund in Thomas J Ryan 
support of its mo for summary Judgment 
Memorandum in opposition to Pit revised second motn for partial sum judg Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of keely E. Duke in support of Def memo in opposition to Pit Thomas J Ryan 
revised second motn for partial sum judg 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek RE: Pit revised second motion for PArtial sum Thomas J Ryan 
Judgment 
Response to Def memo in oppose to Pit revised second mo for PArtial Sum Thomas J Ryan 
Judgment 
Def Reply to Pit memo response to def motn for sum judg on the meaning Thomas J Ryan 
of Idaho Code section 72-915 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/27/2007 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held sum judg 
Memorandum decision upon motions for summary judgment-(summary Thomas J Ryan 
judgment neither granted nor denied this decision is on the ruling of Idaho 
Code 72-915) 
Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificate (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificate (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Rule 54(b) Certificate (fax) 
2-14-08 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/14/2008 09:00 AM) motn for rule Thomas J Ryan 
54 cert 
Def s Memorandum of Costs and Fees (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Keely E. Duke in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs Thomas J Ryan 
(fax) 
Defendant's Brief in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Costs (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Objection to proposed order regarding motions for summary judgment and Thomas J Ryan 
notice of hearing 02/14/2008 (fax) 
Memorandum in support of objection (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
pltfs objection to costs claimed by defendant (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in support of pltfs objection (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Hearing 02/14/2008 (defs memo costs) Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in opposition to Pit's motn for Rule 54(b) certificate and Pit's Thomas J Ryan 
objection to proposed order regarding motn for sum j_udg 
defs reply to objections to memorandum of costs (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/14/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held motn for rule 54 cert/def memo costs 
Order RE: Motions for summary Judgment Thomas J Ryan 
000006 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Amendment to the courts memorandum Decision Upon motions for 
sumamry Judgment 
Rule 54b certification of Final Judgment 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Civil Disposition entered for: Alcorn, James M, Defendant; Danielson, Judi, Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant; Deal, William W, Defendant; Geddes, Gerald, Defendant; 
Goedde, John, Defendant; Idaho State Insurance Fund, Defendant; Martin, 
Elaine, Defendant; Mclaughlin, Marguarite, Defendant; Meyer, Wayne, 
Defendant; Snodgrass, Mark, Defendant; Terrell, Milford, Defendant; 
Becker, Scott Alan, Plaintiff; Critter Clinic,, Plaintiff; Farber, Randolph E, 
Plaintiff. 
order date: 2/15/2008 
Case Status Changed: Closed 
Motion for Appeal By Permission 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in support of mo for Appeal Thomas J Ryan 
Notice Of Hearing on Pit mo 3-20-08 9:00 Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/20/2008 09:00 AM) mo for Appeal Thomas J Ryan 
by Permission 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk action Thomas J Ryan 
SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Appeal Thomas J Ryan 
by Permission (fax) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/20/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held mo for Appeal by Permission 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/20/2008 09:00 AM: Plan Thomas J Ryan 
Denied mo for Appeal by Permission 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Thomas J Ryan 
Order Regarding Pit Motion for Appeal by permission and Def Request for Thomas J Ryan 
Atty fees & costs (Denied 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court ($86.00 Directly to Supreme Thomas J Ryan 
Court Plus this amount to the District Court) Paid by: Lojek, Donald W 
(attorney for Farber, Randolph E) Receipt number: 0302797 Dated: 
3/27/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: Farber, Randolph E (plaintiff) 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 302799 Dated 3/27/2008 for 100.00) clerks Thomas J Ryan 
record 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Thomas J Ryan 
Notice of Appeal from Pit 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 307483 Dated 4/18/2008 for 60.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 37951 dated 7/17/2008 amount 
100.00) 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 37952 dated 7/17/2008 amount 
60.00) 
SC-Opinion (Summary Judgment is Reversed and Remanded) 
Request for Status Conference (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 04/16/2009 01 :30 PM) 
000007 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Order Setting Case for Status Conference 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 04/16/2009 01 :30 PM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Order Vacating Status Conference 
Substitute Opinion (S C - Judgment Reversed and Remanded) 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 06/18/2009 10:30 AM) 
Order Setting case for Status Conference 
Remittitur (Atty Fees of $651.00 allowed for Appellant) 
Notice Of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Hearing result for Conference - Status held on 06/18/2009 10:30 AM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter:Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Hearing result for Conference Status held on 06/18/2009 10:30 AM: 
Interim Hearing Held 
Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/04/2010 09:00 AM) 9 days 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 08/19/2010 11 :00 AM) 
Notice Of Service (fax) 
Notice Of Service (fax) 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Thomas J Ryan 
Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Thomas J Ryan 
Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised Thomas J Ryan 
Second Moton for Partial Summary Judgment 8-20-09 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/20/2009 09:00 AM) to renew pits Thomas J Ryan 
revised 2nd motn for partial summ judg 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Amended Notice of Service Re: Discovery (fax) 
Notice of Service Re: Discovery (fax) 
Memorandum in opposition to Pits Motion to renew Pits revised secone 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Counsel in support of Memo in opposition to Pits Motion to Thomas J Ryan 
Renew Pits revised second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Pint's Reply to Defn's Memo Opposing Pint's Motn to Renew Pint's Revised Thomas J Ryan 
Second Motn for Summary Jdmt 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in Suppt of Pint's Motn to Renew Pint's Revised Thomas J Ryan 
Second Motn for Partial Summary Jdmt 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/20/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held to renew pits revised 2nd motn for partial summ judg 
000008 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/20/2009 09:00 AM: Motion Thomas J Ryan 
Granted for mot for Rule 56f relief 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 08/20/2009 09:00 AM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/15/2009 09:00 AM) sum jdmt Thomas J Ryan 
Transcript Filed - motion for partial summary judgment dated August 20, Thomas J Ryan 
2009 
Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs (Randolph E Farber, Scott Alan Becker and Thomas J Ryan 
Critter Clinic) Answer to Defendant State Insurance Funds Second Set of 
Interrogatories 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition Pint's Motn for Partial Summary Thomas J Ryan 
Jdmt, or in the Alternative, Defn's Motn for Summary Jdmt 
Affidavit of Counsel I in Suppt of supplemental Memorandum in Opposition Thomas J Ryan 
to Pint's Motn for Partial Summary Jdmt, or in the Alternative, Defn's Motn 
for Summary Jdmt 
Supplemental Memorandum in support of pltfs motion to renew pltfs 
revised second motion for partial summary judgment 
Motion for Order Shortening Time 
Notice Of Hearing 10-1 5-09 
pltfs Objection to defs motion for order shortening time (fax) 
Affidavit of bruce bistline (fax) 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Notice vacating hearing on defs motion summary judgment (fax0 Thomas J Ryan 
Reply in support of supplemental memorandum in opposition to pltf's Thomas J Ryan 
motion to renew pltfs revised second motion for partial sumamry judgment 
(fax) 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 10/15/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held - under advisement 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 10/15/2009 09:00 AM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference- Status 11/19/2009 09:00 AM) Thomas J Ryan 
Order Setting case for Status Conference 
Memorandum Decision Upon Pit Revised Second Motion for PArtial 
Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Service (fax) 
Plaintiff's third Motion for partial summary judgment 
Affidavit of bvruce bistline in support of motion 
Memorandum in support of motion 
Notice Of Hearing 12/17/2009 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/17/2009 09:00 AM) pltfs motn 
partial sum judg 
Hearing Held 000009 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Date: 12/13/2010 
Time: 04:40 Pl\!1 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Judge 
District Court Hearing Held Thomas J Ryan 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/17/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated pltfs motn partial sum judg 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/04/2010 01 :30 PM) 1/2 day Thomas J Ryan 
Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in Suppt of Motion for Reconsideration and Alternative Motn Thomas J Ryan 
to Bifurcate 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek Thomas J Ryan 
Motion for Leave to File Pint's Second Amended Class Action Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in Suppt of Motn for Leave to File Pint's Second Thomas J Ryan 
Amended Class Action Con plaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
Motion to Amend Memorandum Decision Upon Pint's Revised Second 
l\ilotn for Partial Summary Jdmt 
Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in Suppt of Pin's Motn to Amend Memorandum Thomas J Ryan 
Decision Upon Pint's Revised Second Motn for Partial Summary Jdmt 
Pint's Motion to Amend Class Definition Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in Suppt of Pint's Motn to Amend Class Thomas J Ryan 
Definition 
Notice of Depositon of Persons Identified in INterrogatory #34 Date: Thomas J Ryan 
12-22-09 9:00am 
Notice of Deposition 30(8 )(6) Idaho State Insurance Fund Date: 12-22-09 Thomas J Ryan 
9:00am 
Memorandum in Suppt of Defn's Motn for Summary Jdmt Re: Dividend Thomas J Ryan 
Amounts and Prejudgment Interest 
Affidavit of John Marshall Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Jdmt Re: Dividend Amounts and Thomas J Ryan 
Prejudgment Interest 
Affidavit of Counsel in Suppt of Defendant's Motion for Summary Jdmt Re: Thomas J Ryan 
Dividend Amounts and Prejudgment Interest 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Re: 
Dividend Amounts and Prejudgment Interest 2-4-10 (fax) 
Notice Of Hearing 02/04/2010 
Notice Of Service (fax) 
Amended Notice of Hearing 2-4-10 (fax) 
Amended l'..Jotice Of Taking Deposition of Person(s) Identified in 
Interrogatory No. 34 (John Marshall) (fax) 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition of Person(s) Identified in 
Interrogatory No. 34 (Lahcen Airir) (fax) 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition of Person(s) Identified in 
Interrogatory No. 34 (James Alcorn) (fax) 
Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Idaho State Insurance Fund (fax) 
000010 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Date: 12/13/2010 
Time: 04:40 PM 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Judge 
ISIF's Objection to Amended Notice of Deposition of Person(s) Identified in Thomas J Ryan 
Interrogatory No. 34 John Marshall (fax) 
ISIF's Objection to Amended Notice of Deposition of Person(s) Identified in Thomas J Ryan 
Interrogatory No. 34 Lahcen Airir (fax) 
ISIF's Objection to Amended Notice of Deposition of Person(s) Identified in Thomas J Ryan 
Interrogatory No. 34 James Alcorn (fax) 
ISIF's Objections to Amended Notice of Deposition 30(b)(6) Idaho State Thomas J Ryan 
Insurance Fund (fax) 
Notice vacating amended deposition 
Stipulation for Protective Order RE; Database Information 
Protective Order 
Defn's Opposition to Pltn's Motn to Amend Memo Decision upon Pint's 
Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Jdmt 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Defn's Opposition to Pltn's Motn for Leave to File Pint's Second Amended Thomas J Ryan 
Class Action Comp and Demand for Jury Trial 
Defn's Opposition to Pltn's Motn to Amend Class Definition Thomas J Ryan 
Defn's Opposition to Pltn's Motn for Reconsideration, for Bifurcation of Thomas J Ryan 
Class 
Defn's Memorandum in Opposition to Pint's Third Motn for Partial Summary Thomas J Ryan 
Jdmt 
Defendants' Amended Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (fax) 
Plaintiff's Motion rule 56(f) to continue summary judgment re: dividend Thomas J Ryan 
amounts 
Memorandum in support of motion 
Pltf's Memorandum opposing def's motion for sumamry judgment 
Affidavit of bruce bistline 
Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment Re: Dividend Amounts and Prejudgment Interest 
Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment RE: 
Dividend Amounts and Prejudgment Interest 
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, Pursuant to Rule 56(f), to 
Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings Re: Dividend Amounts 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion, Pursuant to Rule, 56(f), to Continue Summary Judgment 
Proceedings Re: Dividend Amounts 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Third Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Class Thomas J Ryan 
Definition 
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Thomas J Ryan 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Thomas J Ryan 
Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial 
Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline Re: Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Thomas J Ryan 
File Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint 
Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Thomas J Ryan 
for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class 
Notice Of Hearing re: pltf motion continue sumamry judgment 02/04/2010 Thomas J Ryan 
(fax) 
Notice Of Hearing 02/04/2010 (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 03/18/2010 02:00 PM) 1/2 day - Thomas J Ryan 
various motns/defs motn summ judg/pltf motn continue and reset 
Notice vacating hearing and resetting hearing 03/18/2010 (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/04/2010 01 :30 PM) def's various Thomas J Ryan 
motns 
Stipulation for entry of partial summary judgment re: pltf's share of declared Thomas J Ryan 
dividends (fax) 
Notice Of Hearing 2-26-10 Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/26/2010 03:30 PM) Mo for James C. Morfitt 
Reconsideration 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/26/2010 03:30 PM: Hearing James C. Morfitt 
Vacated Mo for Reconsideration-counsel have partially settled this matter 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/04/2010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated defs various motns 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 02/26/2010 03:30 PM) mo to James C. Morfitt 
reconsider 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 02/26/2010 03:30 PM: Motion James C. Morfitt 
Held mo to reconsider (Under Advisement) 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Yvonne Hyde Gier 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Notice vacating motions on 3/18/2010 and rest for 4/23/2010 (fax) 
James C. Morfitt 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 03/18/2010 02:00 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Vacated 1 /2 day - various motns/defs motn summ judg/pltf motn continue 
and reset 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 04/23/2010 01 :30 PM) pltf motn 
amend class def/ amend memo/amend comp 
Notice Of Hearing 04/23/2010 (fax) 
Decision Or Opinion 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
James C. Morfitt 
Memorandum decision and order upon plaintiffs motion for reconsideration James C. Morfitt 
-DENIED 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 04/23/2010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held pltf motn amend class def/ amend memo/amend comp 
0000:12 
Date: 12/13/2010 
Time: 04:40 PM 
udicial District Court - Canyon Coun 
ROA Report 
User: HEIDEMAN 














Case: CV-2006-0007877-C Current Judge: Thomas J Ryan 
Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Other Claims 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearlng estimated: less than 100 
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement 
Statement of Notice Alternatives 
Declaration of Daniel Burke Regarding Claims Administation and 
Qualifications and Procedures 
Stipulation Regarding Excluded Members (Filed Under Seal) 
Document sealed 
Stipulation for Settlement 
Order Preliminarily Approving Settlement and Providing for Note 
Stipulation regarding the Modification of Exhibit E to Stipulation for 
Settlement 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Order Re: Stipulation Regarding the Modification of Exhibit E to Stipulation Thomas J Ryan 
for Settlement 
Class counsel's 1st report to the court (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Class counsel's 2nd report to the court Thomas J Ryan 
application of class counsel for an order fixing the amount of the common Thomas J Ryan 
fund (fax) 
Notice Of Hearing 9/16/2010 (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/16/2010 01 :30 PM) pltf motn fix Thomas J Ryan 
amount common funds 
Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 08/19/2010 11 :00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated per Judge 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/04/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 9 days per Judge 
Declaration of Tricia M Solorzano Re Mailing of Notice 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Joint Declaration of Class Counsel in Support of Final Approval of Class Thomas J Ryan 
Action Settlement, Plan of Allocaflon of Settlement Proceeds, and Award of 
Attorneys Fees and Expenses 
Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in Support of Application for Attorneys Fees Thomas J Ryan 
and Expenses 
Affidavit of Donald W Lojek Relating to Attorneys Fees Thomas J Ryan 
Affidavit of Philip Gordon in Support of Application for Attorneys' Fees and Thomas J Ryan 
Expenses 
Memorandum in Support of Application of Class Counsel 
Supplemental Notice of Service of Documents Related to Application for 
Attorney's Fees and Expenses 
Notice Of Service of Filing of Amended Notice of Objection (fax) 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Amended Notice of Objection to Proposed Settlement and Application for Thomas J Ryan 
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Out of Settlement Proceeds (fax) 
Class counsel's 3rd report to the court (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
00001.3 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Judge 
Reply to amended notice of objection to proposed settlement and Thomas J Ryan 
application for attorney fees to class counsel, and for the award of 
attorneys' fee and costs out of settlement proceeds 
Second Affidavit of Philip Gordon in support of application for attorneys' Thomas J Ryan 
fees and expenses 
Supplemental Affidavit of Donald W Lojek in support of application foe Thomas J Ryan 
attorneys' fees 
Affidavit of R Brent Walton in support of application for attorneys' fees and Thomas J Ryan 
expenses 
Second Affidavit of Bruce S Bistline in support of application for attorneys' Thomas J Ryan 
fees and expenses 
Affidavit of Benjamin A Schwartzman Thomas J Ryan 
Supplemental Affidavit of bruce bistline (fax) Thomas J Ryan 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/16/2010 01:30 PM: Hearing Thomas J Ryan 
Held pltf motn fix amount common funds - under advisement 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 09/16/2010 01 :30 PM: District Thomas J Ryan 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Final judgment and Order of dismissal with prejudice Thomas J Ryan 
Civil Disposition entered for: Alcorn, James M, Defendant; Danielson, Judi, Thomas J Ryan 
Defendant; Deal, William W, Defendant; Geddes, Gerald, Defendant; 
Goedde, John, Defendant; Idaho State Insurance Fund, Defendant; Martin, 
Elaine, Defendant; Mclaughlin, Marguarite, Defendant; Meyer, Wayne, 
Defendant; Snodgrass, Mark, Defendant; Terrell, Milford, Defendant; 
Becker, Scott Alan, Plaintiff; Critter Clinic,, Plaintiff; Farber, Randolph E, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 9/17/2010 
Case Status Changed: Closed Thomas J Ryan 
Order fixing the amount of the common fund which may be applied to the Thomas J Ryan 
payment of fees and awarding sums certain for the reimbursement of 
litigation expenses, the payment of class plaintiff incentive compensation 
and the payment of the final settlement fund administration expenses 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid Thomas J Ryan 
by: Farber, Randolph E (plaintiff) Receipt number: 0063195 Dated: 
10/7/2010 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Becker, Scott Alan (plaintiff), 
Critter Clinic, (plaintiff) and Farber, Randolph E (plaintiff) 
Appellant's Notice of appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Case Status Changed: Reopened 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 63198 Dated 10/7/2010 for 100.00) For 
Clerk's record 
S C - Order Augmenting Appeal 
class counsels 4th report to the court 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
Thomas J Ryan 
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Randolph E Farber, etal. vs. Idaho State Insurance Fund, etal. 
Other Claims 
Application of class counsel for order directing the settlement disribute 
portion of the attys fees awarded to the court 
Judge 
Thomas J Ryan 
Order Directing the settlement administrator to distribute portion of the attys Thomas J Ryan 
fees awarded by the court 
Application of Class Counsel for an Order Directing the settlement Thomas J Ryan 
Administrator to Pay or assure Payment of Immediate & Periodic Future 
PAyment of Atty Fees to Class Counsel 
Order Directing the Settlement Administrator to Pay or Secure Payment of Thomas J Ryan 
Immediate and Periodic Future Payments of Attorney's Fees to Class 
Counsel 
Motion for Order Regarding Erroneous Payments Thomas J Ryan 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Order Regarding Erroneous 
Payments 
00001.5 
Thomas J Ryan 
-
Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W :\.1\.1-461.2\MSJ - Mtn.doc 
Attorneys for Defendants Idaho State Insurance Fund and 
James M. Alcorn, Manager of the State Insurance Fund 
( ~ ----::;-----;-----;--~~7 
F I A.b:$% 
FEB 132007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
p, SALAS, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO ST A TE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7877 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund and James M. Alcorn, Manager of 
the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht 
OEFENBANTS' MOT!Of~ FOR SUMMARY JUOOMEl~'f'- I 
000016 
·J ( ( 
& Blanton, P.A., and hereby move this Court for summary judgment on the grounds that 
plaintiffs lack standing to bring this action and that their claims are time barred. 
This motion is supported by the memorandum and affidavits filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
DATED this ~ay ofFebruary, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
E. Hall- e Firm 
Keely . Duke-Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant, Idaho State Insurance 
Fund 
Dflff!NOAN'l'S' MO'flOM POil ~UMMA'ltt ffl:OOM'fflff- 2 
00001.7 
p ( 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I ~day of February, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices, CHTD 
1199 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701-1712 
Fax No.: (208) 343-5200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Fax No.: (208) 345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 













Richard E. Hall 
ISB #1253; reh@hallfarley.com 
Keely E. Duke 
ISB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com 
_F _1 A.~·~;=9~ 
FEB 132007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS, DEPUTY 
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A. 
702 West Idaho, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 395-8500 
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585 
W:\3\3-461.2\MSJ - Memo I.doc 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
.STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7877 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. Alcorn, Manager of the 
State Insurance Fund, and the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund ("SIF"), by and 





through their counsel of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs filed their "Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial" ("Complaint") 
claiming that the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") had no authority to deny them dividend 
payments, based on annual premiums paid, over the course of the last five years. 1 Plaintiffs seek 
to enjoin the State Insurance Fund defendants ("SIF defendants") from continuing to calculate 
dividends in the present manner and are seeking damages for each year they were a subscriber 
during the class period, which they allege covers a period including 2003 through 2006.2 
The SIP defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the following three 
independent theories: (1) plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this lawsuit because they do 
not have a property interest in the SIF funds; (2) the SIF defendants exercised the authority given 
to them by the Idaho Legislature in determining that during the years 2003 through 2006, 
dividends would not be issued to SIF policyholders who paid premiums of $2,500 or less during 
the respective dividend year; and (3) plaintiffs have waived their claims in this lawsuit by 
continuing to insure themselves with the SIF despite their knowledge that during the years 2003 
through 2006, they were not issued a dividend given that they paid premiums of $2,500 or less 
during each respective dividend year. In the event the Court does not grant the SIP defendants 
summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs' claims, the SIF defendants seek a partial summary 
judgment with respect to plaintiffs' claims for dividends in 2003 because such claims are time 
barred pursuant to Idaho law. 
1 Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, pg. 3. Of note, plaintiffs have not yet certified a class. As 
such, and at the time of the filing of this memorandum, no class exists pursuant to Idaho law. 
zld. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-2 
000020 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
A. The Purpose of the SIF Is to Provide Workers' Compensation Insurance to Idaho 
Employers and to Ensure the Existence of a Solvent Source From Which Workers 
Entitled to Compensation May Collect. 
In 191 7, the Idaho legislature enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme, now codified as 
LC. §§ 72-901 et seq., creating the SIF "for the purpose of insuring employers against liability 
for compensation under this worker's compensation law . . . and of securing to the persons 
entitled thereto the compensation provided by said laws." Idaho Code § 72-901(1). Since its 
enactment, the SIF has fulfilled its public purpose by providing worker's compensation 
insurance coverage to thousands of Idaho employers who have relied on such service being 
available. 3 
While Idaho employers are not required to procure insurance with the SIF, if an employer 
is declined coverage by two private carriers and the SIF, then coverage must be obtained through 
the assigned risk pool.4 In an effort to fulfill one of its principal purposes - providing worker's 
compensation insurance to Idaho employers - the SIF maintains a liberal underwriting policy 
that seeks to insure all Idaho employers, regardless of size, so the majority of Idaho employers 
who could not otherwise obtain coverage through a private carrier could obtain coverage with the 
SIF, and therefore avoid the extra costs associated with acquiring an insurance contract through 
the assigned risk pool, which is the carrier of last resort. 5 
In structuring the SIF, the Legislature determined it should be "created as an independent 
body corporate politic" and derive its financial well-being from "premiums and penalties 
received," "property and securities acquired," and "of interest earned" thereon. Idaho Code § 
3 See Affidavit of Jim Alcorn ("Alcorn Aff."), ~ 13. 
4 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 12. The assigned risk pool insures Idaho employers who cannot otherwise secure worker's 
compensation coverage, but they are generally require~ to pay a thirty percent (30%) higher premium than if they 
were insured through the SIF or a private carrier. See Alcorn Aff., ~ 11. 
5 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 13. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT-3 000021. 
... 
72-901(1). The money generated is deposited with the state treasurer, whom acts as custodian 
for the SIF; however, 11 [t]he money in the fund does not belong to the state ... [the money is held 
by the treasurer] ... for the contributing employers and the beneficiaries of the compensation 
law, and for the payment of the costs of the operation of the fund. 11 State ex rel. Williams v. 
Musgrave, 84 Idaho 77, 84, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). 
Moreover, the SIF is to "be administered without liability on the part of the state." Idaho 
Code § 72-901 (1). Yet, per LC. § 72-901(4), the SIF is subject to the provisions of the Idaho 
insurance code, but is not allowed to be a member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association 
("IIGA"). The IIGA offers security for those insurers who are unable to make payments on a 
claim, and guaranties the payment of insurance benefits in the event that an insurance carrier 
becomes insolvent. 6 However, as directed by statute, this protection does not extend to the SIF. 7 
Unlike 'other insurance carriers which rely on the IIGA to pay benefits in the event of 
insolvency, the SIF must be managed such that is maintains sufficient surplus and reserve totals 
to provide a stable and ongoing source of worker's compensation insurance to Idaho workers. 8 
As a result, it remains even more critical that the SIF's financial integrity remain intact, for if it is 
compromised, the availability of worker's compensation insurance in Idaho would be critically 
jeopardized; this is especially true in light of the fact that the SIF insures 70% of the market, 
including many policyholders who could not obtain coverage from other private insurers whose 
underwriting policies are not as liberal as the SIF.9 
6 See Alcorn Aff., 116. 
7 Idaho Code§ 72-901(4); see also Alcorn Aff., 115. 
8 See Alcorn Aff.,, 1 18. 
9 See Alcorn Aff., 1 19. 




B. The Idaho Legislature Charged the SIF Manager with the Primary Responsibility of 
Conducting the Business and Administration of the SIF. 
The duty to ensure the SIF maintains its financial integrity is left to the board of directors 
and the Manager. Idaho Code §§ 72-901(3), 72-902. In many ways they share a symbiotic 
relationship in that their collective decisions determine whether the SIF is able to fulfill its public 
purpose. 1° For the majority of its existence, the SIF has been directed by a Manager, charged 
with the duty of conducting the business and administration of the SIF. 11 To accomplish these 
demanding tasks, the Manager, by statute, has been granted full power and/ or discretion over a 
number of critical business and administrative decisions involving .the operation of the SIP, 
including, but not limited to, directing the investment of surplus funds generated from premiums 
and interest, the power to sue and to enter into insurance contracts, setting appropriate reserve 
totals to meet unexpected losses, and declaring a dividend should the proper conditions be 
present. See generally Idaho Code §§ 72-901 et seq. 
Despite the extent of power and discretion invested in the Manager, the board of directors 
plays an integral role through its duty to "direct the policies and operations of the state insurance 
fund to assure that [it] is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and 
maintains the public purposes for which [it] was created." Idaho Code § 72-901(3). Although 
this duty is enacted through the decisions and guidance of the Manager, the two entities work in 
conjunction to satisfy the SIP' s purpose as mandated by statute. 12 
C. As Part of His Duties, the Manager Has Been Charged With the Discretion of 
Determining Whether a Dividend Will Be Paid Each Year. 
The SIF surplus fund is considered an asset of the fund and dividends, if any, are paid 
from what the Manager determines to be excess surplus after evaluating a myriad of factors, 
10 See Alcorn Aff:, ,r 19. 
11 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 20. 
12 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 19. 
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including, but not limited to, present and future SIF operating expenses, the required reserves, 
investment income, market forces, and industry trends. 13 The declaration of a dividend is a 
multi-step process that ultimately boils down to determining how much excess surplus is 
available to declare as a dividend, followed by determining how it is to be divided, taking into 
account such factors as the costs associated with writing the insurance contract, and any losses 
that may have been incurred on the insurance contract. 14 
Another important consideration which deserves attention is the marketing effect that a 
dividend will have on retaining good profitable accounts, because it is the large profitable 
accounts that allow the SIF to fulfill its public policy objectives of providing a source of 
insurance for the smaller, less profitable accounts. 15 
D. Policyholders Are Not Entitled to the Payment of a Dividend Each Year. 
Idaho employers who purchase their worker's compensation insurance from the SIF 
receive a contract of insurance which sets forth the parameters of their coverage.16 The contract 
of insurance does not provide for the payment of a dividend to the policyholders. 17 The 
governing statutes for the SIF do not guaranty payments of dividends to policyholders, nor do 
they set forth that the policyholders have a property interest in the surplus or assets of the SIF. 
See generally Idaho Code § 72-901 et seq. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously 
concluded that the SIF's statutory framework does not create any property rights in the SIF's 
policyholders. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 135,997 P.2d 591, 
597 (2000). An SIF policyholder has no vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIF; rather, 
13 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 2 I. 
14 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 24. 
15 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 25. 
16 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 26. 
17 See Affidavit of Donald W. Lojek filed on January 6, 2007, Ex. 1 (State Insurance Fund Workers Compensation 
and Employers Liability Insurance Policy). 
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the assets and surplus belong to the SIF in order to meet its statutory purpose provided in LC. § 
72-901(1). Id. 
E. The SIF Manager Determines Every Year Whether to Pay a Dividend and the 
Amount, If Any, of the Dividend a Policyholder May Receive. 
The SIF, through four different Managers, has issued dividends continuously since at 
least 1982, using essentially the same dividend formula that is currently being implemented, in 
that the dividends returned as a percentage of paid premium have always differentiated by the 
size of the premium; consequently, the SIF has always returned back a larger percentage of paid 
premium to the large premium policyholders, as opposed to the smaller premium policyholders. 18 
One of the reasons for using the premium amount as a basis for determining the rate of return is 
because a dividend is a return of unused premium and a larger policy will have more unused 
premium than a smaller premium policy because the cost associated with writing a policy is the 
same whether the premium amount is, for example, $2,000 or $200,000. 19 Similarly, the SIF 
looks at the losses incurred on a policy and factors that in determining whether a dividend will be 
paid; if a policyholder had more losses than paid premiums in the dividend year, then a dividend 
would not be i~sued to that policyholder.20 Other considerations for issuing larger dividends as a 
percentage of premium size has to do with the fact that worker's compensation rates are 
regulated, and thus are the same for all carriers; because the SIF has a public purpose to provide 
a source of insurance for the small employer, and because private carriers seek to insure only the 
large policyholders, and because the SIF needs the large policyholders to help support the ability 
to continue to insure the small businesses in the state, the SIF has made a business decision to 
give the larger premium policies a larger dividend as percentage of premium in order to help 
18 See Alcorn Aff:, ,r 27. 
19 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 28. 
20 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 29. 
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retain the business of the larger policyholders.21 Providing larger policyholders with a larger 
dividend as a percentage of premiwn is a good business decision and is consistent with insurance 
industry practices, as well as the statutory mandate of LC. § 72-901(3) to run the SIF as an 
efficient insurance company that remains actuarially sound. 22 
F. Based on a Number of Factors, the Manager Determined in 2003 through 2006 that 
a Dividend Would Not Be Paid to Policyholders With Premiums Equal to or Less 
Than $2,500. 
At a November 21, 2002, SIP board meeting, the Manager at the time, Mr. Jim Alcorn, 
expressed to the SIP Board his decision that dividends payable in January 2003 on contracts of 
insurance with inception dates between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002, would only be paid to 
those policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiwns.23 This determination was made in 
the interest of retaining a strong surplus and reserve.24 At the December 10, 2003 board meeting, 
the board of directors did not object to Mr. Alcom's decision that the same dividend formula .. 
would be followed as the previous year and dividends, payable in January of 2004 on contracts 
of insurance with inception dates between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003, would be paid to 
policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiwns.25 At the October 20, 2004, board 
meeting, it was decided that the same dividend formula would be followed as the previous year 
and dividends, payable in January of 2005 on contracts of insurance with inception dates 
between July 1, 2002 and June 30, 2003, would be paid to policyholders paying over $2,500 per 
year in premiwns.26 At the December 21, 2005, board meeting, it was decided that the dividend 
formula would be followed as the previous year and dividends, payable in January of 2006 on 
21 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 29. 
22 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 32. 
23 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. A (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of November 21, 2002 special 
meeting), CL0028 and 0029. 
24 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 14. 
25 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. B (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of December 10, 2003 ), CL 0025. 
26 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. C (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of October 20, 2004), CL 0014. 
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contracts of insurance with inception dates between July 1, 2003 and June 30, 2004, would be 
paid to policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiums.27 
Each of the named plaintiffs purchased worker's compensation coverage from the SIF 
fund with inception dates between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2004.28 None of the plaintiffs have 
paid premiums. over $2,500 on their contracts for insurance for the contract years of July 1, 2001 
to June 30, 2002; July 1, 2002 to June 30, 2003; or July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004, except Critter 
Clinic which paid premiums in excess of $2,500 for the policy year with an inception date July 1, 
2003 to June 30, 2004.29 Since plaintiffs did not pay premiums over $2,500 per year they were 
not offered a dividend.30 The plaintiffs were each sent a letter stating they would not be 
receiving a dividend based on the amount of premium they paid.31 Plaintiffs have renewed their 
existing contracts for insurance and paid their respective premiums even though they had not 
been offered a dividend the prior year.32 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Marchand v. JEM Sportswear, 
Inc., 143 Idaho 458, 147 P.3d 90 (2006). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to 
the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary judgment. Id. The 
non-moving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with specific facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, 
27 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. D (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of December 21, 2005), CL 0007. 
28 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 3 7. 
29 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 38. 
30 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 39. 
31 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 40. 
32 Id. 
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then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 
Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996). Summary judgment is properly granted in 
favor of the moving party when the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Id 
In situations where both parties have filed for summary judgment, the standard of review 
is not affected. Treasure Valley v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 489, 20 P.3d 21, 15 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Rather, each motion must be separately considered on its own merits, with the court drawing 
reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. Id. 
A. 
ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that SIF policyholders do not have a property 
interest in the SIF's surplus and assets; therefore, plaintiffs' complaint must be 
dismissed for lack of standing since they do not have a property interest in the 
dividends they seek. 
Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the 
merits of the case. Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, _, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). To 
establish standing to bring suit, the complaining party must allege injury to a property right or a 
civil right. Fleenor v. Darby School Dist., 128 P.3d 1048, 1050 (Mont. 2006); Adam v. City of 
Hastings, 676 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Neb. 2004) (holding that "[s]tanding is the legal or equitable 
right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy which entitles a party to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court."). 
1. According to Kelso. Policyholders Do Not Have a Property Right in the SIF's Assets. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Kelso v. State Ins. Fund conducted a painstaking analysis to 
determine whether a policyholder had a vested right in the surplus and assets of the SIF. 134 
Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000). Kelso, a policyholder of the SIF, brought an action against the 
SIF to "return all monies to the policy holders held by SIF under the designation of 'surplus as 
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regards policyholder' in excess of the six million dollars of reserves and surpluses' ... and an 
accounting and recovery of assets squandered by the SIF through invalid and illegal use of the 
monies in the surplus." Id. at 133, 997 P.2d at 594. Kelso's main arguments in support of 
having a property interest were that 1) the SIF was a mutual insurance company, and 2) the 
statutory framework provided policyholders with a property interest in the SIF's assets. Id. The 
court's detailed analysis included a discussion on why the SIF was not a mutual insurance 
company and interpreted the statutory provisions governing the SIF to find no property right of 
the policyholders in the SIF's assets.33 The court's ultimate holding was that Kelso had no 
property right in the surplus or assets of the SIF sufficient to support a claim for relief. Id. 
a. The SIF is not a mutual insurance company; therefore policyholders do 
not have a property right in the SIF's assets. 
Preliminarily, the fund of the SIF consists of all premiums and penalties received and 
paid into the fund and the property and securities acquired by and through the use of the monies 
in the fund and are considered its assets. Id. at 135 n. 3, 997 P.2d at 596, n. 3, 597. 
In its discussion of the differences between a mutual insurance company and the SIF, the 
Kelso court identified some of the similarities, but found that even with some similarities the 
differences were "far more significant." Id. at 134, 997 P.2d at 595. The SIF board of directors 
is appointed by the Governor, the board of directors of a mutual insurance company is elected by 
the policyholders. Id. The SIF is not required to hold annual meetings as is a mutual insurance 
company, but "the most compelling argument against a finding the SIF is a mutual insurance 
carrier is that the Idaho legislature chose not to give policyholders of the SIF the same rights as 
policyholders of mutual insurers." Id. The SIF's statutes 
33 Since any dividend offered to policyholders is paid from the surplus, it is reasonable and logical that a dividend is 
part of the SIF' s assets until the policyholder receives it. 
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do not allow SIF's policyholders to vote for the board of directors or on any other issue, 
and nowhere does it provide the SIF is "owned by and shall be operate in the interest of 
its member." Therefore, while the legislature obviously intended the SIF to operate like a 
mutual insurance company, it must not have intended the SIF to be "owned" by its 
policyholders in the same way a private mutual insurance company is owned by its 
policyholders. Consequently, Kelso does not have vested property interest in the assets 
of the SIF simply because the SIF operates much like a private mutual insurance 
company. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
While plaintiffs are not suggesting they are due a dividend by virtue of the SIF being a 
mutual insurance company, the court's analysis in Kelso is instructive because it addresses the 
expectations of the policyholder. By the language in their complaint, plaintiffs infer that they are 
entitled to a dividend any time the SIF determines that dividends will be issued, as if they were 
"owners" of the SIF. Policyholders are not "owners" in the SIF and are not entitled to the 
surplus or assets, as the Kelso court enunciated. 
b. The statutory structure of the SIF does not create a property interest; 
therefore there is no right to the SIF's assets. 
Any property rights a policyholder might possess must be found either in the insurance 
contract itself or in the statutory framework of the SIF. Id. at 135, 997 P.2d at 596. The Kelso 
court found that the SIF's statutory framework does not grant policyholders a property right in 
the SIF's assets or surplus. Id. at 136, 139, 997 P.2d at 597, 600. Kelso did not allege any 
property rights had arisen from the insurance policy. Id at 135, 997 P.2d at 596. Likewise, 
plaintiffs in the present case have not alleged that a property right exists in their respective 
insurance policies. The reason no such allegations are made is because the insurance policies in 
question do not grant policyholders a property right in the SIF's assets or surplus, nor does the 
policy make any mention of dividends to policyholders. 
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Kelso' s claims and the claims of the plaintiffs herein are quite similar and, as such, 
emphasizes the holding in Kelso. Kelso was asking that the SIF return to the policyholders all 
monies over a $6 million surplus. Here, plaintiffs are asking that the SIF return them a dividend 
from the surplus. The plaintiffs in both cases are asking for money from the surplus. However, 
plaintiffs have not demonstrated, nor can they demonstrate, because of the holding in Kelso and 
the absence of a statutory or contractual right, that they have a property interest in any dividend 
offered by the SIF. Without a property interest in that which a party claims to have been denied, 
there is no standing and plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed against the SIF. 
2. Plaintiffs Cannot Bring a Statutory Violation Claim Without Standing to Bring 
the Action. 
The failure to have a right or interest in an alleged claim was also the basis of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in Troutner v. Kempthorne when it determined that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring a statutory violation claim against the Judicial Council. Troutner, at _, 128 
P.3d at 929. Plaintiffs, who were Democrats, claimed they and other Democrats were denied the 
chance to serve on the Judicial Council because the Governor appointed a Republican, which, 
according to plaintiffs, violated the council's governing statute. Id. However, as the court 
pointed out, "nobody has a right to be considered for such position" and even if the appointee 
were removed, there was no requirement that the Governor consider plaintiffs or any other 
Democrat for the position. Id. The reasoning used to support the court's holding that plaintiffs' 
lacked standing was the fact that the governing statute does not require that membership on the 
council include persons from any particular political party, and, thus, plaintiffs did not have any 
right to have a 'member of their political party appointed. Id. 
The facts of the present case are quite analogous to the facts in Troutner. Plaintiffs here 
are claiming that the SIF manager violated Idaho Code § 72-915 when he did not offer plaintiffs 
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a dividend from the SIF's surplus. The plaintiffs in Troutner, in essence, claimed that the 
Governor abused his discretion when he appointed a Republican to the Judicial Council, denying 
them an opportunity to serve on the council. Part of the rationale behind the court's finding was 
that the Governor, in his discretion, could appoint someone from any political party, or he could 
appoint someone who had no party affiliation at all, which did not guaranty plaintiffs, or any 
Democrat, an appointment to the Judicial Council.. Id. at_, 128 P.3d at 929. 
Here, plaintiffs are claiming that the SIF manager abused his discretion when he 
determined that only policyholders paying more than $2,500 in premiums would receive a 
dividend and · policyholders paying less than $2,500, such as plaintiffs, were denied an 
opportunity to receive a dividend. The statute in the present case is also analogous to the statute 
in Troutner. Although the subject matter of the two statutes is different, the overall gist of the 
two statutes is the same - the statute does not confer a right upon plaintiffs. The Troutner 
plaintiffs had no right to be members on the Judicial Council and plaintiffs in this case do not 
have a right to be offered a dividend from the SIP. 
Since plaintiffs have no property right in the surplus of the fund, they cannot prove that 
they have a right or a guaranty to a dividend if the SIF used different criteria when determining 
the dividend. As set forth above, the formulation for the dividend is determined every year by 
the Manager and is based on what was in the best interest of the fund and what would keep the 
fund's surplus and reserves strong. This in tum benefits all policyholders. Many factors go into 
determining what is in the best interest of the fund and how to keep the fund and the 
policyholders protected. Changing any part of the calculus could yield a variety of results in 
determining which policyholders receive a dividend and, therefore, no guaranty can be given to 
plaintiffs that they will receive a dividend. 
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The Troutner court found that the relief requested by plaintiffs, if granted, would not 
necessarily get them a seat on the council. In this case, plaintiffs cannot show that a grant of the 
relief they have requested will get them a dividend. 
Recall that in determining whether a party has standing the focus is on the party seeking 
relief, not on the merits of the case. Id. at_, 128 P.3d at 928. The focus for standing in the 
instant case is not whether the manager had discretion to formulate the dividend as he did, but 
whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring their claim in the first place. Plaintiffs do not have 
a property right in the SIF's surplus and without such a right they have no injury to be remedied 
by this Court. Plaintiffs' claim is nothing more than a hope for a dividend and is no different 
than a person who cries foul because he/she did not receive a gift when others did. There is no 
right in receiving a gift, only a hope that a gift will be given. However, unlike the person who 
fails to receive a gift, plaintiffs are not without a remedy. Their remedy is through the political 
process wherein the governing statutes could be amended to provide policyholders a property 
right in the surplus funds. Plaintiffs must have more than a hope of receiving a dividend to 
confer standing; they must have a property right, which the Kelso court determined non-existent. 
And, without a property right, there can be no standing to bring a claim for relief. 
Without a property interest in the SIF' s assets or surplus, plaintiffs do not have standing 
to bring their claims. As both the Montana and Nebraska Supreme Court's pointed out, standing 
is based on having a legal right or interest in the subject matter of the action. Here, because of 
the unequivocal holding from Kelso and the supportive holding in Troutner, the SIF defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in its entirety and plaintiffs' claims dismissed. 
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B. In the event the Court rules that plaintiffs have standing to bring this lawsuit, the 
SIF defendants are nevertheless entitled to an award of summary judgment as to all 
of plaintiffs' claims because the SIF Manager exercised his statutory authority in 
issuing dividends and deciding who would receive those dividends. 
1. Title 72, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code grants the Manager of the State Insurance 
Fund discretionary authority to issue dividends as he deems may be "safely and 
properly divided." 
The Idaho legislature granted the Manager the discretionary authority to issue dividends 
as he deems may be "safely and properly divided": 
At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in his discretion 
may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of the several 
classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an aggregate balance 
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry which the manager 
deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his discretion, credit to each 
individual member of such class who shall have been a subscriber to the state 
insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such 
readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having 
regard ~o his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates. 
Idaho Code§ 72-915 (emphasis added). When referencing the power of the Manager, the statute 
makes repeated reference to the term "discretion," which the Idaho Supreme Court has 
embraced: "since 1919 the Manager has had the authority to set surplus and reserves without 
outside approval and to declare dividends in his discretion." Hayden Lake Fire Prof. Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388,392, 111 P.3d 73, 77 (2005) (emphasis added).34 
Plaintiffs assert that Idaho Code Section 72-915 should be read in a vacuum with no 
regard to the other statutes contained within Title 72, Chapter 9 and, therefore, request that this 
Court enjoin the SIF, its Manager, and its Board of Directors from exercising the very discretion 
34 Although the Legislature amended the SIF statutes most recently in 1998 to, among other things, create a board of 
directors to appoint a manager of the SIF, in general, the Legislature left the Manager's power and discretion intact, 
including the authority to set reserve and surplus levels and to declare dividends. Id. See also Affidavit of Michael 
Camilleri ("Camilleri Aff."), ,r 11. 
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provided to it by the Legislature in Title 72, Chapter 9 of the Idaho Code. As discussed below, 
plaintiffs' argument fails. It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that statutes 
should not be construed to render other provisions meaningless. Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 
165, 166, 765 P .2d 676, 677 (1988). In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court has previously 
rejected plaintiffs' argument that one statute should be read in a vacuum by holding that 
"statutory ... provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the 
entire document. Id. at 166, 765 P.2d at 677 (citing Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 757 
P.2d 664 (1988)); see also Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474,476, 725 P.2d 179, 181 (1986) 
("Statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence."). 
Second, if adopted, plaintiffs' argument would undermine the authority and discretion the 
Idaho Legislature granted to the SIF, the Manager, and the Board of Directors in order for the 
SIF to be run as an efficient insurance company that is actuarially sound. See generally LC. § 
72-901(3). In reading Title 72, Chapter 9 of the Idaho in its entirety, the SIF Manager has the 
discretion to handle the day-to-day operations of the SIF. In the instant matter, of particular 
significance is LC. § 72-901(3), which states: 
It shall be the duty of the board of directors to direct the policies and operation of 
the state insurance fund to assure that the state insurance fund is run as an 
efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public 
purposes for which the state insurance fund was created. 
Idaho Code § 72-901(3).35 Although LC. § 72-901(3) focuses on the duty of the board of 
directors, several other statutes direct how the Board will effectuate the policy quoted above, 
along with the SIF's Manager's power and discretion in the related areas of surplus, reserves, 
premiums, or dividends. As the Court noted in Rivera v. Johnston, 71 Idaho 70, 75, 225 P.2d 
35 Camilleri Aff., ,r 11. 
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858, 862 (1951), "Sections 72-901, 902, 903, 904, and 909 give the State Insurance Fund 
Manager complete power over the Fund and settlements thereby."36 
Beginning with I.C. § 72-902, the Idaho Legislature required that the SIF Board of 
Directors appoint a manager of the fund. The statute goes on to provide that it is the SIF 
Manager's duty "to conduct the business of the state insurance fund and do any and all things 
which are necessary and convenient in the administration thereof, or in connection with the 
insurance business to be carried on .... " LC. § 72-902.37 Idaho Code Section 72-903 gives the 
Manager ''full power to determine the rates to be charged for insurance in said fund, and to 
conduct all business in relation thereto, .... " while LC. § 72-913 gives the Manager the ''power 
to rearrange any of the classes by withdrawing any employment embraced in it and transferring it 
wholly or in part to any other class, and from such employments to set up new classes in his 
discretion." (emphasis added).38 LC. § 72-914 directs the Manager to account for "the setting 
up of reserves adequate to meet anticipated and unexpected losses and to carry the claims to 
maturity." Finally, LC. § 72-915 gives the Manager discretion to declare a dividend if he deems 
it may be safely and properly divided. 
The many references to power and discretion provided by the Legislature throughout the 
statutory framework of the SIF cannot be ignored, as plaintiffs are attempting to do. The SIF, 
like any creature of statute, has only the powers and attributes given to it by statute and no 
others: "An administrative agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority 
granted it by the Legislature and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or 
36 While these statutes have been amended since that time, in general, the Manager's authority with respect to setting 
surplus and reserve levels and declaring dividends has not been affected. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho 392, 111 P.3d at 
77. 
37 Camilleri Aff., 1 11. 
38 In 1961, the Idaho Legislature adopted LC. § 41-1618, which states that the powers granted to the state insurance 
manager, under LC. §§ 72-903 and 72-913 are subject to the provisions set forth in Title 41, Chapter 16. This 
essentially determined that the SIF's rates be regulated by the Department of Insurance which approves worker's 
compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an authorized rating organization. Alcorn Aff., 1 8. 
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enlarge the legislative act which it administers." Roberts v. Transportation Dep't, 121 Idaho 
727,732, 827 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Ct. App. 1991), affd, 121 Idaho 723, 827 P.2d 1174 (1992). 
Roberts elaborated: 
[W]here, as here, the legislature enacts a statute requiring that an administrative 
agency carry out specific functions, . . . that agency cannot validly subvert the 
legislation by promulgating contradictory rules. An administrative agency is 
limited to the power and authority granted it by the legislature. Such delegated 
authority is primary and exclusive in the absence of a clearly manifested 
expression to the contrary. An agency must exercise any authority granted by 
statute within the framework of that statutory grant. It may not exercise its sub-
legislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish the provisions of the 
legislative act which is being administered. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Per Roberts, the SIF defendants had (and have) the authority to act in the manner the SIF 
did with respect to its dividend practices especially in light of the fact that LC. § 72-901 was 
amended in 1998 to provide a clear mandate to the board of directors. The Legislature clearly 
delegated authority to the board of directors, which is "primary and exclusive in the absence of a 
clearly manifested expression to the contrary." Id. And if the Legislature wanted to curtail the 
Manager's power or discretion in the areas of dividend and surplus practices it could have easily 
accomplished the task. As indicated in footnote 38 above, the Legislature limited the Manager's 
power to determine the rates to be charged for insurance contracts by mandating the SIF's rates 
be regulated by the Department of Insurance, which approves worker's compensation rates based 
upon the rate filings of an authorized rating organization. 39 The foregoing provides a clear 
indication of the fact that when the Legislature wants to limit the power and discretion of the 
SIF, it will do so statutorily. 
By not limiting the Manager's discretion, and in a number of instances directing the SIF 
Manager to exercise his discretion regarding the level of surplus and reserves and whether a 
39 Idaho Code§ 41-1618; see also Alcorn Aff., ,r 8. 
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dividend would be declared, the Legislature impliedly granted the Manager, through the board of 
directors, the authority and responsibility for making the following determinations in order to 
carry out the SIF's purpose: (1) the amount of excess surplus to be distributed, (2) how to 
distribute the dividend after it is declared, (3) how the dividend is calculated, and (4) which 
policyholders are entitled to receive the dividend and which ones are not. LC. §§ 72-901, 72-
902, 72-903, 72-904, 72-909, 72-913, 72-914, and 72-915. By doing so, the Legislature left the 
day-to-day administrative operations to the SIF Manager who is appointed by the board of 
directors. 
Despite the day-to-day administrative operations being within the discretion of the SIF 
Manager, in the past, like here, courts have been asked to supersede the SIF Manager's authority 
and the lower court and Idaho Supreme Court have refused to do so. See Hayden Lake Fire Prof. 
Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005). In Hayden Lake, the district court judge, 
Judge Judd, judiciously declined to substitute his decision-making for the Manager and board of 
directors, commenting that even though the SIF was conservatively managed, that style of 
management was well within the outer boundaries of the manager's discretion and reasonable 
business judgment of the directors, and also complied with the statutorily mandated duties of the 
manager. 141 Idaho at 401, 111 P.3d 86. With respect to the SIF's dividend and surplus practice 
Judge Judd wrote: 
This is particularly true in light of the financial difficulties, including outright 
insolvency, of some private workers' compensation insurers and state workers' 
compensation funds. This conclusion is not changed by evidence that the 
processes by which these decisions were reached may have been somewhat 
deficient. 
Id. As is illustrated in Hayden Lake, the SIF, through its Manager, must ensure the maintenance 
of a solvent fund. 
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As discussed above, in addition to the discretion granted to the SIF Manager by LC. § 72-
915, the remainder of Title 72, Chapter 9 grants the SIF Manager the authority to issue dividends 
as he deems may be safely and properly divided, including the discretion to determine the 
amount of and recipients of such dividends. 
2. As public officials, the Manager and Board of Directors are entitled to the 
presumption of regularity and the plaintiffs are unable to meet their burden in 
showing the decision to exclude certain policyholders from receiving dividends is 
grossly unfair. 
In Hayden Lake, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that the 
presumption of regularity applied to the actions taken by the SIF. 141 Idaho 388,403, 111 P.3d 
73, 88 (2005). Although the presumption of regularity in Hayden Lake applied in the context of 
real estate transactions, there is no reason to indicate that it would not apply to the actions of the 
Manager and/or board of directors taken in connection with the SIF's surplus and dividend 
practices. 
"There is in Idaho, as in most states, a presumption of regularity in the performance of 
official duties by public officers." Id. (citing Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 
793, 605 P.2d 968, 971 (1980)); see also Horner v. Ponderosa Pine Logging, 107 Idaho 1111, 
1114, 695 P.2d 1250, 1253 (1985) (a presumption that the Industrial Commission did its duty 
and informed itself of the facts in reaching its decision); Meservey v. Gulliford, 14 Idaho 133, 
137, 93 P. 780, 784 (1908) (a presumption that public officers act within their authority until the 
contrary is shown concerning the appointment by the Board of County Commissioners where the 
court states "it is, moreover, a rule of procedure that the burden of proving unlawful or irregular 
conduct rests upon him who asserts it, since there is no presumption of official irregularity ... In 
the absence of an affirmative showing, it will be presumed that the officers were in the rightful 
performance of duty and that the conditions existed which authorized them to act as they did"). 
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Due to the presumption of regularity, the burden is on the plaintiffs to show that the 
decision to exclude policyholders of $2,500 or less from receiving a dividend was grossly unfair. 
It is not SIP defendants' burden to prove to this Court that the decision was at all prejudicial. 
This is especially true in light of the fact that the decision was made for the benefit of the SIF as 
a whole. The Manager (a state employee) and the board of directors have no personal stake in 
the excess surplus; they are deriving no personal benefit from maintaining a financially sound 
and secure SIF. Rather, they are simply fulfilling their obligations as mandated by the statutory 
framework of the SIP. 
Moreover, the SIF, through four different managers, has issued dividends continuously 
since at least 1982 using essentially the same dividend formula as is used presently, in that the 
dividends returned as a percentage of paid premium have always differentiated by the size of the 
premium, such that the SIP has always returned back a larger percentage of paid premium to the 
large policy holders as opposed to the smaller sized policyholder. 40 And since 1982, this policy 
has not been challenged. Mr. Alcorn has simply changed the threshold for receiving a dividend 
based on the amount of dollars available for a dividend, which has been supported by the board 
of directors as being in the best interests of the SIP. Accordingly, it is the plaintiffs' burden to 
show that this new policy is grossly unfair keeping in mind the overall purpose of the SIF. 
3. Discretionary decisions made by the Manager under this authority are subject to 
the abuse of discretion standard of review. 
When reviewing the actions of the Manager pertaining to the SIF's surplus and dividend 
practices, the abuse of discretion standard has been determined to be the appropriate standard of 
review. In fact, recent Idaho case law involving the State Insurance Fund supports this finding. 
In Hayden Lake, prior to analyzing the district court's decision, the Idaho Supreme Court 
40 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 27. 
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outlined its authority to review the matter: "[t]his Court has free review over the construction of 
a statute ... which includes whether a statute provides for judicial review, and the standard or 
review to be applied if judicial review is available. 141 Idaho 3 88, 400, 111 P .3d 78, 85 (2005) 
(citing Waters Garbage v. Shoshone County, 138 Idaho 648, 650 67 P.3d 1260, 1262 (2003)). 
"This Court also has free review over the district court's determination that the SIF's Manager 
did not abuse his discretion." Id. (citing Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 
1049, 1056 (2003)). The foregoing is important because it stands for the proposition that where 
judicial review is appropriate, the court has the ability to determine the appropriate standard of 
review to be applied. 
In Hayden Lake, the Court determined that the district court's decision to implement the 
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the SIF's dividend related policies was appropriate 
"considering the fact that the challenged decisions of the Manager and Directors were 
discretionary." Id. at 400, 111 P.3d at 85. The Court agreed with the district court's assessment 
that although Idaho's Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA) did not apply to the SIF, the Act's 
"judicial review provisions 'enunciate a sound standard' to review the SIF's Managers' and 
Directors' actions." Id. In particular, the Court referenced Idaho Code § 67-5279, which states 
that agency action should be confirmed "unless the court finds that the action was: ... (d) 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion .. " Id. Despite having the opportunity to analyze 
the Manager's actions regarding the management and issuance of dividends under either an 
arbitrary or capricious standard, the opinion is noticeably silent as to both standards. And the 
Court followed suit by confirming the district court's application of the abuse of discretion 
. standard as being the appropriate standard of review, while dismissing HLFPD's argument that 
the business judgment rule should be applied to evaluate the decisions made by the Manager or 
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the Board of Directors. Id. at 400-01, 111 P .3d at 85-86. The Court noted that the SIF is not a 
private corporation, and thus "its Managers and Directors are entitled to the higher level of 
deference afforded by the abuse of discretion standard." Id. at 401, 111 P.3d at 86. 
The SIF understands the validity of any discretionary decision exercised by the Manager 
is subject to judicial review. However, once the validity of a decision based on the Manager's 
discretion is called into question, the SIF argues-per Hayden Lake-the appropriate standard of 
review is the abuse of discretion standard. 
4. Based on the presumption of regularity and the abuse of discretion standard. the 
Manager did not abuse his discretion in deciding to not provide policyholders of 
$2,500 or less from receiving a dividend in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.41 
The Manager did not abuse his discretion because the decision of precluding 
policyholders of $2,500 or less from receiving a dividend is entitled to the presumption of 
regularity and was not an abuse of discretion. 
In determining whether an act or decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, this Court 
must ask (1) whether the issue is correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether 
the decision was within the outer boundaries of the discretion provided and consistent with 
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the decision was reached by an exercise of reason. 
See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991); 
Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'/ Med Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001); Selkirk Seed Co. v. 
Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 996 P.2d 798 (2000). "Discretion" denotes wise conduct and 
management, as well as the power of free decision-making. Black's Law Dictionary 499 (8th ed. 
2004). 
As discussed throughout this memorandum, the decision to preclude policyholders who 
have paid annual premiums of $2,500 or less from receiving a dividend was well within the 
41 see also Camilleri Aff., ,r,r 1-14. 
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statutorily mandated discretion of the SIF Manager. Dividends, if any, are paid from what the 
SIF Manager determines to be excess surplus after taking into consideration a multitude of 
factors, including present and future SIF operating expenses, the required reserves, investment 
income, market forces, industry trends and other additional factors which are relevant.42 The 
determination as to whether a dividend may be safely and properly declared, the amount of such 
dividend, and which policyholders will receive a dividend is not an exact science, but rather is a 
decision-making process that is based upon experience and knowledge of the insurance business, 
industry trends, and market forces. 43 The declaration of a dividend is a multi-step process that 
ultimately boils down to determining how much surplus is safely available to be declared as a 
dividend, followed by determining how it is to be divided, taking into account such factors as the 
costs associated with writing the policy, and any losses that may have been incurred on the 
1. 44 po icy. 
Another important consideration is the marketing effect that a dividend will have on 
retaining larger, more profitable accounts, because these accounts allow the SIF to fulfill its 
public policy ·objectives of providing a source of insurance for the smaller, less profitable 
accounts. 45 Using the premium amount as a basis for determining the rate of return is 
appropriate because a dividend is a return of unused premium, and a larger policy will have more 
unused premium than a smaller premium policy because the cost associated with writing a policy 
is the same whether the premium amount is $2,000 or $200,000.46 
Moreover, worker's compensation rates are regulated and thus are the same for all 
carriers. See Idaho Code§ 41-1618. As a result, the SIF must implement certain policies to help 
42 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 21; see also Camilleri Aff., ,r 13. 
43 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 23; see also Camilleri Aff., ,r 13. 
44 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 24; see also Camilleri Aff., ,r 13. 
45 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 25. 
46 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 27. 




retain the business of the larger policyholders, and one of these business related decisions was to 
provide the larger premium policies a larger dividend as a percentage of the premium. 47 
Providing larger policyholders with a larger dividend as a percentage of premium is a good 
business decision and is consistent with insurance industry practices, as well as the statutory 
mandate of LC. § 72-901(3) to run the SIF as an efficient insurance company that remains 
actuarially sound. 48 
This argument is further supported by the following example. Assume policy holder A 
has a $2,500 premium insurance rate, but has $100,000 in losses on its worker's compensation 
coverage during the period in which the SIF Manager deems the aggregate balance remaining 
may be safely and properly divided. Under plaintiffs' confined interpretation of I.C. § 72-915 
and Title 72, Chapter 9, policy holder A would be entitled to share in the dividend pool along 
with the remaining policy holders. Surely the Legislature did not intend for this to occur as it 
would run contrary to the purpose of the SIF. It is clear that policyholder A should not be able to 
share in the dividend pool when he or she is being subsidized by the remaining policyholders. 
Such a policy would threaten the solvency of the SIF. 
In addition, it is significant that the Idaho Supreme Court determined that SIF is not a 
mutual insurance carrier in the Kelso case. 134 Idaho 130, 134--35, 997 P.2d 591, 595-96 
(2000). Whereas a mutual insurance carrier may assess a policyholder whose premiums do not 
cover its losses, the SIF steers clear of this approach by covering the losses of such 
policyholders. See id. Moreover, worker's compensation coverage is a unique form of insurance 
in that it provides unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the premium size.49 The 
47 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 29. 
48 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 32. 
49 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 34. 
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SIF provides a $2,500 policyholder with the same amount of upper coverage as a $500,000 
policyholder.50 But either policy can have extensive losses well above their premium amounts. 
The Legislature afforded the SIF Manager discretion to counteract these precise 
illustrations. The SIF Manager must be given discretion to exclude a policyholder whose losses 
exceed its premium amount. And although LC. § 72-915 does not explicitly provide this 
authority, it can be indirectly inferred as being one of sound policy. As previously stated, the 
board of directors, through the SIF Manager, is under a duty to run the fund like an efficient 
insurance company that remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purpose. Allowing a 
policyholder to receive a dividend under the circumstances outlined above would be a violation 
of that duty. And this same rationale applies across the board, whether the policy holder has a 
$2,000 premium, or a $500,000 premium. Consequently, the decision to give dividends pursuant 
to a formula that excluded smaller policyholders during the policy years in question was made 
after considering and weighing all of the factors set froth above, and was consistent with the law 
and industry practice, and was done with the knowledge of the board of directors. 
Although the SIF Manager, in his discretion, ultimately determined the best course of 
action for the SIF is to exclude policy holders with annual premiums of $2,500 or less from 
receiving a dividend, this policy was not implemented in isolation; rather, there was no objection 
by the board of directors. The duty of the board of directors is clear. It must assure that the SIF 
is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound, and maintains the public 
purposes for which it was created. Id. Yet, these duties can sometimes be at odds with one 
another. Being an efficient insurance company that is actuarially sound does not always comport 
with the public purpose of the fund. As a result, the SIF is forced to make difficult decisions 
50 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 34. 
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within the power and discretion provided by the Legislature in order to strike a balance between 
these duties. 
Recall that the SIF is not a monopolistic state fund, but rather must compete for business 
against private worker's compensation insurance carriers. 51 As a competitor in the private 
marketplace, the SIF is under constant barrage from more agile, less restricted competitors 
seeking to lure away its best clients. 52 These private companies have the luxury of tailoring their 
business practices in such a way to attract the best clients in the market, whereas the SIF is less 
flexible in that it exists to maintain the public purpose of providing affordable worker's 
compensation insurance coverage to Idaho employers. The private competitors of the SIF are 
not bound by the same public purpose, and as a result, are able to "cherry-pick" the prime 
candidates from the SIF's roster of policyholders. 
The SIF serves a "public purpose" but not a "governmental purpose." State ex rel. 
Williams v. Musgrave, 84 Idaho 87, 85, 370 P.2d 778, 782 (1962). Mr. Alcorn referenced this 
fact when noting that while private companies are picking only the best accounts, the SIP 
continued to write as many employers as it can. 53 Chairman Bill Deal reiterated this theme by 
commenting to the board of directors that if the SIF is taking accounts no other insurance 
company will take, the losses will increase due to those smaller companies being added to the 
SIF's base. 54 Moreover, a policyholder with a premium of $2,500 could have equal or greater 
losses than a policyholder with a premium of $100,000.55 There is nothing to insulate the SIP 
51 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 10. 
52 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 29. 
53 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. E (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of January 22, 2004), CL 0021. 
54 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. A, CL 0029. 
55 See Alcorn Aff., ~ 33. 
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should this occur; consequently, the SIF needs the larger policyholders to absorb the losses 
generated by lower premium contributors. 56 
Mr. Alcom's discretionary authority to exclude policyholders whose annual premiums 
are $2,500 or less is also supported by the Idaho Attorney General's office. In 2003, David 
High, Chief of the Civil Litigation Division, wrote a letter to an SIF policyholder who was upset 
after learning of the SIF's newly fashioned policy to exclude policyholders whose annual 
premium charges were below $2,500 from receiving a dividend. 57 Mr. High's letter discusses 
the SIF's prior dividend practices, and specifically its decision to reduce a large surplus that had 
accumulated over the course of the l 990's. 58 Due to the surplus being reduced, the SIF 
established new criteria for the receipt of a dividend, including the decision to exclude 
policyholders whose premiums were below $2,500.59 In discussing the validity of this decision, 
Mr. High wrote: "It appears the actions taken by the State Insurance Fund with respect to its 
issuance of dividends are within the Manager's discretion."60 This letter supports SIF 
defendants' position that decisions related to the issuance of dividends is within the SIF 
Manager's discretionary authority. 
In operating in such a manner, the SIF is able to maintain the public purpose for which it 
was created. However, it also runs the risk of losing larger, more attractive policy holders whose 
larger premium totals have a greater impact in maintaining the financial integrity of the SIF. The 
decision to return larger dividends to those policy holders who pay larger premium totals is one 
of the tools available to the SIF to maintain its purpose. 61 It is a discretionary decision well 
56 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 33. 




60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 See Alcorn Aff., ,r 29. 
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within the statutory framework provided by the Legislature when it enacted the SIF. Referring 
back to the comments articulated by Judge Judd, it is also a discretionary decision that helps to 
achieve the financial solvency of the fund, a result which should be commended in a time when 
other funds (private and state) are not faring as well as the SIF. 
5. Other state legislatures have granted their state insurance funds the power to set a 
minimum policy premium amount below which a policyholder is not entitled to 
receive a dividend. 
The decision of the SIF defendants to preclude policyholders who have paid annual 
premiums of $2,500 or less from receiving a dividend relative to the distribution of any surplus is 
not a novel concept. At least two other states, Montana and North Dakota, follow a parallel 
practice. Similar to Idaho, both states have enacted a state insurance fund via statute, and 
although SIF defendants realize Montana and North Dakota's state insurance funds are not 
structured identically to Idaho's state insurance fund, an examination of their dividend practices 
remains instructive. 
Montana overhauled its workers' compensation statutes in 1990 in response to its state 
insurance fund going insolvent. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-2301 et seq. Although the 
Montana State Insurance Fund has been in existence since the early part of the century, the 
revision created a new fund. Id. In Montana, unlike Idaho, the management and control of the 
state insurance fund is vested solely in the board of directors. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-2315 
(2005). As far as dividend practices are concerned: 
[I]f at the end of any fiscal year there exists ... an excess of assets over liabilities, 
including necessary reserves and an appropriate surplus as determined by the 
board ... , and if the excess may be refunded safely, then the board, after 
consultation with the independent actuary engaged ... , may declare a dividend. 
The rules of the state fund must prescribe the manner of payment to those 
employers who have paid premiums into the state fund in excess of liabilities. 




Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-2323 (2005). The statute makes reference to "rules of the state fund" 
which in turn provide a structure for the dividend calculation attributable to each qualifying 
policy holder. One of these rules is entitled "Individual Loss Sensitive Dividend Distribution 
Plan" and provides several dividend factors the board of directors should consider when 
calculating a policy holder's rightful dividend calculation-should the board of directors 
determine a dividend declaration is appropriate. See MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.55.502 (2006). The 
factors are based on the actuarial determination of a policy holder's proportionate contribution to 
the operating results of the state fund during the dividend year and are provided in the rule. See 
id. However, the rule also provides that "[t]he board may set a premium amount below which a 
dividend shall not be payable to an individual policyholder." Id. 
In North Dakota, the legislature has directed the board of directors of its state insurance 
fund to exclude minimum premium policy holders from participating in the dividend pool. 
North Dakota's relevant dividend statute is as follows: 
Upon approval of its board of directors, the organization may create and 
implement actuarially sound employer premium calculation programs, including 
dividends, group insurance, premium deductibles, and reimbursement for medical 
expense assessments. 
N.D. Cent. Code§ 65-04-19.3 (2005). Once a dividend is declared by the board of directors, the 
administrative rules delineate a policy holder's eligibility and the distribution thereof. N.D. 
Admin Code § 92-01-02-55 (2005). Of particular significance is the fact that the rule states 
"minimum premium ... accounts are not eligible for dividend payments." Id. 
The Montana and North Dakota legislatures have taken steps to clarify the board of 
directors' ability to exclude policy holders at and below a certain premium amount from 
receiving a dividend should one be declared. Although the Idaho Legislature has not followed 
suit by adopting a similar express provision, SIF defendants argue that the Legislature has not 
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had the need, especially in light of the 1998 amendments and specifically the impact ofl.C. § 72-
901(3). This conclusion is supported, rather than diminished, by the Legislature's overall grant 
of power, authority, and discretion to the Manager and board of directors throughout the Act. 
There is no need because the ability for the SIF defendants to implement the type of policy 
plaintiffs complain of can be inferred from the power, authority, and discretion provided 
throughout the statutory construct of the Act. Had the Legislature wanted to curb the power, 
authority, and discretion of the Manager and board of directors, it could have taken the steps to 
do precisely that. However, the 1998 amendments indicate the Legislature's preference to 
remain "hands-off' and let the Manager and board of directors, collectively, work together to 
ensure the purpose of the SIF continues to be fulfilled. 
And it is hard to argue with that logic in light of the recent success the fund has enjoyed. 
While other state insurance funds have endured financial crisis, the SIF continues to enjoy 
financial success and stability, which is largely attributed to the skill and expertise of Mr. Alcorn 
and the board of directors. Collectively, they understand the delicate intricacies of the SIF's 
business, and have been able to successfully navigate around many of the pitfalls affecting the 
industry as a whole. 
C. In the event the Court does not grant the SIF defendants' summary judgment in its 
entirety, plaintiffs' claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitation. 
The state insurance fund's governing statutes are incorporated into the policyholder's 
insurance contract and where the gravamen of a party's claim is a statutory violation, a three-
year statute of limitation is applicable. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 138,997 P.2d at 599; Hayden Lake, 
141 Idaho at 403-04, 111 P.3d at 88-89. Plaintiffs allege that defendants acted in contravention 
to their statutory authority, which places plaintiffs' claim within the three-year statute of 
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limitation for claims involving statutory violations. Therefore, any claims for alleged damages 
that occurred prior to July 21, 2003 are time-barred. 
In plaintiffs' complaint they are seeking an award of damages going back five years 
preceding the filing of their complaint. However, application of a three-year statute oflimitation 
for claims of statutory violations as set forth in Hayden Lake determines that plaintiffs were 
required to bring their cause of action within three years of being passed over for a dividend 
from SIF. Upon determination of the dividend for a particular year, the SIF sent all 
policyholders who would not be receiving a dividend a letter indicating such. For dividends 
issued in January 2003, plaintiffs were sent a letter informing them they would not be receiving a 
dividend in 2003, which is the date plaintiffs would have been on notice of their alleged harm 
and is the date the three-year statute of limitations began to run on that particular dividend claim. 
Because the statute of limitation for allegations of statutory violation is three years, 
plaintiffs' claims for dividends offered prior to July 21, 2003, are time-barred. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' claim for damages as to the January 2003 dividend must be dismissed. 
D. Plaintiffs waived any right to a claim for dividends by continuing to pay their 
premiums despite their notice that they were receiving a dividend in prior years. 
Generally, waiver is an issue in contractual situations where the contract contains certain 
conditions which need to be met before one of the parties is expected to perform. 17 A 
Am.Jur.2d Contracts §638. A party waives that condition and any accompanying claims for 
failure of the condition when he goes ahead and performs anyway without the condition being 
satisfied. Id. The situation presented here is somewhat different but application of the waiver 
doctrine is still useful and applicable. Plaintiffs' insurance policy is in fact a contract between 
the policyholder and the SIF. Intermountain Gas Co. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. of Idaho, 125 
Idaho 182, 868 P .2d 510 (Ct. App. 1994). There is no dividend provision in the contract and, 
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therefore, there is no condition precedent to be considered. However, the waiver doctrine is 
appropriate because, even though plaintiffs were passed over for a dividend based on the amount 
of premium paid, they still paid their insurance premiums for the next policy year knowing they 
had not received a dividend. This scenario has been repeated each and every year since the 
inception of the dividend pay-out based on the $2,500 premium level in 2003. 
Plaintiffs knew they had not been paid a dividend for the years in question, along with the 
reasoning for such decision, but chose to keep paying their premiums, renewing their insurance, 
and subjecting themselves to their perceived injury. However, they could have mitigated their 
damages by changing insurance carriers, if they truly believed they were being harmed. 
Plaintiffs are free to obtain their worker's compensation coverage from other insurance 
companies who will insure them if they believed they could get a better deal on worker's 
compensation insurance elsewhere. The fact that plaintiffs kept their SIF policy demonstrates 
two things: 1) they knew they had no right to a dividend and 2) there was no real harm or injury 
in not receiving a dividend. 
Plaintiffs waived their right to claim injury when they continued to pay their premiums 
and renewed their insurance policies with the SIF, without receiving a dividend. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The SIF defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on the following three 
independent theories: (1) plaintiffs do not have standing to bring this lawsuit because they do 
not have a property interest in the SIF funds; (2) the SIF defendants exercised the authority given 
to them by the Idaho Legislature in determining that during the years 2003 through 2006, 
dividends would not be issued to SIF policyholders who paid premiums of $2,500 or less during 
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the respective dividend year; and (3) plaintiffs have waived their claims in this lawsuit by 
continuing to insure themselves with the SIF despite their knowledge that during the years 2003 
through 2006, they were not issued a dividend given that they paid premiums of $2,500 or less 
during each respective dividend year. In the event the Court does not grant the SIF defendants 
summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs' claims, the SIF defendants seek a partial summary 
judgment with_ respect to plaintiffs' claims for dividends in 2003 because such claims are time 
barred pursuant to Idaho law. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J~ day of February, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
E. Hall-Of the Firm 
. Duke-Of the Firm 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA DISTRlefR 1 3 2007 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN OF CA~ml\f 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO STATE 11\JSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their 
Capacity as member of the Board of Directors 
Of the State lnsurancH Fund 
Defendants. __________________ / 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL CAMILLERI 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
P. SALAS. DEPUTY --· 
1. My name is Michael Camilleri and I am an attorney licensed to practice in 
the jurisdictions of New York & Washington, D.C. 
2. I currently serve as a principal in the insurance consulting firm of Preferred 
Insurance Capital Consultants, LLC and as a principal, director and General Counsel of 
First Commercial Insurance Company, a Florida domestic property and casualty insurer. 
3. From 1978 - 1990, I was with the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, a national insurance rating organization during which time I served as Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, managing the countrywide legal and regulatory 
offices for that organization, including the State of Idaho. During that time, I 
represented the insurance industry on numerous occasions before state and federal 
1 
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legislatures and insurance departments, including the State of Idaho. I also served on 
various advisory committees to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. 
4. From 1981 - 1988, I was an adjunct Professor of Law at the College of 
Insurance. 
5. From 1991 - 1998, I was a senior partner at the law firm of Adorno & 
Zeder (now Adorno l~ Yoss) heading up the firm's countrywide insurance regulatory 
department. 
6. From 1B99 - 2001, I was President of Insurance Data Resources, a 
national workers compensation rating organization. 
7. Throughout the 29 years I have been in the insurance industry, I have 
frequently been retained to draft and interpret insurance regulations and statutes by 
state legislators, state insurance departments, insurance carriers and employers. 
These assignments have included statutory and regulatory construction for the State of 
Idaho. 
8: I have also served as an expert and qualified by numerous state courts on 
issues of statutory ancl regulatory construction. 
9. l have been retained as a consulting expert by the State of Idaho State 
Insurance Fund in the matter of Randolph E. Farber. Scott Alan Becker and Critter 
Clinic, an Idaho Professional Association v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, James M. 
Alcorn, its Manager, and William Deal, Wayne Meyer, Marguerite McLaughlin, Gerald 
Geddes, Milford Terrell, Judi Danielson, John Goedde, Elaine Martin, and Mark 




10. During the course of my assignment, I was asked to review the issues 
contained in Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ancl more specifically the 
following: 
"1. Other than I.C. §72-915, there are no contract provisions, 
mgulations, or statutes wt-1ich bear upon the determination of 
which policy holders are entitled to share in a dividend pool 
which the Manager of the SIF determines should be 
distributed; 
2. I .C. §72-915 does not confer any discretion upon the 
Manager of the SIF relative to the selection of criteria for 
determining which policy holders are entitled to share in a 
dividend pool which the Manager of the SIF determines 
should be distributed. 
3. I.C. §72-915 does not permit the SIF to utilize the amount of 
premium paid by a policy holder for the purpose determining 
whether such policy holder is eligible to receive any share of 
the dividend fund but instead requires the SIF to utilize the 
amount of premium paid by a policy holder for the purpose of 
computing the pro rata portion of the dividend pool which is 
payable to every policy holder." [Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, p. 2) 
11. I.C. §72-915 provides as follows: 
"Dividends. - At the end of every year, and at such other times as 
the manc1ger in l"lis discretion may determine, a reaqjustment of the 
rate shall be made for each of the several cl.asses of employments 
or industries. If at any time there is an qggregate balance 
remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry 
which the manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he 
may in his discretion, credit to each individual member of such 
class who shall have been a subscriber to the state insurance fund 
for a period of six (6) months or more, prior to the time of such 
readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates."[I.C. §72-915, p 582] 
The sole statutory requirement in I.C. §72-915 is that the manager, in his 




Fund for a period of six months or more. That discretion can be exercised to declare or 
not declare a dividend to all or some of the policyholders. 
However, it should be noted that additional statutory authority on this issue 
is relevant. For example, I.C. 72-901 (3) provides that "it is the duty of the board of 
directors to direct the policies and operations of the state insurance fund to assure that 
the state insurance fund is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially 
sound and maintains the public purpose for which the state insurance fund was 
created". Consistent with the general mandate I.C. 72-901 (3) provides to oversee and 
manage the fund, I.C. 72-902 provides that: 
"The board of directors of the state insurance fund shall appoint a 
manager of the state insurance fund, whose duties, subject to the direction 
and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the business of the state 
insurance fund, and do any and all things which are necessary and 
convenient in the administration thereof .... " 
These provisions, along with I.C. 72-915, impose upon the manager both 
the responsibility and the discretion to administer the fund so as to make all decisions 
necessary to assure ttle financial integrity of the fund. 
12. I.C. §72-915 is very general in its treatment of dividends. This is fairly 
typical. See South Dakota Code Section 20:06:23:03; Utc1h Code Section 31A-33-116; 
Nevada RS 693A.160; Nebraska Code 44-325. In those states, as well as almost all 
other jurisdictions, industry custom and practice typically follows a pattern as follows: 
a. Mam~gement reviews the financial performance of the company 
over the course of the last fiscal year. 
b. Management reviews the anticipated financial needs of the 
company for the future. 
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c. Management determines whether excess funds are available 
beyond those required to meet statutory, regulatory and organizational obligations. 
d. If an excess exists, management can declare a dividend to certain 
policyholders within the context of an approved (management and board of directors) 
plan of dividend distributions. Such determinations can be made on the basis of risk 
performance, longevity, size or other relevant criteria. 
e. The plan is discussed with the board of directors and such plan is 
either accepted, rejected or modified. 
f. Those eligible for dividends receive distributions. 
13. During the course of my analysis, I reviewed the methodology used by the 
Idaho State Insurance Fund in determining its dividend program. That review indicates 
that the Fund considered the following factors in making its determination: risk size, 
experience and loss history, expense factors, and risk retention considerations. This 
methodology and the aforementioned factors are consistent with both industry practice 
and usage and reasonable and prudent insurance company management. 
The Idaho State Insurance Fund's determination with respect to dividends 
is very much consistent with this analysis and with other State Fund and private carrier 
methodology. The Idaho Fund manager reviewed the expense and performance history 
of risks delineated by premium size and concluded that the profitability of risks below 
$2,500 in premium did not warrant a dividend. Accordingly, fiscal prudence dictated 
that a dividend should not be issued to policyholders under $2,500 in premium for the 
years in question. 
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The practice of issuing dividends to policyholders has its basis in the 
concepts of recognizing performance and as a marketing tool to retain the more 
profitable risks. Some companies take these concepts to a very fine degree, actually 
limiting dividends on a risk by risk basis to those insureds achieving a certain 
performance. 
Other companies may expand the program to all risks within a certain 
class. In this case, the Fund manager performed an expense and performance analysis 
by size of risk and determined that smaller risks had produced a lower profitability 
return. In addition, because of certain fixed costs applicable to all insureds, the 
expense ratio for smaller risks is generally higher than that of larger risks. Based on 
these factors, the manager determined that those small insureds did not merit a 
dividend. 
ft should be noted that this exercise of discretion was reviewed by the 
Chief of the Civil Litigation Division for the Office of the Attorney General, State of Idaho 
and found that the Fund's decision was a proper exercise of that discretion (See Letter 
of David G. High to Mr. Robert Equaquiza dated January 22, 2003). 
14. Based on the above, it is my conclusion that: 
a. Neither I.C. §72-915 nor any other Idaho Code provision, 
prescribes how dividends are to be distributed, only under what financial circumstances 
they may be distributed. However, other statutory provisions, specifically I.C. § 72-901, 
provide the Manager and board of directors with the implied authority and power to 




efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and maintains the public 
purposes for which state insurance fund was created." 
b. Consistent with I.C. §72-915, I.C. § 72-901 (3), I.C. § 72-902, I.C. 
72-914 and industry practice and usage, the Idaho State Fund Manager has the 
discretion, subject to Board approval, to determine which policyholders, if any, are 
entitled to a dividend. 
c. The Idaho State Fund properly exercised its discretion in 
establishing a dividend plan which excluded insureds paying premiums under $2,500. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED AUTHORITY, personally appeared Michael 
Camilleri, who is personally known by me and who states that the matters set forth in 
the foregoing Affidavit are true and correct; that he executed the Affidavit in his own 
hand, and that he did take an oath. 
~· :i'\, Elizabeth FiM~ 
!' J . My Commission 00295791 
"XJ':..J Expire5 March 02, 2008 
My commission expires: ._~)~-\ O~) \ell 
.. ~ ' 
7 
Notary Pt.Jblic 
State of Florida 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, James M. Alcorn, being first duly sworn, depose and state: 
1. I am the Manager of the SIF and have been since April 1998. 
2. I have had extensive experience with the insurance industry since 1970 as 
a licensed insurance agent and owner of independent property and casualty 
insurance agencies and currently hold the professional designation of Certified 
Insurance Counselor. 
3. I served as the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance from May 
1994 to January 1995, and as its Deputy Director from January 1995 to December 
1995, and then again served as Director of the Department from December 1995 
until April of 1998. 
4. My past experience as a licensed insurance agent and as Director of the 
Idaho Department of Insurance has caused me to be familiar with the laws 
regulating the insurance industry and insurance industry practices. 
5. As the Manager of the State Insurance Fund (SIF), I am familiar with its 
history and its day to day operations and am required by law to conduct the 
business of the SIF and do all things convenient and necessary to manage the SIF 
so that it is run as an efficient insurance company, remains actuarially sound and 
maintains the public purposes for which it was created. 
6. The SIF was created by the Idaho Legislature in 1917 for the purpose of 
providing a stable source of worker's compensation insurance for Idaho 
employers and their employees. 
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7. Idaho Law provides that all Idaho employers must maintain worker's 
compensation insurance coverage for their employees. 
8. Since the enactment of 41-1601 et seq. in 1961, Idaho's worker's 
compensation insurance rates have been regulated by the Department of Insurance 
which approves worker's compensation rates based upon the rate filings of an 
authorized rating organization (National Council on Compensation Insurance aka 
NCCI). Idaho is an administered pricing state which means that the rating 
organization files the entire rate. Companies may file with the Department of 
Insurance for approval to deviate from the filed rate by individual rate or for all 
rates. Companies may also use schedule credits on specific policies. Companies 
may not use both a deviation and scheduled credits. 
9. SIF has chosen to deviate 7% from all filed rates. Therefore, the 
premiums for all SIF policyholders are calculated beginning with a rate 7% below 
the rates approved by the Department of Insurance. This deviation is applied 
across the board for all policyholders regardless of premium size or losses 
occurring on an insurance policy. 
10. Idaho is a competitive state which means that the SIF is not a monopoly 
and must compete for business against the private worker's compensation 
insurance carriers. 
11. Idaho also has a worker's compensation assigned risk pool which insures 
employers who cannot otherwise secure workers compensation coverage, but 
employers insuring through the assigned risk pool are subject to rates 30% above 
the standard rate. 
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12. Idaho employers are not required to insure through the SIF, they may 
insure with a private carrier or if they are declined coverage by two private 
carriers and the SIF then coverage can be obtained through the assigned risk pool 
which is the carrier of last resort. 
13. The SIF has a public purpose to provide worker's_ compensation insurance 
to Idaho employers and while it is not the insurer of last resort, the SIF maintains 
a liberal underwriting policy that seeks to insure all employers regardless of size 
so that most Idaho employers who could not otherwise obtain coverage through a 
private carrier could obtain coverage with the SIF and avoid the extra costs 
associated with acquiring an insurance policy through the assigned risk pool. 
14. As SIF Manager, I am required to maintain the solvency of the SIF and 
make decisions regarding the level of surplus and reserves needed by the Fund to 
remain actuarially sound so there continues to be a stable and available source of 
worker's compensation insurance coverage. 
15. The maintenance of adequate surplus and reserves is an important aspect 
of managing the SIF because unlike all other worker's compensation carriers 
operating in Idaho the Fund is precluded by statute (LC. §72-901(4)) from being a 
member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association. 
16. The Idaho Insurance Guaranty Association guaranties payment of 
insurance benefits in the event that an insurance carrier cannot pay its insurance 
claims or becomes insolvent. 
17. All insurers in the state belong to the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association except the SIF which is barred by law. 
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18. Since the SIF cannot like other carriers rely on Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association to pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIF must be managed 
such that it maintains sufficient surplus and reserves to provide a stable ongoing 
source of worker's compensation insurance to protect Idaho workers. 
19. The duty of the Manager and the Board of Directors to maintain the 
financial integrity of the SIF is paramount because if the SIF were to become 
insolvent, the availability of worker's compensation insurance in Idaho would be 
critically jeopardized, since the SIF insures over 39,000 employers which 
comprise approximately 70% of the market. Many of these employers, especially 
the smaller employers, could not obtain coverage from other insurers whose 
underwriting policies are not as liberal as the SIF. 
20. Since its inception the duty to operate and manage the SIF and to decide 
the appropriate level of surplus, reserves and dividends has been the duty of its 
Manager and subject to his or her discretionary authority. 
21. The SIF surplus is an asset of the SIF and dividends, if any, are paid from 
what the Manager determines to be surplus that is safely available after taking 
into consideration various factors including, but not limited to, present and future 
SIF operating expenses, the required reserves, projected investment income, 
market forces, and industry trends. 
22. Dividends paid by the SIF are not the same as dividends paid by to 
stockholders of a company. SIF dividends are not related to ownership or the 
sharing of profits. SIF dividends are the return of unused premium. 
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23. The determination as to whether to declare a dividend, how much, and 
who will receive one is not a science, but is a decision-making process that is 
based upon experience and knowledge of the insurance business, industry trends, 
and market forces. 
24. The declaration of a dividend is a multi-step process that starts with 
deciding how much surplus is safely available to be declared as a dividend, then 
there is a determination as to how it is to be divided up taking into account the 
cost of writing an insurance policy and considering the losses that may have been 
incurred on the policy. 
25. One other consideration is the marketing effect that a dividend will have 
on retaining good profitable accounts, because it is those large profitable accounts 
that allow the SIF to fulfill its public policy objectives of providing a source of 
insurance for Idaho employers which includes many of the smaller less profitable 
accounts. 
26. Policyholders of the Fund are provided with a contract of insurance that 
sets forth the parameters of their coverage and neither it nor the governing statutes 
of the SIF provide that policyholders are entitled to, or guarantied that they will 
receive a dividend. 
27. The SIF, through three previous managers and the current Manager, has 
issued dividends continuously since at least 1982 using essentially the same 
dividend formula as is used presently, in that the dividends returned as a 
percentage of paid premium have always differentiated by the size of the premium 
taking into account the losses incurred on the insurance policy such that the SIF 
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has always returned back a larger percentage of paid premium to the large policy 
holders, as opposed to the smaller sized policyholders. This is consistent with 
workers compensation insurance industry practices. 
28. One of the reasons for using policy size as a basis for determining the rate 
of return is because dividend is a return of unused premium and a larger policy 
will have proportionately more unused premium than a smaller premium policy 
because certain costs associated with writing a policy are essentially the same 
whether it be for $2,000 or $200,000 policy. 
29. Other considerations for issuing larger dividends as a percentage of 
premium size has to do with the fact that workers compensation rates are 
regulated and as such are the same for all carriers, and because the SIF has a 
public purpose to provide a source of insurance for the Idaho employers including 
the small employers, and because private carriers seek to insure only the large 
profitable policyholders, and because the SIF needs the large policyholders to 
help support the ability to continue to insure the small businesses in the state. The 
SIF has made a business decision to give the larger premium policies a larger 
dividend percentage in order to help retain the business of the larger profitable 
policyholders. Moreover, the SIF looks at the losses incurred on a policy and 
factors that in when determining whether a dividend will be paid; if a 
policyholder has losses that exceed a certain percentage of premium in a policy 
year then a dividend would be reduced or not paid depending on the level of 
losses. 
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30. It is the retention of the large profitable insurance policies that helps the 
SIF maintain its public purpose of providing insurance to Idaho employers. It is 
the large profitable accounts that are subject to being lured away by the private 
insurance carriers with whom the SIF is in competition. 
31. Since workers compensation rates are regulated by the state, the primary 
method used to cause large profitable policyholders to switch workers 
compensation insurance companies is to offer them high scheduled credits. 
32. Since the SIF has chosen to deviate from the regulated rates it cannot use 
scheduled credits so it relies on the return of dividend to retain large profitable 
accounts. (See Paragraph 8 above) This is a good business decision that helps the 
SIF retain the large profitable policyholder and is consistent with workers 
compensation insurance industry practices and the statutory mandates of Idaho 
Code Section 72-901 to run the SIF as an efficient insurance company. 
33. Additionally, a policyholder with a premium of $2,500 could have equal 
or greater losses than a policyholder with a premium of $100,000, and therefore 
the larger policyholders more readily absorb the losses generated by lower 
premium contributors. 
34. Worker's compensation coverage is a unique form of insurance in that it 
provides unlimited coverage to its policyholder regardless of the premium size. 
The SIF provides a $300 policyholder with the same amount of upper coverage as 
a $500,000 policyholder, but either policy can have extensive losses well above 
their premium amount. Losses in excess of a million dollars on a claim are not 
unheard of and have been paid by the SIF. 
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35. The decision to give dividends pursuant to a formula that excluded smaller 
policyholders during the policy years in question was made by considering and 
weighing all the factors set forth above and was consistent with the law, and 
industry practice, and was done with the knowledge of the Board of Directors. 
36. The decision to give dividends pursuant to a formula that excluded smaller 
policyholders was also informally reviewed by the Chief of the Civil Litigation 
Unit of the Idaho Attorney General's Office in a letter dated January 22, 2003, to 
Robert Egusquiza, wherein Deputy Attorney General David High stated that the 
dividend distribution practice was within the discretionary authority of the S1F 
Manager. 
37. Each of the named plaintiffs purchased worker's compensation coverage 
from the S1F with inception dates between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2004. 
38. None of the plaintiffs have paid premiums over $2,500 on their contracts 
for insurance for the contract years of July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2002; July 1, 2002 
to June 30, 2003; or July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004 except the Critter Clinic which 
paid premiums in excess of $2,500 for the policy year with an inception date 
between July 1, 2003, to June 30, 2004. 
39. Plaintiffs were not offered a dividend for years they did not pay premiums 
over $2,500. 
40. Dividends are declared by the S1F in December and the plaintiffs were 
each sent a letter the January following the declaration of the dividend stating 
they would not be receiving a dividend based on the amount of premium they paid 
for the particular policy year. Plaintiffs have renewed their existing contracts for 
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insurance and paid their respective premiums even though they may not have 
been offered a dividend the prior year. 
41. If the Court were to accept the Plaintiff's interpretation that Idaho Code 
Section 72-915 does not give the SIF Manager the discretion to declare a dividend 
that can be safely and properly divided with regard to prior paid premiums then it 
severely impacts the ability of the Manager to run the SIF as an efficient 
insurance company, remain actuarially sound, and maintain the public purposes 
for which the insurance Fund was created. 
42. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from November 21, 
2002' s Special Meeting. 
43. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 10, 2003. 
44. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from October 20, 2004. 
45. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from December 21, 2005. 
46. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the 
letter sent by David G. High, Chief, Civil Litigation Division of the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office, to Robert Egusquiza on January 22, 2003. 
47. Attached to this affidavit as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of 
Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes from January 22, 2004. 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 3 f!i day of February, 2007. 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES M. ALCORN 11 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Bo 1:Se,, 
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Board or Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
Minutes of November 21, 2002 Special Meeting 
Board Members Present: 
Bill Deal, Chairman, Agents Representative 
Representative Wayne Meyer, Vice Chairman, Legislative Representative 
Senator John Goedde, Legislative Representative 
Gerald Geddes, Employees Representative 
Milford Terrell, Employer Representative 
In addition to the Board members, the following individuals attended all, or a portion of, the 
meeting: 
James M. Alcorn - Manager, State Insurance Fund 
George Parham - Chief Legal Counsel, State Insurance Fund 
Debbie Hiatt - Secretary, State Insurance Fund 
Peter Marshall -Attorney, Marshall, Batt and Fisher 
Doug Dom - Investment Consultant 
Becky Gratsinger-R.V. Kuhns & Associates, Inc. 
Josh Kevan-RV. Kuhns & Associates, Inc. 
Pursuant to the posted notice of the meeting and agenda, Chairman Deal called the Special 
Meeting of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund to order at 9:00 a.m. The absence 
of Milford Terrell was noted. 
Mr. Alcorn welcomed Doug Dorn and introduced Becky Gratsinger and Josh Kevan from R.V. 
Kuhn & Associates, Inc. (RVK). Mr. Alcorn explained the new business relationship with RVK 
as investment consultants to provide consulting opinions and recommendations on investments 
made by the Endowment Board. · 
Mr. Terrell joined the meeting at 9:05 a.m. 
Ms. Gratsinger provided a brief resume of her qualifications, and the history RVK. Mr. Kevan 
introduced himself and reviewed his qualifications. There being no specific questions by the 
Board, Chairman Deal thanked the representatives of RVK. Ms. Gratsinger, Mr. Kevan and Mr. 
Dorn left the meeting at 9: 13 a.m. · 
Chairman Deal explained the purpose of the special meeting was to discuss the 2003 dividend. 
Mr. Alcorn provided the following information on the Fund for the Board to consider when 
discussing a proposed dividend: 
• There is currently $132-133 million worth of premium. 
• The Fund has approximately 30,000 policies. 
• There is approximately $74 million in surplus. 
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• Reinsurance coverage was changed from catastrophic and individual coverage, to 
catastrophic coverage only, which provides a greater liability than in the past. The largest 
concentration of state employees is in the "towers" where the Health and Welfare 
employees are housed. 
• The Fund is not a member of the Guarantee Association so the Fund needs to be more 
conservative. 
• The Fund gave large dividends over the past years based on money accumulated during 
the 90's. 
• He would like to keep the fund at a 2-1 premium to surplus ratio. 
• The Fund is showing a $4. 7 million profit to date. 
Mr. Alcorn stated that he could be very conservative and not issue a dividend. He realizes 
policyholders have come to expect a dividend, but a strong case could be made for no dividend. 
Mr. Terrell reviewed the $74 million surplus and $5 million in investments, and asked the 
Manger to review the down side of 2000 and 2001. Mr. Alcorn responded that before dividends, 
there was $18 millio':1 worth of profit in 2001, and $6.8 million in year 2000. 
Mr. Terrell asked the amount of dividends paid the last two years. Mr. Alcorn responded the 
Fund paid out $24.7 million in 2001 and $32.4 in 2000. 
Mr. Alcorn feels the Board should look at whether a dividend should be given to the smaller 
.Policies, and stated now may be the time to consider changing the procedures. The down side to 
not offering a dividend to the smaller policies ($2000 and below) is that 20,000 of the 30,000 
policyholders have $2000 or less in premium. The under $2000 policyholders account for $12 
million worth of the premium. The other $120 million premium is received from the 10,000 
policies that are over $2000. 
Senator Goedde indicated he has been a proponent of a policy fee for a long time and suggested 
that perhaps a policy fee could be taken off any dividend paid, which would eliminate the 
smaller policies from actually getting a dividend. Mr. Terrell agreed with Senator Goedde and 
asked what the cost of paperwork is to set up for a new policy. He agrees with an up-front fee, 
but no dividend. He indicated that is the cost of business and that no money is made on smaller 
accounts, but on the larger accounts. Mr. Alcorn concurred, but said we need to discuss both the 
pros and cons. 
Mr. Alcorn stated that policyholders are used to getting dividends so he knows he'll "take heat", 
for having a lower dividend or no dividend at all. He also said that some policyholders feel, in 
error, that they are getting tax money back. 
Mr. Alcorn noted that the Fund writes business that other companies will not write, and tries to 
accommodate those accounts rather than having them assigned to the Assigned Risk Pool. 
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Fund is saving those policyholders 45%. Mr. Terrell said other companies are also cutting back 
and feels the Fund has gone the extra mile to provide service to those policyholders. 
Mr. Terrell encouraged the Board to talk about eliminating dividends to the smaller policies, but 
pay dividends only to the larger policies. He also wanted to note, for the record, that his 
company is not insured with the State Insurance Fund, so his recommendation is not self-served. 
Mr. Geddes inquired about the investment income; Mr. Alcorn responded $4.7 million. The 
combined loss ratio is 103-104%, which means for every $1 in premium, the costs and operating 
expenses are $1.03. Mr. Alcorn said he wants to stay at a 100% combined loss ratio and make 
up the difference on investments. 
Mr. Geddes questioned the change in deviation. Mr. Alcorn rem,inded the Board that at the last 
meeting, it was decided to deviate 7% next year. 
Mr. Geddes asked if Mr. Alcorn anticipates investment income to be the same as this year; Mr. 
Alcorn said he hopes it will be better, but it is hard to forecast as it changes on a day-to-day 
basis. Mr. Alcorn explained the Fund invests conservatively and has a lot invested in bonds. 
Representative Meyer asked if the Fund could legally charge a fee as Senator Goedde suggested 
earlier. Mr. Alcorn responded that the Fund could not and that any fees would have to be set by 
the Department oflnsurance and NCC!. 
Chainnan Deal stated the Board needs to realize the marketplace is different this year. He feels 
that after visiting with some other larger agencies, the approach to draw a line at a level where no 
dividends are paid is acceptable. He said if the Fund is taking accounts no other insurance 
company will talce, the losses will increase due to those smaller companies being added to the 
Fund's base. He further stated the medical inflation of 17-19% needs to also be considered. 
Chainnan'Deal said his recommendation would be no dividend on smaller policies ($2,000 or 
$2,500) and work with a formula where loss ratio is taken into consideration so only companies 
who earn a dividend should receive one. Mr. Alcorn agreed. 
Mr. Terrell recommended that the Board instruct Mr. Alcorn to consider no dividend for policies 
of $2,500 or less, and to look at a total dividend around $4 million and keep $1 million in 
retained earnings. Senator Goedde said the Board also needs to consider a reduced deviation 
next year so more money can go to surplus. 
Representative Meyer agrees with Mr. Terrell's recommendation. 
Mr. Geddes also feels it is all right, and would like $4-5 million paid out to only policies making 
a profit for the Fund. 
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Chainnan Deal reiterated the consensus of the Board that policies of $2,500 or less in premium 
would receive no dividend, and the Fund would issue a total dividend around $4 million. 
Chainnan Deal thanked the Board for their input and discussions. There being no other business 
before the Board, the meeting was_ adjourned at 10:05 a.m. · 
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Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
Minutes of Special Meeting held December 10, 2003 
Board Members Present (by telephone): 
Bill Dea1, Chairman, Agents Representative 
Representative Wayne Meyer, Vice Chairman, Legislative Representative 
Senator John Goedde, Legislative Representative 
Gerald Geddes, Employees Representative 
In addition to the Board members, the following individuals attended all, or a portion of, the 
meeting: 
J runes M. Alcorn - Manager, State Insurance Fund . 
George Parham - Chief Legal Counsel, State Insurance Fund 
Debbie Hiatt- Secretary, State Insurance Fund 
Peter Marshan -Attorney, Marshall, Batt and Fisher 
Pursuant to the posted notice of the meeting and agenda, Chairman Deal called the Meeting of 
the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund to order at 10:00 a.m. Chairman Deal noted 
the vacant Board member position has not yet been filled by th~ Governor. 
Chairman Deal stated that the purpose of the special meeting is to discuss dividends. 
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the information involved in determining the amount of dividend to be paid 
in January 2004. He stated that at the present time he estimates 2003 will end with surplus of 
approximately $85 million and premiums of approximately $160 million. As of the end of 
November the Fund has a profit of approximately $8.34 million. Currently, the premium income 
stands at $141.6 million, with losses and loss adjustment expense of $115.46 million, netting just 
over $26 million. From the $26 million, operating expenses of $17.6 million are subtracted 
leaving an underwriting profit before other expenses of about $8.5 million. The other expenses, 
made up erimarily of agents' commissions and premium taxes, are approximately $13.6 million. 
The Fund has investment income currently of approximately $13.1 million. Mr. Alcorn stated 
that last year the Board discussed keeping the combined ratio of approximately 100 and informed 
the Board it is currently running 101. 
He said if the same dividend formula is used as last year, issuing dividends to qualifying 
policyholders with premiums over $2,500, the total dividend would be approximately 
$5. l million. Last year the total dividend was $4 million. Mr. Alcorn explained if minimum 
premium policies were included in the dividend, the average amount paid on those small policies 
would be approximately l ½%. The overall difference of the total dividend would be around 
$136,000. 
Mr. Geddes asked Mr. Alcorn for clarification on the minimum amount of the dividend checks. 
Mr. Alcorn explained that the maximum check written on accounts between $250 l-$5000, if the 
policyholder qualified, would be 3.75%, or $187 on a $5,000 policy. If a dividend was issued on 
policies between $300 and $2,500, the maximum premium for a qualifying policyholder would 
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be 1 ½%, or $4.50 dividend on a $300 policy. Mr. Alcorn said the difference of the dividend 
would be around $136,000. 
Mr. Alcorn pointed out that the Treasurer's Office cost to issue a check is. approximately $1.25, 
and with the staffs time in processing, could bring the cost to about $5-$10 per check issued. A 
discussion followed regarding the cost effectiveness of issuing dividend checks on accounts 
when the amount of the check would be less than the processing costs. 
The Board unanimously agreed on the manager issuing a dividend of approximately $5.1 
million, using the same dividend formula as last year, and issuing dividends on accounts over 
$2,500. . 
Mr. Alcorn stated that the Fund will likely receive complaints from the smaller policyholders 
again this year for not receiving a dividend, and the calls and letters will be directed to his 
attention for response. 
The next regular meeting of the Board was scheduled for Thursday, January 22, at 1 :30 p.m. 








Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
Minutes of Meeting held October 20, 2004 
Board Members Present: 
Bill Deal, Chairman, Agents Representative 
Representative Wayne Meyer, Vice Chainnan, Legislative Representative 
Senator John Goedde, Legislative Representative 
Gerald Geddes, Employees Representative. 
Elaine Martin, Employers Representative 
In addition to the Board members, the following individuals attended all, or a portion of, the 
meeting: 
James M. Alcorn-Manager, State Insurance Fund 
George Parham - Chief Legal Counsel, State Insurance Fund 
Debbie Hiatt - Secretary, State Insurance Fund 
Richard Hal~ - Attorney/Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
Pursuant to the posted notice of the meeting and agenda, Chairman De:a1 announced ~I l"!leinbers 
were present and called the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund to· 
order at 9 :05 am. 
Senator Goedde moved that the minutes of the meeting held July 14, 2004, be approved, 
seconded by Representative Meyer. The motion to approve the minutes passed. 
Mr. Alcorn distributed copies of the Idaho State Insurance Fund Quarterly Statement as of 
June 30, 20()4., which has been filed with the Department of Insurance. He reviewed the 
reserves, surplus, premiums to date, losses, underwriting expense, and investment income. He 
said the Fund is showing a profit of $3 million for the first six months. 
Chairman Deal asked where the new premiums were coming from. Mr. Alcorn said that some 
business is from other companies, such as Liberty who does not write the smaller policies; the 
Utah Fund, and also from contractors and new business. · 
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the direct premium earned, direct losses incurred and the loss ratio for the 
year, and explained the differences in losses at the request of Senator Goedde. 
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the financial stateqients for September 30, 2004, the adjustment to surplus, 
losses and operating expenses, and reviewed the differences between 2004 and 2003. He 
explained premium taxes were approximately $1.5 million higher because the taxes to the 
Industrial Commission, Second Injury Fund and Department of Insurance, are based on 
premiums, which have increased. He also said the agents commissions have increased. 
Representative Meyer asked about the Industrial Commission premium tax. Mr. Alcorn 
explained that the percentage of the premiums paid to the Industrial Commission is set per Idaho 
Code. 
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Mr. Alcorn reviewed the cash budget as of September 30, 2004. He explained each unit has their 
own budget, and as of the end of September they were at 73.5% of budget - $19.9 million of the 
$27 .2 projected total. · 
Mr. Alcorn reported that the Fund is kept well informed on investments and that Matt Haertzen 
was doing a very good job at the Endowment Board Mr. Alcorn briefly explained the 
investment policy and said the Endowment Board follows the policy closely. 
Senator Goedde inquired about the Bank Custodial Fee. Mr. Alcorn explained the funds are 
deposited as required by statute and the fee includes bank charges and investment trades. 
Representative Meyer asked about the Bad Debt Write-Off. Mr. Alcorn explained the Code 
section states bad debts such as audits/premiums not paid, can only be written off after four 
years. 
Ms. Martin asked Mr. Alcorn to explain the telephone expenses. Mr. Alcorn said the telephones 
at the outside offices are being changed over to a system similar to the Boise o1nce. He 
explained their phones wil1 now have four digit/direct dial extension numbers, calls can be 
transferred between offices, charges for long distance are reduced, lines are cheaper, etc. Mr. · 
Alcorn said he plans to review the major changes that have occurred at the Fund during the last 
five years at the next Board meeting. 
As a new member of the Board, Ms. Martin asked what the Board's responsibility was.for the 
budget. Chainnan Deal explained that the Board of Directors has the responsibility. for hiring the 
Fund Manager, adopting personnel and compensation polides, and making sure the Fund is run : 
as an efficient insurance company. He further explained it is the Manager's responsibility to set 
dividends and manage the employees. Chairman Deal further explained that prior to 1998, the . 
Fund was run more like a government agency vs. an insurance company. In 1998, the law was 
amended and a Board of Directors was appointed. The Board hired a Manager and directed him 
to operate the Fund like other insurance companies. 
Mr. Alcorn explained that the computer program shows aJl individual line items on the budget, 
and what invoices make up each category should any Board member want to see it. He said the 
budget starts with a zero base each year, and that he should have a draft of next year's budget to 
present to the Board at the next meeting. 
Mr. Alcorn said the 2005 rates have been published by NCCI, and the overall average rate 
increase is 5.3%. For the benefit of the new Board member, Mr. Alcorn gave a history of how 
the rating structure in Idaho is set up and explained that all companies writing workers comp 
insurance must be a member of a rating organization, which in Idaho is the National Council of 
Compensation Insurance (NCCI}. He further explained how NCCI determines the rates, how the 
Fund reports to NCCI, and how NCCI files 600+ classes and rates with the Department of 
Insurance. He said companies can then file with the Department of Insurance for a deviation 
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from the published rate or give schedule credits. Mr. Alcorn said he filed with the Department of 
Insurance for a 7% rate deviation, which had been approved. 
Mr. Alcorn advised that although the Manager has been given the responsibility of setting 
dividends for the Fund, he would like the Board's input. He said last year the Fund issued a 
dividend of approximately $5 million for policies over $2,500, and he is looking at doing the 
same for 2005. Mr. Alcorn explained the more premiums the Fund writes, the more is needed in 
surplus which lessens the amount that can be given in dividends. Chainnan Deal explained the 
Fund's policy is to keep a 2:1 ratio (premiums/surplus). Mr. Alcorn said that 2:1 is a good 
general industry standard; 3:1 is too light and could be subject to regulatory review. Chairman 
Deal said the Fund must also keep a conservative level because they do not belong to the 
Guaranty Association. He also advised the Board carries reinsurance. 
Mr. Alcorn said that the first year that the lower premium policies did not receive a dividend 
(2003), he had around 200 telephone calls. The second year he received around 100 calls. He 
said some policyholders still feel that dividends are tax refunds due them through the state. Ms. 
Martin commented that if the Manager only received 300 calls in two years, that not issuing 
dividends to policyholders under $2,500 appeared to be a good business decision. 
Representative Meyer agreed and feels the policyholders are used to it now and the process 
shouldn't be changed. He also said that the dividend on a $2,500 premium would probably only 
be $15-$20; Mr. Alcorn agreed. 
The Board agreed with the Manager's thoughts to issue a dividend of approximately $5 million 
for policies over $2,500. 
Mr. Alcorn stated that the Fund being or not being a member of the Guaranty Association was 
discussed with him again by some individuals in the industry. Mr. Alcorn discussed why the 
Fund is not a member of the Guaranty Association. Mr. Alcorn advised the Board that the law 
states the State Insurance Fund shall not be a member of the Guaranty Association. He 
explained in the past, companies didn't want state funds to be members because state funds 
historically had lost money and the Guaranty Association would be required to pick up the cost. 
He said now they are looking at it more individually. 
Mr. Alcorn explained the payments to the Second Injury Fund, the Industrial Commission, and 
the NCCI Assigned Risk Pool. 
Mr. Deal reminded the Board that the State Insurance Fund was listed in the July 2004 issue of 
Best's Review magazine in the list of top 200 property and casualty companies in the United 
States. 
Mr. Alcorn distributed copies of Idaho Code section 72-906, which states that the Board shall 
adopt personnel policies and compensation schedules comparable to other insurance companies 
doing business in the state and region, and handed out copies of the salary survey completed by 
the Hay Group. Mr. Alcorn said the Fund is pretty close.on their salary structure. He also 
explained the longevity percentage the Fund gives their employees. He further explained the 
000086 
. .. 
Minutes of Board of Directors Meeting 
October 20, 2004 
Page4 
Fund is not on the state system, but uses a broad-banded system where management looks at 
market for the position, the worth of the position to the Fund, and the performance of the 
employee. Representative Meyer asked about pay increases. Mr. Alcorn said presently 4% is 
the average pay raise increase, although some employees may receive less and others may . 
receive more. Mr. Alcorn said he feels the current pay scale is working and he tries to pay yearly 
increases, based on what other insurance companies are giving. 
:Mr. Geddes expressed concern that those employees paid under $10/hr. should be increased. Mr. 
Alcorn said they will be after longevity at the Fund. Mr. Alcorn stated that the Fund tries to keep 
all employees above the "living wage" category. 
Representative Meyer also mentioned they receive a good benefit package. Mr. Alcorn agreed, 
but also brought up that other companies also give bonuses, which the Fund does not. 
After discussions which included comparison of the salary survey to wages paid at the Fund, pay 
increases, longevity, and benefits, the Board of Directors agreed the current compensation 
schedule meets statutory standards. 
Representative Meyer moved, and Senator Goedde seconded. that the Board go into Executive 
Session as outlined in Idaho Code section 67-2345 to discuss legal and personnel issues. Roll 
call of members present: 
Board Member Vote 
Chairman Bill Deal Aye 
Representative Wayne Meyer Aye 
Senator Goedde Aye 
Gerald Geddes Aye 
Elaine Martin Aye 
The motion passed and the Board went into Executive Session. Upon completion of Executive 
Session, the Board went back into Open Session. 
Chairman Deal discussed the state seal currently on the letterhead used by the State Insurance 
Fund. Mr. Alcorn said it could portray the concept that the Fund was something it is not, i.e. a 
taxing organization, and asked the Board if they felt the seal should be taken off the letterhead. 
After discussion, the Board did not feel there would be any political repercussions either way, 
and concurred that it was a good idea but up to the Manager. 
Senator Goedde advised the Board that after discussions the IMA would not object to some type 
of fee schedule, based on the Medicare and the Blues, to help control the medical fees Idaho pays 
compared to the surrounding states. He will continue working on this and keep the Board 
members informed. 
Chairman Deal announced that Representative Meyer's term of office would be expiring in 
November. He thanked Representative Meyer for all his insight and help on the Board, and said 
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he will be missed on the Board as well as over at the Legislature. Mr. Alcorn prese_nted 
Representative Meyer with a plaque of appreciation on behalf of the Board of Directors and 
asked to go on record showing his appreciation for all the hard work, good ideas, and common 
sense that Representative Meyer brought to the Board through the years. Representative Meyer 
thanked the Board and wished them the best of luck. 
The next meeting of the Board was scheduled for Thursday, January 20, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. 
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Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
Minutes of Special Meeting held December 21, 2005 
Board Members Present: 
Bill Deal, Chainnan, Agents Representative (by conference call) 
Senator John Goedde, Legislative Representative (by conference call) 
Representative Mark Snodgrass, Legislative Representative (by conference call) 
Gerald Geddes, Employees Representative 
Elaine Martin, Employers Representative (by conference call) 
In addition to the Board members, the following individuals attended all, or a portion of, 
the meeting: 
James M. Alcorn - Manager, State Insurance Fund 
George Parham - Chief Legal Counsel, State Insurance Fund 
Debbie Hiatt - Secretary, State Insurance Fund 
Pursuant to the posted notice of the meeting and agenda, Chairman Deal called the Meeting 
of the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund to order at 2:00 p.m. 
Chairman Deal welcomed the Board and said the special meeting had been called for the 
purpose of discussing dividends, and turned the meeting over to Mr. Alcorn. 
Mr. Alcorn said as of the end of November, the Fund had over $30 million of profit for the 
year and $131 million in surplus. Based on that information, he suggested the dividend 
formula be the same as last year, which would amount to slightly over $8 million. He said 
last year's dividend came to approximately $6 million, but there was more premium to base 
the dividend on for the latest period. 
Mr. Alcorn recommended that they use the existing formula and not include policies under 
$2500 or less. He said if policies with premiums between $300 and $2500 were included, 
it would increase the total dividend paid by $420,000. 
Chairman Deal asked the Board members for their comments. Senator Goedde said he is 
happy with the $8 million - it makes sense to him and he agrees with the $2500 floor. 
Representative Snodgrass feels it is sufficient and indicated he has confidence in the 
Manager's recommendation. Mr. Geddes agreed to stay with the same formula, and Ms. 
Martin also concun-ed with the Manager's suggestion. 
Chairman Deal recapped that the Board unanimously agrees with the Manager's 
recommendation that a dividend of $8 million be paid, with the floor at $2500 to pay those 
dividends. 
Chainnan Deal reminded the Board that the next meeting was set for January 18, 2006 at 
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Mr. Alcorn said he invited the Fund's reinsurance brokers who will be reviewing how the 
Fund reinsures, how reinsurance works and the reinsurance markets, as a whole. 
Mr. Alcorn said they would also be discussing year-end financials and the 2006 budget and 
any other items the Board members would like to talk about. 
Ms. Martin asked if the meeting dates for the remainder of 2006 could be set at the January 
meeting. Chairman Deal asked Mr. Alcorn to look at the calendar and set some proposed 
dates for future meetings, based on the dates the Board met during 2005. Mr. Alcorn said 
he will send out an e-mail prior to the Board meeting, and provide some meeting date 
options at the January meeting. 
There being no further business before the Board, the Chainnan adjourned the meeting at 
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Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund 
Minutes of Meeting held January 22, 2004 
Board Members Present: 
Bill Deal, Chairman, Agents Representative 
Representative Wayne Meyer, Vice Chainnan, Legislative Representative 
Gerald Geddes, Employees Representative 
In addition to the Board members, the following individuals attended all, or a portion of, the 
meeting: 
James M. Alcorn -Manager, State Insurance Fund 
George Parham - Chief Legal Counsel, State Insurance Fund 
Debbie Hiatt - Secretary, State Insurance Fund 
Peter Marshall -Attorney, Marshall, Batt and Fisher 
PUIBuant to the posted notice of the meeting and agenda, Chairman Deal called the Meeting of 
the Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund to order at 9:35 a.m. 
Representative Meyer moved that the minutes of the meeting held October 2, 2003, be approved, 
seconded by Mr. Geddes. The motion to approve the minutes passed. 
Representative Meyer moved that the minutes of the special meeting held December 10, 2003, be 
approved, seconded by Mr. Geddes. The motion to approve the minutes passed. 
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the Quarterly StaJement of the State Insurance Fund/or the Period Ending 
September 30, 2003. He mentioned that the year-end financial statement is not required to be 
filed with the Department of Insurance until March. Assets, surplus, premiums, losses, reserves 
and investment income were reviewed and discussed. Chairman Deal inquired bow the Fund's 
loss ratio compared to the industry as a whole. Mr. Alcorn responded until the other companies 
file their annual statements with the Department of Insurance in March, he does not have 
information available to compare.-
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the Balance Sheet and Income Statement ending December 31, 2003. 
Mr. Alcorn reported the Fund had a 102.9 combined ratio before investment income compared to 
109.8 last year, and the loss ratio for year ending 2002 was 83.9 compared to 76.5 in 2003. 
Premiums were $134.3 million in 2002 and $162.2 million in 2003, for an increase of almost 
$30 million. 
Chairman Deal commented that this is a good loss ratio. Mr. Alcorn agreed and pointed out that 
over the last year, the Fund continued to write as many employers as it can, whereas other 
companies are picking only the best accounts. He further stated that other companies are 
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Mr. Alcorn clarified for Representative Meyer that the new workers comp rates are effective in 
January of each year. NCCI filed an average rate increase of 7.2% for 2004. It was approved by 
the Department of Insurance. 
Mr. Alcorn reviewed the year-end claim figures: 
• Medical paid was $58 miUion in 2003, compared to $54 million in 2002; 
• Time loss benefits paid were $44 million in 2003, compared to $41.8 milJion in 2002; 
• There were 20,348 new daims in 2003, compared to 20,374 in 2002. 
Mr. Alcorn said although medical was up $4 million and comp up $3-4 million, premium 
received increased $30 million. It said it is hard to determine if claiip.s costs are increasing, or if 
the increase in claims paid was just the result of an increase in policy count. He said the figures 
are still being reviewed. 
Mr. Deal said it had been a goal of the Fund to stay close to a 2:1 ratio on surplus and said the 
Fund accomplished that goal. Mr. Deal further stated that the manager had met the goals of 
keeping the surplus ratio where it should be and to keep the combined low. 
Mr. Geddes asked about Unearned Revenue; Mr. Alcorn explained it is unearned premium. He 
further explained the accounting process and why unearned revenue is a liability on the books. 
Mr. Alcorn distributed and discussed the 2004 budget and which provided a comparison against 
the 2003 budget. · 
He explained some of the main areas where the budget increased or decreased: 
• Personnel Expense - increase due to a 4% average pay raise for the employees, an extra 
pay period in 2004 and expected increase in insurance costs. Chairman Deal said the 
Department of Administration is putting the benefit package out to bid this year, but that 
an estimate of 16-19% increase could be expected. 
• A'.dministrative Expense - increase due to telephone switches being updated and making 
it so the district offices can transfer calls directly to the Boise Office, and updating 
photocopiers. 
• Communication Expense-increase due primarily to more outgoing correspondence 
postage. 
• Facilities Expense - the Fund is contracting directly for some of these services now rather 
that using the Department of Administration contracts and that is providing some savings. 
• Data Processing Expense - budget shows a decrease in DP Software-Developed. The 
Fund is contracting with some of the individuals on a direct basis now or has hired them 
as direct employees which has resulted in a net decrease in the expenses for this work. 
• Total Budget for Operating & Personnel Expenses - $27.1 in 2004 compared to $26.3 in 
2003; a 3.1 % increase over the 2003 budget. 
Representative Meyer asked how the pay increases are done and when they go into effect. Mr. 
Alcorn stated they are paid after evaluations. Many of the evaluations are done from February 
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through May. He further clarified that it is not an across the board 4% raise, but based on 
performance. He also mentioned that the Fund pays a longevity increase. Chairman Deal asked 
about employee turnover; Mr. Alcorn responded there is now very little turnover. 
Mr. Alcorn advised that he is setting up a meeting with the Hay Group to discuss performing a 
salary survey to compare Fund salaries to that of the other insurance companies doing business 
in the state and the region. He said the last survey was done five years ago. Mr. Marshall 
reminded the Board members they have a statutory responsible for making sure that the salaries 
are tied to the industry standards. Representative Meyer mentioned that economic problems of 
surrounding states should be taken into consideration when comparing salaries. Mr. Alcorn said 
he felt the salaries levels were probably not affected because companies tend to lay off 
employees rather than reducing salaries. Mr. Alcorn also informed the Board that salaries at the 
Fund were based on performance, market value of the job and what the job is worth to the Fund. 
Mr. Geddes asked what the increase amount was based on. Mr. Alcorn replied that it appears 
that private industry pay increases were between 3 ½% and 4 ½%. Chairman Deal stated he 
feels the analysis of pay was a good idea in light of the Board's statutory requirement. 
Mr. Alcorn discussed the dividend recently paid. He said the dividend was paid as discussed and· 
agreed upon in the December 10th meeting. He said the total dividend was approximately $5 
million and was based on the same formula as last year, with policyholders of $2500 or less 
premium not receiving a dividend. 
Mr. Alcorn discussed the cost of the policy. Mr. Alcorn said some have complained about 
overall costs going up because of the lower dividends. Surprisingly, many were the minimum 
premium policyholders not receiving a dividend. Mr. Alcorn said he has not received nearly the 
calls he received last year and compared to the overall number of policies, he feels the dividend 
procedure went relatively smooth. 
Mr. Geckles asked Chairman Deal and Representative Meyer if they had noticed new growth in 
the state.· R~presentative Meyer said northern Idaho is rapidly growing. 
Representative Meyer inquired if they had any idea when the vacant Board position might be 
filled. Mr. Alcorn and Chairman Deal both said they have not heard anything from the Governor 
on the appointment of a new Board member. 
Representative Meyer moved, and Mr. Geddes seconded, that the Board go into Executive 
Session as outlined in Idaho Code section 67-2345 to discuss legal and personnel issues. Roll 
call: 
Board Member Vote 
Chairman Bill Deal Aye 
Representative Wayne Meyer Aye 
Gerald Geddes Aye 
The motion passed and the Board went into Executive Session. Upon completion of Executive 
Session, the Board went back into Open Session . 
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Mr. Geddes moved to renew Mr. AJcorn's contract for an additional two-year period with a 
salary increase to $145,000; seconded by Representative Meyer; motion passed. ·On behalf of 
the Board, Mr. Deal expressed his gratitude to Mr. Alcorn for his continued good work and for . 
meeting the goals set for the Fund. Mr. Alcorn thanked the Board for their comments, and 
accepted the two year contract. The Board authorized Chairman Deal to execute a new contract. 
Mr. Alcorn infonned the Board that he has been questioned on numerous occasions as to why the 
Fund does not advertise their services to encourage new business as well as to counteract any 
negative comments. Some question why the Fund does not blow its own horn more. He asked 
for the Board's input. 
Chainnan Deal said that in the past, there was animosity between the Fund and the private 
carriers and Mr. Alcorn has overcome that. He has been able to show that the Fund can 
successfully operate without actively attempting to talce business.away from the private sector. 
Chainnan Deal said he feels that word of mouth is sufficient advertisement Mr. Geddes feels 
the Fund shows they are a dedicated agency with dedicated servants, and the Fund gets their 
recognition based on performance and the confidence oftheit policyholders. It·was the Board's 
consensus that the Fund not actively advertise their services. 
On behalf of the Board, Chairman Deal thanked Peter Marshall for his excellent legal 
representation to the Board of Directors, and wished him the best on his retirement. Mr. Alcorn 
added that Mr. Marshall's expertise has been invaluable over the years. He said that he was 
always amazed at how well Mr. Marshall was prepared and on top of a subject. Mr. Marshall 
thanked the Board and said he has enjoyed working with them. 
The next regular meeting of the Board was scheduled for Wednesday, April 14, at 9:00 a.m. 
There being no other business before the Board, the meeting was adjourned at 3:45 p.m. 
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General Car & E:xheust 
1524 First Street So. 
Nampa, ID 83651 
STATE. OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY oeNERAL 
LAWRENCE O. WASDEN 
January 22, 2003 
Re: State Insurance Fund - DMdend Polley 
Dear Mr. Egusqulza: 
On January 8, 2003, you phoned our office seeking assistance regarding your workers' 
compensaUon policy purchased through the ldaho State lnsuranoe Fund. After leamlng 
you had called, I requested that Bridget Vaughan In my dlvlsfon, return your call, which · 
she did. During that conversatton, you voiced your dissatisfaction with the State 
1nsurance Fund1s decision no1 to lssue you a dtvldend this policy year. The Fund Issued 
a 1ettar to its Insureds advising It hes elected not to Issue dividends to pollcyholders 
whose annual premium charges were less than $2,500.00. lt Is my understanding that 
you spoke with State Insurance Fund Manager Jim· Alcorn end you related your 
objections to this policy. Since you were not entirely satisfied wtth Mr. Aloom·s 
re~ponse, you contacted the Office of the Attorney General. · 
This office has contacted Mr. Alcorn and reviewed the stah.tta that euthorlzas the Fund 
Manager to Issue dividends. Idaho Code Section 72-916 gives the Manager 
discretionary authority to Issue dividends as he deems may be safely and property 
divided. In recant years, the State Insurance Fund has Issued substantial premium 
refunds (dividends) to its Insureds. l understand from the State Insurance Fund that thrs 
was ·possible at least In part because of tha strong eoonomy and the posltlve effects on 
the State Insurance Fund's Investments. The Fund also elected to reduce a large 
surplus that had accumulated over the course of the 1990's. That surplus has now 
been reduced, and this year new criteria were ·established for receipt of a dividend, 
lnciudlng a decision not to award dividends to pollcyholdere whose premium charg&e 
did not exceed $2,500.00. The premium refun_d was :proportlonally smaller than In 
previous years. · Twenty~flve mllllon dollars· was In the . dividend pool la~ year. This 
year, that figure was reduced to $4,000.000.00. · 
P.O. Box 8372.0. Bolao, Idaho 83720-0010 
Tolephoi'lt: (208) 3344.00, FAX: ~8} 334-2530 
LOOI.I~ 11100 w. J1t11raon sire.1, Stittl 210 
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It appears the actions taken by the State Insurance Fund with respect to Its Issuance of 
dividends are within the Manager's discretion. I am sorry I could not be of more help to 
you. Unfortunately, many State Fund policyholders who are accustomed to receMng 
dividends were not Issued a premium refund this year. If you wish to pursue this matter 
further, you should communicate with the State Insurance Fund again. 
S1ncerely, 
DAVID G. HIGH 







































LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
1199 W. Main Street 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-343-5200 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
~r{f:r,--. 
~1bt_) 
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MAR 1 2 2007 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
T WHITE, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, 
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER 
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TIIE IDAHO ST ATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their 
capacity as member of the Board of Directors of 
the State Insurance Fund 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7877 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview: What the current Summary Judgment proceeding should and 
should not be about. 
Upon completing a review of the memoranda filed by the parties in support of their 
respective motions for summary judgment, the Court will no doubt have noticed that the parties see 
the seminal issue of this case very differently. Plaintiffs have contended that the SIP does not have 
discretion with respect to the calculus to be used in making an allocation, among policy holders, of 
any dividends which are declared and distributed by the SIP. The premise of this contention lies in 
the fact that the Legislature, it its wisdom, has clearly and unambiguously mandated that after the 
State Insurance Fund (hereinafter referred to as SIP) has exercised its discretion and decided to 
distribute an amount equal to that which is deemed to be excess surplus as a dividend, the dividend 
must then be allocated on a pro rata based calculus. Apparently being unable to make a cogent 
argument for the proposition that it has discretion with respect to the allocation calculus, the SIP has 
sought, under the guise of claiming that the Court must find that it has not abused its discretion, to 
divert the inquiry away from "Does the SIP have discretion?" to "Should the SIP have discretion?" 
There are essentially three problems with this approach. First, by appearing to be urging that 
the Court must find that it has not abused its discretion, the SIP is raising a claim which is both 
untimely (as will be addressed in Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings 
Pursuant to Rule 56(1)) but also outside of the issues that counsel for the SIP advised the Court and 
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the Plaintiffs, would be raised at this time. 1 Second, by appearing to be urging that the Court must 
find that it has not abused its discretion, the SIF is inviting the Plaintiffs and the Court to waste 
valuable resources upon a complicated fact and business theory dependent "abuse of discretion" 
analysis before it has even been ruled that the SIF has any relevant discretion. Third, to the extent 
that the SIF is asking the Court to consider whether or not the SIF "should" have the relevant 
discretion, it is improperly inviting the Court to engage in an evaluation which belongs exclusively 
within the authority of the Legislature. 
Perhaps the historical events, asserted facts, self professed rational thought process, claims 
about the demands of the marketplace and other extraneous information set out in the Memorandum 
In Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment and the supporting affidavits might be 
enough to carry the day in legislative proceedings in which all the competing interests can participate 
and each can bring to bear their specialized knowledge of the issues. However, to the extent that 
these matters are put forth here as supporting the conclusion that the SIF must have discretion 
because it makes sense for them to have discretion, they have no place in this proceeding. 
These matters are within the province of the Legislature and not of this Court.2 Moreover, 
until this Court determines that the provisions of the I.C. § 72-915 relative to the dividend allocation 
1 A transcript has been ordered but the undersigned distinctly recall that Counsel for Defendants advised 
the Court and Plaintiffs' Counsel that they were requesting the summary judgment hearing requested by Plaintiffs 
be delayed so that they could raise Statute of Limitations, Waiver and Standing arguments. If"lack of abuse of 
discretion" had been identified as an issue, the undersigned would have then raised the concerns identified in the 
Motion to Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 56(/). Indeed, Ms. Duke's affidavit of 
1/26/07 in support of a continuance seems to dwell on the necessity of 1/26/07 having Mr. Alcorn handy to "fmalize 
defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." 
2 As it acknowledges, the rates to be charged by the SIF are regulated and while it can and regularly does 
seek to deviate downward (a rational step because it has no need to make a profit). What it does not acknowledge is 
that a dividend is little more than an after the fact rate deviation. It is very reasonable to think that the legislature 
never intended to give the SIF the power to discriminate against lower premium policy holders in an after the fact 
rate adjustment. If some have overpaid for the risk protection, then all have overpaid and allowing the SIF to give 
some of the small premium policyholders' overpayments back to large premium policyholder could easily be seen 
as given the SIF unfair advantage over companies which could not give special rate breaks to secure the large 
premium policies. 
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calculus either explicitly confers discretion upon the SIF or are either unclear or ambiguous, all of 
the information which purportedly supports the rationality of the allocation calculus being used by 
the SIF amounts to nothing more than a plea for judicial activism instead of the application non-
ambiguous statutory language. 
B. Overview: Clarifying the terminology 
To fully appreciate the nuances of the debate set out at length in the respective supporting 
memoranda, it is important to understand that there are five independent steps in the dividend 
declarqtion and distribution process. 
The first step toward declaration is to determine whether there is a aggregate balance in the 
surplus funds attributable to any classes of employment or industries - this is a fact finding step. 
The second step in the declaration process is to detennine whether, in the judgment of the Manager, 
this balance may be "safely and properly divided" - this is a mixed fact finding and discretionary 
step. 
The first step in the distribution process is for the Manager to decide whether to exercise his 
discretionary power to proceed to distribute that dividend - this is an entirely discretionary step. The 
second step in the distribution process is the mathematical process of allocating or crediting to each 
qualified member (policy held for more than six months during the applicable period) of the classes 
of employment or industries as to which there is adequate surplus funds "such proportion of such 
balance as he may be properly entitled to, having regard, to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment ofrates"-this is a purely ministerial step which allows for no discretion in the selection 
of an allocation calculus. LC. § 72-915. Of course, the final step in the distribution process is the 
purely ministerial act of getting the money to the policyholders by way of outright payment or by 
crediting their accounts. 
C. Overview: Matters about which there needs to be no further debate. 
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Defendants have gone to great length, in their Memorandum In Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, to make clear that the Manager has discretion over the declaration 
process and the first step of the distribution process ( deciding to distribute) and that he has not, based 
upon the record of this case, abused that discretion. What seems to be lost upon Defendants is that 
Plaintiffs have not and do not challenge the fact that the Manager has discretion over these first three 
steps in the declaration and distribution process. Specifically, Plaintiffs do not challenge that upon 
finding that there is a surplus balance, the Manager does have the discretion to decide whether some 
portion of those funds can be safely and properly divided. Upon making an affirmative 
determination on that point, the Manager has the discretion to decide whether some portion of those 
available surplus funds should be distributed among policy holders. Plaintiffs recognize that the 
foundational criteria for the exercise of discretion and the actual conference of discretion are both 
clear in the language ofl.C. § 72-915 and unequivocally supported by the holding in Kelso. 
D. Overview: Matters which are "in play" 
Plaintiffs' claims in this matter do focus entirely upon the SIF's execution of the second step 
in the dividend distribution process. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenge here the determination made 
with respect to the calculus used in allocating the surplus funds the Manager chooses to distribute 
as a dividend. In this regard, the Plaintiffs initial claim is that the Manager lacks the discretion to 
first ignore the allocation calculus provided by the Idaho Legislature (pro rata among policy holders 
qualified only by duration of policy) and then to choose to utilize some other calculus not provided 
by statute. Complaint and Proposed First Amended Complaint ,r 8. Secondarily, Plaintiffs claim 
that even if the Manager has some lawfully afforded discretion to determine the calculus to be used 
in allocating a declared dividend among policy holders, that discretion has been abused with respect 
to the distribution of dividends declared since 2002 by being exercised in an arbitrary manner. 
Complaint and Proposed First Amended Complaint ,r 14. It is the first claim which Plaintiffs 
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believe must, for the sake of judicial economy, be resolved before extensive discovery and debate 
should proceed on the second claim. 
E. Overview: What issues will and will not be addressed in the Memorandum 
For all the reasons discussed above Plaintiffs submit that there are only four issues properly 
before the Court for summary judgment resolution at this time. Those matters are: (1) does the SIP 
have discretion over the allocation calculus used in the distribution process; (2) do the Plaintiffs 
have standing; (3) what is the correct statute oflimitations; and, (4) have the Plaintiffs waived their 
objections to the allocation calculus that has been used since the SIP stopped paying dividends to 
policyholders who were paying premiums of $2,500 or less. 
The first of these issues-does discretion exist- is the subject of the Plaintiffs' Motion. The 
other three relevant and timely issues - standing, statute oflimitations and waiver, are the legitimate 
part of the Defendants' motion and will be addressed below. 
Beyond this, the Plaintiffs decline to participate in sidetracking the Court's focus from these 
issues onto debates that, in their view, the Court is never going to need to hear. For this reason and 
consistent with the Motion to Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 5 6(1) 
which Plaintiffs have filed ( or will in short order file), Plaintiffs, without intending to waive the right 
to do so, are not going to challenge in this Memorandum any of the Defendants' assertions about 
"undisputed facts" which bear upon whether the SIP has acted appropriately in the selection of a 
allocation calculus other than the pro rata calculus called for by law. 
In addition, again without intending a waiver, Plaintiffs are not going to respond to most of 
the discussion or arguments in the Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment heading Bat pages 16-32.3 This section of the SIF's Memorandum professes to address 
the right to summary judgment on the basis that the "SIF Manager exercised his statutory authority 
in issuing dividends and deciding who would receive those dividend." And goes far beyond what 
the defense counsel advised the court and the undersigned what would be presented at this time. 
II. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS 
A. STANDING 
The SIF asserts that Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue the SIF to challenge the dividend 
allocation calculus that it has been using since the dividend distributed in early 2003 in a manner 
which favors only some policy holders. This assertion appears to be hinged upon the erroneous 
belief that Kelso &Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130,997 P.2d 591 (2000) stands 
for the proposition that no policy holder has any claim to or interest in funds within the control of 
the State Insurance Fund. Relying upon this overly broad reading of Kelso, the SIF assert Plaintiffs 
have no legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. Relying 
upon this conclusion and its understanding of the holdings regarding standing in Troutner v. 
Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 128 P.3d 926 (2006), the SIF concludes that Plaintiffs cannot assert a 
claim for a violation of a statute which is by law incorporated into their contracts with the State 
Insurance Fund. Aside from being based upon a misreading of Kelso, the conclusion that Plaintiffs 
lack standing is contrary to the subsequent conclusion of the Court in Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399-402 11 P.3d 73, 84-87 (2005) . 
To fully appreciate the defect in the SIF's argument regarding standing, it is necessary to 
3 So far as Plaintiffs can discern not a single word on these 16 pages demonstrates how the last 6 lines of 
I.C. § 72-915 can be seen as unclear as to the intent of the legislature, or ambiguous in establishing the precise 
allocation calculus to be utilized by the manager or anything other than an explicit and controlling limitation on the 
discretion of the SIF as to the allocation phase of the dividend distribution process. Until it is shown that the statute 
cannot be applied as written,any discussion about why it is necessary to construe that statute as affording discretion 
is premature. See, e.g. Barbee v. W'.MA Secs., Inc.,_ Idaho __ , 146 P.3d 657, 660 (Idaho 2006) 
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have the relevant legal principles and the root claim of the Plaintiffs in this matter in mind. It is oft 
repeated that the evaluation of standing turns not upon the claim being asserted but rather upon the 
interests of the person asserting the claim. See, e.g., Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,641, 
778 P.2d 757, 763 (Idaho 1989). Underlying this inquiry is the view that a person pursuing a claim 
must have a personal stake which is greater than the stake of the public at large in order to assure that 
this party has suffered a "distinct palpable injury" that is "fairly traceable" to challenged conduct, 
Id. citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). To satisfy this 
standing requirement, "litigants must allege an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that judicial 
relief will redress the alleged injury.Milesv. Idaho Power, supra, 116 Idaho at 641,778 P.2d at 763. 
Under this standard, the allegation of injury and of judicial relief which will redress the injury is 
sufficient for satisfaction of the standing requirement which "does not require that the party prove 
their case before the commencement of trial." Pro Indiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 
741, 746 (Idaho 1998). 
In this regard, Plaintiffs contend that they have been improperly denied a pro rata share of 
dividends which were actually declared and actually distributed for the reason that the Manager 
improperly employed an allocation calculus different from the pro rata based calculus provided for 
by the explicit provisions of LC. § 72-915. That is an alleged injury in fact. They have requested 
that the Court give them judgment allowing them to force the SIF to pay them the amounts that have 
been denied. Thus, injury and a relief that will redress that injury have been plead and standing has 
been established under Idaho law. 
1. The SIF misapprehends the import of the holding in Kelso. 
While the SIF spends several pages essentially regurgitating the analysis that lead the Court 
to the conclusions that it reached under the heading "A. Kelso Has No Vested Property Right in the 
Surplus and Assets of the State Insurance Fund Sufficient to Support a Claim for Relief." Kelso, 
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134 Idaho 133-136, 997 P.2d 595- 597 (2000), there are two very critical aspects of the holding in 
Kelso which Defendants have apparently overlooked. First, while the Court concludes that the 
plaintiff in Kelso had no vested property right in the surplus and assets of the SIP sufficient to 
support the claims being made in the case, it nonetheless concluded that the plaintiff had breach of 
contract claims which had to be remanded for determination. Second, at the core of the claim 
asserted by the plaintiff in Kelso was a contention that the SIP had accumulated an excessive surplus. 
The claim primarily turned upon a construction ofl.C. § 72-911. The section at issue in this case, 
LC. 72-915, was only mentioned by the Court because the SIP asserted that it conferred discretion 
upon the Manager of the SIP to accumulate surplus until there was a balance which he determined 
could be safely and properly divided. Notwithstanding this claim, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
in Kelso had stated a breach of contract claim which was remanded for consideration by the District 
Court.4 When these aspects of Kelso are taken into account, it becomes apparent that the Court has 
never concluded either: 
a. That nothing in the language of I. C. § 72-915 gives rise to a vested property interest 
in funds held by the SIP; or, 
· b. That, in the absence of a vested property interest in the funds held by the SIP, a 
policyholder could not maintain an action against the SIP for a failure to perform one 
of the duties to its policyholders which are imposed upon it by the laws which govern 
its conduct. 
When these limitations of the breadth of the holding in Kelso are taken into account, it is 
apparent that the case provides no basis for concluding that Plaintiffs in this case have no standing 
4 This breach of contract claim ultimately failed because the Court concluded that I.C. § 72-911 did not 
create a limit upon how much swplus could be accumulated and other sections of the law including I.C. § 72-915 
make clear that the legislature intended to give the Manager discretion over how much swplus was accumulated. 
From this determination the Court went on to conclude that there was no evidence that the Manager has abused this 
discretion. Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 399-402, 11 P.3d 73, 84-87 (2005). 
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to maintain a claim premised upon the assertion that once the Manager has found that some portion 
of the surplus held by the SIF may be safely and properly divided and elected to begin to distribute 
that portion of the surplus, he cannot thereafter deny policyholders the right to receive a pro rata 
share of the dividend. 
It is apparent that without regard to whether the plaintiffs in Kelso had a vested property 
right, they had the right to and did pursue their claim that they were damaged by the failure of the 
Manager to perform one of the duties he owed the policyholders based upon the statutes enacted to 
govern the SIF. Indeed, after remand of these claims, a standing challenge was raised by the SIF as 
to the request for declaratory relief and this challenge was rejected by the District Court. Hayden 
Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho at 395, 11 P.3d at 80 (2005). On appeal, while 
noting that the challenge had been raised the Supreme Court, apparently did not consider it worth 
evaluating further as it went on to hold that the District Court had properly concluded that with 
respect to the particular claims asserted by the plaintiffs as violations of the Manager's statutory 
duties, the Manager had discretion and had not abused that discretion. (Hayden Lake Fire Protection 
District, 141 Idaho at 399-402, 11 P.3d at 84-87 (2005).) Id. at 399-402, 11 P.3d at 84-87. 
2. The holding in Troutner v. Kempthorne has no bearing upon an evaluation of 
whether the Plaintiffs in this action have standing. 
Defendants' reliance upon the holding in Troutner v. Kempthorne as a guide to the evaluation 
of whether Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the Manager's failure to use the pro rata based 
calculus called for by the provisions of LC. § 72-915 is misplaced. The holding in Troutner v. 
Kempthorne adds nothing to the analysis. The Court merely reiterates the requirement that the 
plaintiff must suffer some injury which is distinct from any injury suffered equally by all and which 
is palpable. After examining the claims of the plaintiff in Troutner, the Court concludes that to the 
extent it is an injury at all, it is an injury suffered by everyone in the State in equal measure. 
Troutner, 142 Idaho at 391-393, 128 P.3d at 928-930. 
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Troutner really adds nothing to Idaho jurisprudence. " ... a citizen and taxpayer may not 
challenge a governmental enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and 
taxpayers of the jurisdiction." Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798,800 (2002) citing Mi/es, supra, at 
641. "[Plaintiffs] must 'establish a peculiar or personal injury that is different than that suffered by 
any other member of the public."' Id. citing Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass 'n v. State, 128 Idaho 831, 83 4 
(1996). Since the SIF's policy holders-- Plaintiffs here-- do not fall in the category of all tax payers 
or all members of the public Troutner is misapplied by Defendants. 
Based upon the claims made in this case, the Court should conclude that Plaintiffs have, at 
minimum, asserted a heretofore unresolved claim to a vested property right to receive a pro rata 
share of a dividend once the Manager of the SIP exercises his discretion and determines that it is 
appropriate to distribute a dividend. The Plaintiffs have a right previously recognized in Kelso to 
bring an action to assert that the Manager has violated a statutorily-imposed duty to them relative 
to dividends. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to conclude that the Plaintiffs have alleged 
a distinct and palpable injury which can be addressed by judicial relief and that they have, therefore, 
standing to pursue their claim. 
B. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
As Defendants properly acknowledge, the parties to this action are also parties to an 
insurance contract. The terms and conditions which establish the relative powers, duties, and 
obligations of the parties to this insurance contract are not only those set out within the contract but 
also those provisions ofldaho Code which direct and control the conduct of the SIP and which are 
incorporated into the policyholder's contract with the SIP. This "incorporation" is such that any 
conduct by SIP which violates the terms of the statutes which are incorporated into the contract, are 
a breach of that contract. Kelso, supra, 134 Idaho at 138,997 P.2d at 599 ("Consequently, any act 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 11 
0001.10 
taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority would also be a breach of the SIF's contract with 
Kelso."). 
While this would seem to compel the conclusion that the statute oflimitations which applies 
to the breach of a written contract document (5 years) would also apply to a breach of the terms 
"incorporated" into contract by law, Defendants have pointed to what they believe is contrary 
authority. In Hayden Lake Fire Protection District v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 11 P.3d 73 (2005) the 
Court concluded that the statute of limitations applicable to actions upon a "liability created by 
statute" (3 years, LC. §5-218) applied to prevent the Plaintiff in that case from pursuing a claims that 
the SIF had violated LC. 41-722 by entering into certain purchase and lease agreements which were 
all entered into by SIF more than three years prior to the filing of the Complaint. See, Hayden Lake 
Fire Protection District, supra, 141 Idaho at 394-395 and 404, 111 P.3d at 79-80 and 88. The 
decision provides very little insight into the Court's analysis of the issue other than to confirm that 
the "conclusion" of the District Court was correct. The "conclusion" which appears to have been 
affirmed is that the holding in Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916), 
probably is not controlling because of the decision in Kelso, supra. Hayden does provide "'useful 
support of the proposition that the true gravamen of the plaintiffs' claims should control the question 
of what statute of limitations is applicable rather than the way the claims are actually plead"'. 
Hayden Lake Fire Protection District, supra, 141 Idaho at 404, 111 P.3d 89 (citing from and 
providing emphasis to the District Court Memorandum Decision and Order of 11/14/01 ). On close 
analysis it becomes apparent that the Defendants' are actually asking this Court to extend the 
application of LC. 5-218 beyond the logical extreme and to the point of rendering the holding in 
Kelso (the statutes are incorporated into the SIF contract) meaningless. 
The gravemen of the Plaintiffs' case is their contractual right to a pro rata share of those 
monies distributed by the SIF to its policy holders as a dividend. As we have seen, Kelso, supra, 
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compels this identification of the gravemen, i.e., a case sounding in contract and a written contract 
at that. This allows a five-year statute to be applied. "The defense of statute oflimitations is never 
favored by the Courts, and if there is doubt as to which of two limitation periods should apply, courts 
generally apply the longer. Gust, et al. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 898 P .2d 964, 968 (Mont. 
1995). "Because statutes of limitation are in derogation of a presumptively valid claim, a longer 
period of limitations should prevail if two statutes are arguably applicable." Aneco Ins. Co. v. 
Rockwell, 940 P .2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997). This principle seems to be widely held. See, 
e.g., Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Anderson, 983 P.2d 999, 1002 (Ariz. 1999); Global Financial 
Services, Inc. v. Duttenhefuer, 575 N.W. 2d 667,671 (N.D. 1998); Zoss v. Schafers, 598 N.W. 2d 
550, 553 (S.D. 1999). 
Idaho does not have a case directly on point, but holdings in this state are clear that "The 
substance, not the form, of the action controls and determines the applicable Statute of Limitations." 
Barnett v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 99 Idaho 246 (1978). Stated somewhat differently, the 
"' appropriate statute of limitations is determined by the substance, not the form, of the action."' 
Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen, 140 Idaho 144, 148 (2004). 
Kelso itself is awfully clear: 
It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation 
insurance with the SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that 
contract would constitute a breach of contract by the SIF. 
Additionally the contract necessarily incorporates the statutory 
framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that 
can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds . . . 
Consequently, any act taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority 
would also be a breach of the SIF's contract with Kelso. At 138. 
Thus, whether we analyze this as a contest between two statutes which are arguably 
applicable or we focus on the substance of this action, we are looking squarely at LC.§ 5-216 and 
a five-year statute governing a breach of contract claim where the smaller policy holders have been 
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the victims of multiple breaches of contract. 
The Court needs no reminder that in Kelso the Plaintiffs made numerous claims regarding 
the conduct of the SIF. All claims were dismissed by the District Court. Most of the District Court's 
decisions were upheld on appeal but two breach of contract claims were remanded for further 
proceedings. The Court was not called upon to consider and did not consider whether one or both 
of these claims might be precluded by the statute of limitations. One of the claims which was 
remanded arose from the assertion that the SIF had failed to perform duties imposed upon it, a 
section within the chapter of the Idaho Code which created the SIF and which directly governs its 
conduct, specifically LC. § 72-911. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 139, 997 P.2d at 599. The other claim 
sought an accounting for squandered assets and acted beyond its statutory authority when it 
purchased certain real property. Kelso, 134 Idaho at 140, 997 P.2d at 600 (portion of the SIF had 
acted beyond its statutory, authority and which provides for the statutes applicable to the SIF to be 
incorporated into its contracts). While it is not made clear in the decision in Kelso what provision 
ofldaho law created the foundation for this claim, the case was remanded and consolidated into the 
District Court proceedings chronicled in Hayden and from the decision in Hayden, it appears that 
the claims relative to improper real estate transactions were premised upon the assertion what were 
professed to be leases or mortgage loans and if they were loans they violated the provisions of LC. 
§41-722. Hayden at 141 Idaho 393-394, 111 P.3d 78-79. 
The final step in the process of recognizing the irrelevance of the holding in Hayden relative 
to the applicable statute of limitations involves a close analysis of the holding in Hayden. At the 
outset, it is important to note that by the time both the District Court and the Supreme Court got to 
the point of determining which statute of limitations applied to the Plaintiffs' claims, both had 
already concluded that the Plaintiffs could not recover upon their claims premised upon LC. §72-
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911. Hayden at 141 Idaho 394-396, 398-399, 111 P.3d 79-81, 83-84. With respect to the claims 
premised upon LC. § 41-722 the Court in Hayden held that the 3 year statute of limitations 
applicable to a "liability created by statute" was properly relied upon to dismiss the Plaintiffs' (SIF 
policy holders) claims against the SIF . The statute involved in Hayden, is found in the chapter of 
the Idaho Insurance Code which regulated the investments which may be made by insurance 
companies doing business in Idaho. Unlike in Dietrich where the statute provided for the 
defendants, as directors of an ultra vires corporation, to be personally liable to persons dealing with 
the Corporation, nothing in the language ofl.C. § 41-722 provides that the insurance company will 
be liable to its policy holders for a violation of LC. § 41-722.5 
Having completed the analytical steps discussed above, it is apparent not only that the 
Hayden Court did not conclude and would not have concluded that the 3 year statute oflimitations 
is applicable to actions premised upon a violation of the provisions of LC., §72-901 et. seq., which 
create and expressly govern the conduct of the SIF and which are incorporated into the contract 
between the SIF and its policyholders. While the Court in Hayden does not detail its reasoning, it 
is clear that at the time of considering what statute of limitations was applicable, the only claim 
under consideration was the claim that certain real estate transactions violated the Idaho Insurance 
Code which is generally applicable to all insurance companies doing business in Idaho. It is also 
apparent from the decision in Hayden, that the Court perceives some elasticity in the language of 
LC. § 5-218 ("an action upon a liability created by statute") so that it might apply to at least some 
"statutory violations." However, the reiteration of the District Court's conclusion that Dietrich 
probably does not control in light of Kelso and the emphasis the Court places upon the word 
5 Indeed, the Department of Insurance is charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Idaho Insurance 
Code and it is not at all clear that an insured even has a private cause of action for investments which violate the 
provisions of the Idaho Insurance Code. 
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"gravaman" which is used by the District Court indicates that the Court recognizes that there is a 
difference between claims premised upon the contract (which, per Kelso, incorporates provisions of 
LC.§ 72-901 et. seq. which explicitly governs the conduct of the SIF) and claims premised upon a 
violation of the provisions of the Idaho Insurance Code. · 
When the claim made in this case is considered in light the facts, statutes and case law 
underlying the holding in Hayden it is apparent that gravaman of Plaintiffs' claim is their contract 
with the SIF.6 The claim is not premised upon a violation of the general insurance law ofldaho 
which regulates the conduct of all insurance companies doing business in Idaho. The claim is 
premised upon a violation of a duty that only the SIF owes to a policyholder, that the SIF owes only 
to its policyholders and that only its policyholders can force the SIF to honor. Without a contract 
between Plaintiffs and the SIF, there would be no claim that Plaintiffs can make. The gravamen of 
this action is the contract and the correct statute of limitations is the 5 year statute applicable to 
written contracts (J.C. § 5-216). If this is not the correct conclusion then Kelso 's requirement that 
the statutes governing the SIF be treated as being incorporated into the contract between the parties 
is meaningless. 
C. WAIVER 
Defendants have asserted that for each policy year that has an inception date after the 
dividend distribution which occurred in 2003, the Plaintiffs have waived their objection to the 
dividend allocation calculus being used by the SIF. Exactly how this assertion is justified by the 
6 It is worth noting that the District Court in Hayden at stated that the pleadings were not the controlling 
consideration and that the Court should look instead to the gravaman. Hayden, 141 Idaho 395, 111 P.3d 80. The 
Defendants have noted that the Complaint in this matter does not allege "breach of contract." To the extent that this 
is considered a critical fact relevant to the determination then the correct remedy is to afford the Plaintiffs an 
opportunity to amend the complaint. A dismissal at this point for this reason will only lead to an immediate refiling 
of the complaint and, if Plaintiffs are correct about the applicability of the 5 year contract statute of limitations then 
a complaint filed in April of 2007 will reach back to April of 2002 and sweep in all claims relating to dividends at 
issue in this matter. 
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facts of this case is difficult to discern. In some respects, it appears that the claim is really a "failure 
to mitigate claim." In other respects, it appears that the claim is that the purchase of a new policy 
is a waiver of any objection about the previous policy year distribution allocation. In still other 
respects, it appears that the claim is that the purchase of a new policy is a waiver of any objection 
about the distribution allocation for the policy just purchased. 
These various claims will be taken up in turn but at the outset it is worth noting that the SIF 
has cited not a single case in support of this waiver/failure to mitigate argument. The only authority 
cited, 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 638, clearly pertains only to the fact that under appropriate 
circumstances, that party A can be held to have waived a contractual requirement that the party B 
perform some act before party A is expected to perform. This case does not involve such a 
circumstance and the SIF has not provided any authority for the proposition that when Mary, who 
has previously contracted with Bob enters into a subsequent contract with Bob, Mary can be seen 
has having waived her objection Bob's performance on the earlier contract. Nor has the SIF 
provided any authority for the proposition that, given the same history, where Bob is free to decide 
to behave differently with respect to the second contract and has provided no indication that he will 
not reform his ways, Mary's decision to enter into the second contract can possibly be seen as a 
waiver of the right to hold Bob accountable ifhe also breaches the second contract. Finally, the SIF 
has provided no authority for the proposition that, absent a clear showing that Mary's damages 
arising from Bob's deficient conduct exceed the damages she would sustain by being forced to enter 
into a contract with Bill solely to preserve her right to force Bob to pay for the damage he has 
caused, Bob can expect the Court to conclude, on summary judgment or otherwise, that Mary has 
failed to mitigate her damages. Plaintiffs, being themselves unable to find authority that would 
support such claims, is left to conclude that the SIF has cited no supporting authority because there 
is no supporting authority. 
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What can be said in general terms is that waiver and failure to mitigate have been asserted 
by the SIF as affirmative defenses. See, Answer to Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial, Third Defense and Fifth Defense. As the party seeking summary judgment based 
upon a affirmative defenses, the SIF has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of fact 
material with respect to those defenses. Mason v. Tucker & Assocs., 125 Idaho 429, 43 7, 871 P .2d 
846, 854(Idaho Ct. App. 1994). The SIF has not and on the record cannot meet this burden. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that ''waiver" is even an applicable defense in this matter 
- something the SIF has yet to demonstrate - the record will not support a fact finding that 
that the Plaintiffs, by purchasing policies after they had been passed over for dividends in previous 
years, have waived either their claim for previous damage for any policy purchased after they had 
previously been passed over. Initially, there is the fact that the Board of the SIF acts each year to 
decide if they will use the same dividend calculus as they used the previous year. Given this fact, 
there is no way for the Court, the Plaintiffs or even the Defendants to know at the beginning of a 
policy year what allocation calculus they intend to use if they decide to declare and distribute a 
dividend. Beyond this, the fact that the defense of waiver requires a good deal of specific evidence 
which is not inferable from the record, even if Court assumes that on any given policy inception date, 
each of the Plaintiffs knew that the SIF would use the same dividend allocation calculus when, 12 
to 18 months after the end of that policy year, they set about to distribute a dividend. It is well 
established that "waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage." 
Tiffany v. City of Payette, 121 Idaho 396,403,825 P.2d 493,500 (1992), quoting Brand S Corp. v. 
King, 102 Idaho 731,734,639 P.2d 429,432 (1981). While the Court could certainly conclude that 
each of the Plaintiffs voluntarily entered into new policies with the SIF after the dividend allocation 
which occurred in early 2003, there is simply no evidence that would support a finding or an 
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inference that they did so knowing that the conduct of the SIF was a breach of contract and with the 
intention of waiving the right to seek recovery of the dividends that they were wrongfully denied. 
Assuming for the sake of discussion that "failure to mitigate" is even an applicable defense 
in this matter - something the SIF has yet to demonstrate - the record will not support a fact finding 
that the Plaintiffs, by purchasing policies after they had been passed over for dividends in previous 
years, have failed to mitigate the theoretical damage that they might suffer if the SIF continued to 
use the same dividend allocation calculus. As Mr. Alcorn goes to lengths to point out, the SIF 
makes affordable coverage available to businesses that might end up in the far more expensive 
"assigned risk" coverage group. There is also the fact that while workers compensation insurance 
rates appear to be regulated, the SIF regularly elects to depart from those rates to lower rates. See, 
e.g. Document# CL00 14, attached part of Exhibit A, Affidavit of James M Alcorn. Assuming these 
things to be true, then the entry of summary judgment on the theoretically applicable affirmative 
defense of failure to mitigate is, based upon the record, precluded by an absence of evidence 
demonstrating that the Plaintiffs had reasonable alternatives. 
The SIF has failed to identify any law or facts which will support the entry of summary 
judgment in its favor on either the affirmative defenses of waiver or failure to mitigate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that in a summary judgment proceeding the 
Supreme Court, exercising its free review on matters of law, "construes all disputed facts liberally 
in favor of the non-moving party." Nerco, supra, at 148 citing Eagle Water Co., Inc. v. Roundy Pole 
Fence Co., 134 Idaho 626, 628 (2000). The same rule applies to the District Court. Doe v. Durtschi, 
110 Idaho 466, 469 (1986). 
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Defendants have not established either good law or undisputed facts which would allow them 
to prevail on the issues of waiver, standing and statutes oflimitation. It is respectfully requested that 
Defendants' motion on these issues be denied in all respects. 
Defendants broader motion for summary judgment may be taken up at a later time if 
necessary after the Court's ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. For the 
reasons set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Continue Summary Judgment 
Proceedings to Permit Discovery, and discussed above, Plaintiffs do not consider it reasonable or 
appropriate to expend any of their time or the Court's responding to the voluminous discussion in 
the Memorandum In Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-32, in support 
of the claim that the Manager has not abused discretion which neither I. C. §72-915 nor any Court 
decision has conferred upon him. If the Court disagrees, then leave of Court will be requested to 
brief the "surprise" issues contained in Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
d, 
DATED: thisii:lday of March, 2007. 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
(IJJL. b~ ~ ~' Prr-----
Donald W. Lojek Bruce S. Bistline 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, SCOTT ALAN 




THE IDAHO ST A TE INSURANCE 
FUND, JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, 
and WILLIAM DEAL, WAYNE MEYER, 
MARGUERITE McLAUGHLIN, 
GERALD GEDDES, MILFORD 
TERRELL, JUDI DANIELSON, JOHN 
GOEDDE, ELAINE MARTIN, and MARK 
SNODGRASS in their capacity as member 
of the Board of Directors of the State 
Insurance Fund, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7877 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW defendants, Idaho State Insurance Fund and James M. Alcorn, Manager of 
the State Insurance Fund ("SIF") ( collectively "SIF Defendants"), by and through their counsel 
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of record, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and hereby respectfully submit this 
memorandum in reply to plaintiffs' "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment." For the reasons stated below, SIF Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
In an attempt to escape the SIF Defendants' compelling arguments made in their 
summary judgment memorandum, plaintiffs focus on unwarranted personal attacks against 
defense counsel and inappropriately attempt to shift plaintiffs' burden of prosecuting this case to 
the SIF Defendants. Such attacks are nothing more than a diversion from one of the main 
dispositive issues in this case - whether the SIF Manager has the discretion to determine how a 
dividend will be allocated. 1 
As addressed in the SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the Idaho Legislature clearly and unambiguously provided the SIF and the Manager 
the discretion to declare a dividend and to determine how a dividend would be distributed. 
Notwithstanding that legislative mandate, plaintiffs want this Court to strip the SIF Defendants 
of that discretion by ignoring the language of Idaho Code Section 72-915, and by attempting to 
read that statute in a vacuum. As addressed in the SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs' argument fails and this Court should rule as a matter 
of law that the SIF Manager has the discretion to determine how a dividend is distributed and to 
dismiss plaintiffs' claims as a matter oflaw. 
1 Plaintiffs baldly assert that the SIF defendants failed to argue in their moving papers that the SIF Manager has the 
discretion to determine how a dividend will be distributed. As is evidenced by the SIF Defendants Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment, the SIF Defendants argued that the SIF Manager has been charged with determining 
whether a dividend will issue and, if so, who will be offered a dividend, on what basis the dividend will be offered, 
and when the dividend will be offered. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pgs. 16-22. 
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In addition, the SIF Defendants have provided substantial affidavit evidence supporting 
their position that Mr. Jim Alcorn, the SIF Manager, appropriately exercised his discretion in 
determining that policyholders of $2,500 or less would not receive a dividend from 2003 to 
2006. Significantly, plaintiffs elected not to refute the substantial evidence presented by the SIF 
Defendants. Rather, they took a gamble and are hoping that this Court will excuse their failure 
to prosecute this case and permit them additional time to respond. As addressed in the SIF 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Summary Judgment 
Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 56(f), SIF Defendants respectfully request that the Court deny 
plaintiffs' request and proceed with a hearing on this issue. Plaintiffs' failure to respond must be 
viewed as a concession of that particular issue and summary judgment should be granted in 
defendants' favor on the ground that there is no genuine issue of fact as to whether defendants 
abused their discretion in distributing the dividend. 
Lastly, as discussed in SIF Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and as addressed 
below, plaintiffs fail to adequately challenge the SIF Defendants' arguments on standing, statute 
of limitations, and waiver; accordingly, as there is no genuine issue of fact on the issues of 
standing, statute of limitations, and waiver, summary judgment should be granted in defendants' 
favor on these three issues as well. 
A. 
ARGUMENT 
PLAINTIFFS MISCONSTRUE SIF DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENT IN A 
DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO POSTPONE THE HEARING BY FIRST ASKING 
THE COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY EVEN HA VE A 
LEGITIMATE LEG TO STAND ON. 
It is clear that plaintiffs either do not fully comprehend the entirety of SIF Defendants' 
position, or they are attempting to avoid confronting the compelling arguments advanced by SIF 
Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' misguided assertions that the SIF 
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Defendants are unable to make a cogent argument for the proposition that the SIF has discretion 
with respect to how declared dividends can be distributed, and instead seek to "divert the inquiry 
away from 'Does the SIF have discretion?' to 'Should the SIF have discretion?"' is not only 
wrought with error, but all flair and no substance.2 
In support of their decision to cower from SIF Defendants' compelling arguments, 
plaintiffs raise three hollow excuses in seeking this Court's protection. The first two excuses are 
addressed in SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Conti~ue 
Summary Judgment Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 56(f), thus need not be repeated here.3 The 
third excuse is based on the erroneous premise that the SIF Defendants are improperly inviting 
the Court to engage in an evaluation which belongs exclusively within the authority of the 
Legislature.4 By making this statement, it is clear that plaintiffs misunderstand the Court's role 
in statutory construction, as well as the central argument advanced by SIF Defendants in this 
matter. 
1. Plaintiffs' attempt to read LC. Section 72-915 in a vacuum violates the rules of 
statutory construction as set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court that, among other 
things, statutory provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in 
the context of the entire document. 
One of the central arguments raised by SIF Defendants in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment is that plaintiffs inappropriately attempt to read I.C. Section 72-915 in a vacuum by 
ignoring the remainder of Title 72, Chapter 9, which, significantly, includes the purposes of the 
2 See plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("plaintiffs' 
Memorandum"), pg. 2. 
3 The first excuse raised by plaintiffs is that defense counsel for the SIF limited the arguments in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment to solely arguments based on the statute oflimitations, standing, and waiver; the second excuse 
is based on the groundless argument that the SIF is inviting the plaintiffs and the Court to waste valuable resources 
in deciding the "abuse of discretion" issue before the Court determines that the SIF even has any relevant discretion. 
See SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings 
Pursuant to Rule 56(f); see also plaintiffs' Memorandum, pgs. 2-3. 
4 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 3. 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SJTMMA,RY JJIDGMENT - 4 
000124 
SIF and the Board of Directors' and Manager's role in effectuating those purposes. In particular, 
I.C. Section 72-915 must be reconciled with I.C. Section 72-901(3), which requires the SIF 
Board to assure that the SIF is run as an efficient insurance company that remains actuarially 
sound. Of course this position directly counters plaintiffs' argument, which is premised on the 
mistaken belief that I.C. Section 72-915 is the sole statute bearing upon the determination of 
which SIF policyholders are entitled to share in any dividend pool. This argument is based 
solely on statutory construction, and directly relates to what plaintiffs' self-pronounced "first 
claim" is all about.5 Yet, inexplicably, plaintiffs refuse to address it, and instead concoct several 
arguments based on smoke and mirrors they hope will divert the Court's attention. The plaintiffs 
cannot run from this statutory argument forever. 6 
From the inception, SIF Defendants have argued that by giving meaning to the entire 
statutory :framework of the SIF, versus reading J.C. Section 72-915 in isolation as plaintiffs 
suggest, the Legislature clearly and unambiguously provided the SIF and the Manager the 
discretion with respect to how dividends can be distributed.7 Plaintiffs' failure to reconcile LC. 
Section 72-915 with the remaining statutory :framework of the SIF proves fatal to their position. 
As more thoroughly discussed on pages 16 to 21 of SIF Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs' myopic reading of LC. Section 72-915 violates the 
5 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pgs. 5-6. 
6 LC. § 72-915 was enacted in 1917 and has not been substantively changed since that time. However, there have 
been amendments to several other statutes within the SIF's statutory framework which need to be reconciled with 
LC.§ 72-915, which plaintiffs narrow and strict reading of the statute fails to accomplish. For instance, when the 
SIF was originaJly enacted ninety years ago, it was designed to be the primary worker's compensation insurance 
provider in the state. At one time it was the sole rate setting mechanism, and was authorized to adjust the rates at the 
Manager's discretion. However, the setting of rates is now done by the NCCI, which prevents the SIF from 
adjusting its own rates to compensate for excess losses or excess gains. Therefore, the SIF needs to be given the 
flexibility to adapt to how business operates in the current market, versus being constricted by an out-of-date statute. 
The SIF must be given discretion to enact those policies that will help it operate as an efficient insurance company 
that remains actuarially sound. 
7 See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("SIF Defendants' Memorandum"), 
pg. 16--21. 
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rules of statutory construction set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court that, among other things, 
statutory provisions cannot be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the 
entire document. Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 757 P.2d 664 (1988); see also Moss v. 
Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 166, 765 P.2d 676, 677 (1988) (statutes should not be construed to 
render other provisions meaningless). As a result, plaintiffs are clearly mistaken when they 
claim the SIF is "improperly inviting the Court to engage in evaluation which belongs 
exclusively within the authority of the Legislature."8 
With these statutory rules of construction in mind, it is imperative that LC. Section 72-
91 5 be examined in the context of the entire statutory framework of the SIF, rather than in 
isolation as plaintiffs suggest. Specifically, the interplay between LC. Sections 72-901(3) and 
72-915 must be flushed out. The crux ofl.C. Section 72-901(3) is that the SIF Board is required 
to implement policies to assure that the SIF is run as an efficient insurance company that remains 
actuarially sound and maintains the public purpose for which is was created.9 Therefore, any 
policy that runs contrary to these enumerated duties is in violation of the Legislature's specific 
mandate. Although LC. Section 72-901(3) focuses on the duty of the SIF Board, several other 
statutes direct how the SIF Board will effectuate the policy mentioned above, particularly J.C. 
Section 72-902, which requires the SIF Board to appoint a skilled and experienced Manager 
whose duties, subject to the direction and supervision of the SIF Board, is to "conduct the 
business of the [SIF] and do any and all things which are necessary and convenient in the 
administration thereof . . . ." Therefore, the SIF Board and Manager work in conjunction to 
effectuate the purposes of the SIF as mandated by the Legislature. 
8 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 3. 
9 The SIF was created "for the purpose of insuring employers against liability for compensation under this worker's 
compensation law ... and of securing to the persons entitled thereto the compensation provided by said laws." LC. 
Section 72-910(1). 
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The Legislature impliedly granted the Manager, through the SIF Board, the authority and 
responsibility for making the following determinations in order to carry out the SIF' s purpose: 
(1) the amount of excess surplus to be distributed, (2) how to distribute the dividend after it is 
declared, (3) how the dividend is calculated, and (4) which policyholders are entitled to receive 
the dividend and which ones are not. LC. §§ 72-901, 72-902, 72-903, 72-904, 72-909, 72-913, 
72-914, and 72-915. Consequently, the SIF Defendants argue that the decision to issue 
dividends only to those policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiums is well within the 
Manager's authority and discretion, since such a dividend allocation policy comports with the 
overall duties as outlined in LC. Section 72-90 I (3 ). But what remains lost on plaintiffs is the 
fact that what they consider to be "historical events, asserted facts, self-professed rational 
thought process, claims about the demands of the marketplace and other extraneous 
information"10 that has no place in this proceeding, actually serves a dual-purpose; what 
plaintiffs are quick to dismiss as a "waste of valuable resources" is not only pertinent to the issue 
of whether the Manager abused his discretion, 11 but more importantly, addresses the crux of SIF 
Defendants' statutory argument by focusing on the interplay between LC. Section 72-915 and 
other relevant statutory provisions within the SIF's framework (namely LC. Section 72-901 (3)), 
and specifically the collection of factors motivating the Manager's decision to issue dividends 
only to those policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiums. 
The Manager's decision to issue dividends only those policyholders paying over $2,500 
per year in premiums "assure[s] that the [SIF] is run as an efficient insurance company, remains 
actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which [it] was created" as outlined in 
JO See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 3. 
11 Whether the Manager abused his discretion is the "secondary claim" per plaintiffs' lingo, and one that they insist 
is "out-of-play'' until the Court rules on their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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J.C. Section 72-901(3). In their Motion for Summary Judgment, SIF Defendants discuss several 
examples in support of this policy which directly cut against plaintiffs' assertions that by 
engaging in such a complicated fact and business theory the SIF Defendants invite the plaintiffs 
and the Court to waste valuable resources. 12 However, engaging in such a complicated fact and 
business theory is precisely what is required in order for SIF Defendants to explain why the 
decision to issue dividends only to those policyholders paying over $2,500 per year in premiums 
promotes the statutory purpose of the SIF. Moreover, it reconciles LC. Section 72-915 with the 
remaining statutory framework of the SIF, which plaintiffs refuse to acknowledge. 
As explained in SIF Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the declaration of a 
dividend is a multi-step process that ultimately boils down to determining how much surplus is 
safely available to be declared as a dividend, followed by determining how it is to be divided, 
taking into account such factors as the costs associated with writing the policy, and any losses 
that may have been incurred on the policy. 13 However, under plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of 
J.C. Section 72-915, losses incurred by a policyholder are insignificant. But clearly such a 
position contradicts the Legislature's express mandate that the SIF be run as an efficient 
insurance company which remains actuarially sound. According to plaintiffs' restricted 
argument, a policyholder with a $2,500 premium insurance rate, but $100,000 in losses on its 
policy during the period in which the SIF Manager deems the aggregate balance remaining may 
be safely and properly divided, would qualify to receive a dividend as long as it has held a policy 
for more than six months during the applicable period. 14 Plaintiffs ignore the fact that it would 
take the SIF forty years to recoup these losses. 
12 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 3. 
13 See Affidavit of James M. Alcorn ("Alcorn Aff."), il 24. 
14 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pgs. 4-5. 
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By forcing all of the action into LC. Section 72-915, while remaining oblivious to other 
pertinent statutory provisions, plaintiffs' argument fails to address such objectionable outcomes. 
However, the Legislature, in its wisdom, did not; it gave the SIF and the Manager the authority 
and discretion to counteract such unwelcome results. The short-sidedness of plaintiffs' argument 
focuses on the trees instead of the forest, and in so doing renders other statutory provisions 
meaningless. 
This process becomes even more complicated due to the fact that the SIF is directed by 
statute to be self-sufficient, but is not allowed to be a member of the Idaho Insurance Guaranty 
Association ("IIGA"). LC. § 72-901(1), (4). Unlike other insurance carriers which rely on the 
IIGA to pay benefits in the event of insolvency, the SIF must implement policies that maintain 
sufficient surplus and reserve totals to provide a stable and ongoing source of worker's 
compensation insurance to Idaho workers.15 And the importance of this duty is magnified by the 
fact the Idaho Supreme Court determined that the SIF is not a mutual insurance carrier; unlike a 
mutual insurance carrier, the SIF does not assess a policyholder whose premiums do not cover its 
losses. Kelso & Irwin, P.A. v. State Insurance Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 134-35, 997 P.2d 591, 595-
96 (2000). The SIF covers the losses of such policyholders, which in turn fulfills one of its 
principal purposes-providing worker's compensation insurance to Idaho employers by 
maintaining a liberal underwriting policy that seeks to insure all Idaho employers, regardless of 
size, so the majority of Idaho employers who might not otherwise obtain coverage through a 
private carrier could obtain coverage with the SIF. 16 Again, plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of 
LC. Section 72-915 fails to take this statutory provision into account; in fact, plaintiffs' 
15 
See Alcorn Aff., il 18. 
16 
See Alcorn Aff., ii 13. 
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Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment fails to discuss the ramifications of the 
IIGA altogether. 
Another important consideration is the marketing effect that a dividend will have on 
retaining larger, more profitable accounts, because these accounts allow the SIF to fulfill its 
public policy objectives of providing a source of insurance for the smaller, less profitable 
accounts. 17 While SIF Defendants have gone to great lengths in their Motion for Summary 
Judgment to explain the necessity in keeping the larger premium policyholders on board, 
highlighting a few of the essential points remains instructive. 
Much of the need to create incentives to maintain the larger, more profitable 
policyholders arises from the fact that worker's compensation rates are regulated and thus are the 
same for all carriers. See Idaho Code § 41-1618. Recall that the SIF is not a monopolistic state 
fund, but rather must compete for business against private worker's compensation insurance 
carriers. 18 As a competitor in the private marketplace, the SIF is under constant barrage from 
more agile, less restricted competitors seeking to lure away its best clients. 19 But the SIF's 
private competitors are not bound by a "public purpose"; whereas the private insurers choose 
only the best accounts, the SIF writes as many employers as it can.20 And without the larger 
premium policyholders, the SIF is less able to absorb the losses generated by the smaller 
premium policyholders.21 Consequently, the SIF determined that one of the methods available to 
17 See Alcorn Aff., '1] 25. 
18 See Alcorn Aff., il 10. 
19 See Alcorn Aff., '1] 29. 
20 See Alcorn Aff., Ex. E (Board of Directors of the State Insurance Fund Minutes of January 22, 2004), CL 0021. 
Chairman Bill Deal reiterated this theme by commenting to the SIF Board that if the SIF is taking accounts no other 
insurance company will take, the losses will increase due to those smaller companies being added to the SIF's base. 
Id. 
21 See Alcorn Aff., '1] 33. 
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retain the business of the larger policyholders was to provide the larger premium policies a larger 
dividend as a percentage of the premium.22 
Ultimately, plaintiffs are correct when they claim that "the parties see the seminal issue in 
this case very differently." 23 However, from SIF Defendants' perspective, the issue is not as 
clear and unambiguous as plaintiffs claim it to be. Whereas plaintiffs' myopic argument focuses 
on one statute within the SIF' s entire statutory framework, the SIF Defendants' argument 
incorporates a more holistic approach, thereby satisfying the rules of statutory construction as set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. It is through this holistic approach that the statutory 
framework of the SIF is best analyzed and interpreted, versus in isolation as plaintiffs suggest. 
2. Plaintiffs continue to ignore critical language in LC. § 72-915, particularly the 
effect of "safely and properly divided" and "properly entitled to" in their 
interpretation. 
Not only do plaintiffs attempt to read LC. Section 72-915 in a vacuum by failing to 
reconcile it with the remaining statutory provisions comprising the SIF, but they also fail to 
define critical language in the statute, specifically what effect "safely and properly divided" and 
"properly entitled to" have on the dividend pool. Plaintiffs' approach violates another rule of 
statutory construction enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court which requires that "all parts of a 
statute should be given meaning." Robbins v. County of Blaine, 134 Idaho 113, 120, 996 P .2d 
813, 820 (2000); see also Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 476, 725 P.2d 179, 181 (1986) 
("Statutes must be read to give effect to every word, clause and sentence."). 
Plaintiffs' oversimplified interpretation of LC. Section 72-915 blows past several critical 
elements of the statute, and in the process fails to give meaning to every word, clause and 
sentence as mandated by the Idaho Supreme Court. Plaintiffs' shoddy statutory interpretation 
22 See Alcorn Aff., il 29. 
23 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 2. 
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begins with what they consider to be the second step of the "declaration process," which in their 
mind consists of whether, in the judgment of the Manager, the aggregate balance may be "safely 
and properly divided."24 Although plaintiffs state that this is a "mixed fact finding and 
discretionary step" that is as far as their analysis takes them. This step is simply void of any 
meaningful or thorough analysis, and ultimately fails to discuss what fact finding elements 
pertain to this step, or what discretion and in what capacity may be exercised by the Manager. 
SIF Defendants argue that "safely and properly divided" goes much further than simply 
determining if there is an aggregate balance remaining attributable to a class of employments or 
industries. For instance, it involves such critical decisions, including, but not limited to, the 
Manager taking into account losses on a policyholder's worker's compensation coverage during 
the applicable period, or the global effect of issuing dividends only to those policyholders paying 
over $2,500 per year in premiums. In plaintiffs' rush to focus the attention on what they 
consider to be the "fourth step"25 in the dividend declaration and distribution process, they gloss 
over statutory language that must be given meaning. And this point is made perfectly clear in 
pointing out plaintiffs' own admission: "Plaintiffs have not and do not challenge the fact that the 
Manager has discretion over these first three steps in the dividend declaration and distribution 
process."26 By failing to give meaning to the terms "safely and properly divided," the plaintiffs 
have inadvertently accepted and supported SIF Defendants' position. 
But plaintiffs also fail to give meaning to the phrase "properly entitled to" contained in 
the latter portion of LC. Section 72-915. Plaintiffs have made it abundantly clear up to this point 
24 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, page 4. 
25 Plaintiffs' self-pronounced fourth step of the dividend declaration and distribution process is the mathematical 
process of allocating the dividend to each qua] ified member (pol icy held for more than six months during the 
applicable period) of the classes of employment or industries as to which there is adequate surplus funds "such 
proportion of such balance as he may be properly entitled to, having regard, to his prior paid premiums since the last 
readjustment of rates." See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 4. 
26 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 4. 
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in the litigation that, in their view, the only requirement a policyholder must meet in order to be 
eligible to receive a dividend-once the Manager declares the aggregate balance may be safely 
and properly divided-is that it must have held the policy for more than six months during the 
applicable period.27 Plaintiffs argue: "this is a purely ministerial step which allows for no 
discretion in the selection of an allocation calculus."28 Although plaintiffs' argument has 
superficial appeal, it is inherently flawed in that it fails to fully define and analyze the effect of 
"properly entitled to" in the context of the statute. For instance, plaintiffs argument fails to take 
into account the fact that a policyholder that incurs losses on policy during the applicable period 
may not be "properly entitled to" receiving a dividend. SIF Defendants argue that "properly 
entitled to" means much more than simply being a policyholder for more than six months during 
the applicable period as plaintiffs suggest. Rather, the Legislature granted the Manager 
discretion to counteract such unwelcome results. Consequently, SIF Defendants argue I.C. 
Section 72-915 is not as clear and unambiguous as plaintiffs claim it to be. 
A statute is ambiguous where its language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 398, 111 P.3d at 83. When a statute is ambiguous, a 
court should determine legislative intent by examining "not only the literal words of the statute, 
but also the reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and 
its legislative history." Id. at 398-99, 111 P.3d at 83-84 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360,362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003)). As such, this Court must look to the Legislature's intent and 
purpose in creating the SIF-to insure employers against liability under Idaho's worker's 
compensation laws, and to ensure workers entitled to compensation have a source from which 
they may collect. I.C. § 72-901 (1 ). Ancillary to that purpose is the requirement that the SIF be 
27 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pgs. 4-5. 
28 See plaintiffs' Memorandum, pg. 4. 
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administered without liability on the part of the state (i.e. solvency), that it be operated as an 
efficient insurance company, and that adequate reserves are maintained to meet anticipated and 
unexpected losses. Keeping the Legislature's intent and purpose in mind, SIF Defendants argue 
their interpretation of J.C. Section 72-915 is much more conducive to meeting these objectives, 
versus the plaintiffs' narrow and confined interpretation. 
B. PLAINTIFFS DO NOT HA VE ST ANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION BECAUSE 
THEY DO NOT HA VE A PROPERTY INTEREST IN THE SURPLUS OR 
ASSETS OF THE FUND. 
Plaintiffs cannot refute that they do not have a property interest under which to raise their 
claims against defendants. The court in Kelso clearly set forth that a policyholder with the SIF 
has no property right in the surplus or assets of the fund. Kelso & Irwin, P.A v. State Ins. Fund, 
134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000). Therefore, plaintiffs' claims that they are entitled to 
dividends from the surplus or assets of the fund are without merit because they do not have a 
right to a dividend. Plaintiffs cannot claim they have been injured because there is no basis for 
their belief that they were entitled to something. If one is not entitled to a certain item, there is 
no injury when you did not receive that to which there was never an entitlement in the first place. 
There is no right to a dividend and without a right to a dividend plaintiffs cannot claim injury. 
Any dividend offered should be enjoyed as an unexpected benefit as the result of the successful 
management of the fund. That certain policyholders received a benefit in the form of a dividend 
does not mean they were entitled to the dividend. To be sure, plaintiffs were not offered a 
dividend; to be sure, plaintiffs are angry that others received a dividend, while they did not; 
however, being angry that you did not receive something that someone else did for which there 
was never an entitlement is not the same thing as an injury in fact. Plaintiffs have not been 
injured, they have been angered and the two are not synonymous. 
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Plaintiffs claim that granting the relief they seek will redress their injury. Before the 
Court can redress an injury, however, it must find injury. Plaintiffs do not meet the standing 
requirements because they do not have a property interest which converts their anger into an 
injury. 
While plaintiffs do not appreciate SIF Defendants' arguments stemming from the Kelso 
case, they cannot escape the law that says they do not have a property right in the surplus or 
assets of the fund. Plaintiffs attempt to align themselves with the Kelso plaintiffs and suggest 
that since the Kelso plaintiffs were allowed to proceed, plaintiffs here should be allowed to 
proceed as if they had standing, as well. Noticeably absent from plaintiffs analysis is the Kelso 
court's determination that where plaintiffs failed to properly allege a breach of contract those 
claims were dismissed. Plaintiffs have wholly failed to formulate their claims in terms of breach 
of contract and, even if plaintiffs' allegations are viewed in a light most favorable to them, 
breach of contract claims will not be illuminated giving rise to standing. 
Plaintiffs also infer that since the Idaho Supreme Court did not discuss standing in either 
Kelso or Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist., 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2004), then plaintiffs should 
automatically have standing. Such an argument fails to recognize that standing was not an issue 
on appeal in either of those cases, therefore, the court was not asked to provide an analysis and 
render a decision. 
Plaintiffs' disagreement with the relevance of Troutner v. Kempthorne, 142 Idaho 389, 
128 P.3d 926 (2006), and their claim that "Troutner really adds nothing to Idaho jurisprudence" 
amounts to a disrespectful attack on the Idaho Supreme Court. Plaintiffs disagree with Troutner 
for the obvious reason that the case is very analogous to the case at hand and if this Court 
follows Troutner, under the doctrine of stare decisis, SIF Defendants win their standing 
argument. As argued in SIF Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
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plaintiffs, here, just as the plaintiffs in Troutner, do not have standing to bring their claims 
because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a right under which to claim injury. Without a right or a 
personal injury that is different than any other citizen, there can be no standing. Plaintiffs do not 
have a right to have a dividend distributed to them once it has been declared by the SIF 
defendants. This is no different than a citizen who would come to the SIF and claim distribution 
of a dividend just because the SIF has declared a dividend since the citizen has no statutory or 
contractual right to the distribution of a dividend. As addressed in the SIF Defendants' briefing, 
plaintiffs do not having standing to bring their action against the SIF Defendants; therefore, SIF 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted. 
C. PLAINTIFFS CHARACTERIZE THIS ACTION AS A "STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION" CASE AND CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS HA VE 
VIOLA TED I.C. § 72-915, WHICH NECESSARILY REQUIRES THE PROPER 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS TO BE THREE YEARS. 
Plaintiffs have and continue to characterize the conduct of the SIF defendants as being in 
violation of Idaho Code Section 72-915. Claims, the gravamen of which are based on statutory 
violations, are subject to a three year statute of limitation. Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist v. 
Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 403-04, 111 P.3d 73, 88-89 (2004). Plaintiffs allege that a five-year 
statute of limitation based on contract law is controlling in this instance by virtue of governing 
laws being incorporated into an insurance contract. Plaintiffs argue that the holding in Hayden 
Lake is not applicable in this case because it referenced different statutes. This is merely a 
distinction without a difference. In upholding the trial court's decision to apply a three-year 
statute of limitation, the Idaho Supreme Court in Hayden Lake relied upon the holding in 
Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber Co. that statutory liability is one that depends for its existence on 
the enactment of the statute, and not on the contract of the parties. Id. at 404, 111 P.3d at 89. 
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Here, plaintiffs have argued throughout this proceeding that the SIF Defendants violated 
Idaho Code Section 72-9 I 5 when they determined that plaintiffs would not receive a dividend 
based on the amount paid on annual premiums. For example, in plaintiffs' "Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Continue Summary Judgment Proceedings Pursuant to Rule 56(f)," page 3, 
plaintiffs state that the Alcorn affidavit was "useless to the question of statutory construction 
which had been raised by the Plaintiffs' motion." In plaintiffs' "Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, " page 2, ,r 1, and their supporting memorandum, plaintiffs state that "[ o ]ther than I.C. 
§72-915, there are no contract provisions" that bear upon the determination of which 
policyholders are entitled to a share in the dividend pool. Plaintiffs should be judicially estopped 
from now arguing against a statutory violation because it works against them. Plaintiffs cannot 
have it both ways for the purposes of determining which statute oflimitation applies. 
Plaintiffs assert that LC. Section 72-915 did not endow the SIF Defendants with 
discretion to determine how the dividends were to be distributed once dividends were declared. 
For liability to flow to the SIF Defendants, plaintiffs will need to prove that the SIF Defendants 
violated LC. Section 72-915. This liability ultimately depends on the existence of a statute, not 
on the insurance contract between the parties, which is supported by the holding in Hayden Lake. 
The resolution of liability does not depend on the insurance contract between the parties. 
Without LC. Section 72-915 there would be nothing to incorporate into the insurance contract. 
The law from Hayden Lake is very clear that statutory violation claims are governed by 
a three year statute of limitations, regardless of the machinations the plaintiffs went through to 
distinguish the Hayden Lake holding. Defendants do not disagree that the gravamen of a 
plaintiffs' case is the controlling factor. Defendants do disagree, however, with plaintiffs' 
assertion that the gravamen of their claims is a contractual right to a share of the dividends. 
Their own motion for summary judgment sets forth their understanding that there are no contract 
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provisions that apply to the dividends at issue here. Because the facts in both Kelso & Irwin, P.A 
v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130, 997 P.2d 591 (2000) and Hayden Lake are similar to the facts 
in the present case and because the SIF is the defendant in all three actions, there is no question 
that the three-year statute oflimitations as applied in Hayden Lake is also applicable here. 
Throughout plaintiffs' documents on file herein, plaintiffs assert that the SIF Defendants 
violated Idaho Code Section 72-915; therefore, plaintiffs cannot be heard to argue that the 
gravamen of their claims rests solely on contractual claims. It is the alleged statutory violation 
that is at the heart of the matter and that type of allegation is governed by a three-year statute of 
limitation. Therefore, any claims for a dividend issued three years prior to the filing of this 
action on July 21, 2006 must be dismissed. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' REPEATED PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS FOR WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION INSURANCE THROUGH THE SIF, DESPITE NOT 
RECEVIEING A DIVIDEND, OPERATES MUCH LIKE A WAIVER IN THAT 
PLAINTIFFS GAVE UP ANY RIGHT TO CLAIM A DIVIDEND FOR PRIOR 
YEARS. 
The SIF Defendants' use of the waiver argument was simply to illustrate plaintiffs' 
choice to continue purchasing their workers' compensation insurance from the SIF, which was 
also a choice to accept the SIF's decision not to distribute a dividend to plaintiffs. Nothing can 
diminish the fact that plaintiffs continue to subject themselves to the discretion of the SIF 
Defendants when they pay their annual premiums each year knowing that they may or may not 
receive a dividend. 
The SIF Defendants acknowledge and are fully aware that this is not your typical breach 
of contract case under which the pure doctrine of waiver would apply. The SIF Defendants 
further argue that this is not a breach of contract case at all - it is a statutory violation case. That 
does not, however, prevent defendants from arguing by analogy and using doctrines that have 
parallel application. Plaintiffs could have decided to take their insurance business elsewhere, 
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which would have avoided a waiver situation and mitigated their damages. We now know that 
plaintiffs did not exercise that option, instead they kept returning to the SIF for their worker's 
compensation needs and kept incurring alleged damages along the way. 
The SIF Defendants insured plaintiffs as they were expected to do under the policy of 
insurance. Plaintiffs expressed their satisfaction with the service the SIF was providing them by 
paying premiums the following years. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to now cry foul. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs wholly failed to respond to the SIF Defendants' abuse of discretion argument 
and their failure is a full concession on that point, which is a central argument in the SIF 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. On that basis alone, SIF Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment must be granted. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to adequately challenge the SIF Defendants' 
arguments on standing, statute of limitations, and waiver. Therefore, the SIF Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted. 
DATED this J! ~ day of March, 2007. 
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT 
& BLANTON, P.A. 
By /Z,-~L· r-
Richard E. Hall-fthe Firm 
Keely E. Duke-Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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J. JONES, Justice 
This class action lawsuit arises out of a decision by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (the 
Fund) to distribute dividends pursuant to J.C. § 72-915 only to those policyholders who paid 
more than $2,500.00 in premiums. The Plaintiffs - those policyholders whose annual premiums 
1 
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were $2,500.00 or less - sued the Fund, its Manager, and its Board ofDirectors1 for damages and 
injunctive relief. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment regarding the interpretation 
of J.C.§ 72-915. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion and granted the Fund's motion. 
We reverse and remand. 
I. 
The Fund was created in 1917 to provide worker's compensation insurance to Idaho 
employers, particularly those employers who could not otherwise obtain insurance from private 
carriers. See J.C. § 72-901. The Board of Directors sets the Fund's policies while the Manager 
conducts the Fund's day-to-day operations. J.C. §§ 72-901 & 902. Since the Fund's inception, 
the Manager has, on occasion, distributed a dividend to policyholders pursuant to J.C. § 72-915. 
This dividend is different from the dividend issued to stockholders of a corporation and is instead 
more aptly described as a refund of unused premium. See id. From at least 1982 until 2003, 
whenever the Manager decided to distribute a dividend it was distributed to all policyholders 
who had paid premiums for at least six months prior to the distribution. 2 The amount of dividend 
each policyholder received was determined based on the premium amount the policyholder paid. 
Beginning in 2003, however, the Manager decided to calculate the dividend by splitting the 
entire surplus between those few policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in annual 
premiums to the Fund. 3 This practice continued during ~e following years' distributions as well. 
The Plaintiffs of this class action lawsuit are those Idaho employers who paid annual 
premiums of $2,500.00 or less to the Fund for worker's compensation insurance from the policy 
year beginning in 2001 onward. These class members comprise the majority of the Fund's 
policyholders. 4 Both parties moved for partial summary judgment resarding the proper 
interpretation of J.C. § 72-915. The Fund argued that the statute does not require the Manager to 
distribute dividends according to a set formula, but rather allows the Manager to exercise his 
discretion in determining how to distribute dividends amongst policyholders. The Plaintiffs 
conceded that the statute grants the Manager discretion in making the decision as to whether to 
1 This opinion will refer to the defendants collectively as ''the Fund." 
2 The Manager stated in an affidavit that large policyholders were paid a larger percentage dividend than small 
policyholders, based in part on the fact that "certain costs associated with writing a policy are essentially the same 
whether it be for $2,000 or $200,000 policy." 
3 The dividend distributed in 2003 was for the policy year beginning in 2001. 
4 The parties estimate that the class may be as large as 30,000 members and comprises at least seventy-five percent 




distribute dividends, but argued that the statute prescribes how to distribute dividends once the 
Manager decides to make a distribution. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, and instead granted the Fund's motion for partial summary judgment. It 
then certified the judgment for appeal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b ). 
The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, reiterating their argument that the statute grants the 
Manager no discretion regarding how to distribute dividends amongst policyholders. 
II. 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. P. 0. Ventures, Inc. v. 
Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The Court 
exercises free review over the entire record that was before the district judge to determine 
whether either side was entitled to summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is proper when 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In order to resolve this appeal we must engage in statutory interpretation, which is an 
issue oflaw over which this Court exercises free review. In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 679, 
183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008). The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of 
Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547, 549, 149 P.3d 
822, 824 (2006). Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document. Westerburg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 403, 757 P.2d 664, 666 
(1988). The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the 
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. 
AmeriTellnns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202,204, 192 P.3d 1026, 
1028 (2008). When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. Payette River, 132 Idaho at 557, 976 P.2d at 483. Therefore, the plain meaning of 
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a statute will prevail unless it leads to absurd results. Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80 
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). However, 
a statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because parties present differing interpretations 
to the court. Id. 
B. The Statute Unambiguously Requires the Manager to Distribute the 
Dividend According to the Formula Provided Therein 
The Fund argues that I.C. § 72-915 is ambiguous and, when read together with other 
statutes and laws, the affidavit of the Manager, and holdings from sister states, it grants the 
Manager the discretion to distribute dividends however he sees fit. The Plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, argue that the statute unambiguously requires the Manager to distribute the dividend 
monies proportionately according to the amount of premium paid by each policyholder who 
meets the six-month longevity requirement and who falls within the classes of employment 
sharing in the dividends. 
The statute in question reads: 
DNIDENDS. At the end of every year, and at such other times as the manager in 
his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of 
the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an 
aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry 
which the manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his 
discretion, credit to each individual member of such class who shall have been a 
subscriber to the state insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior 
to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of 
rates. 
I.C. § 72-915. 
1. The District Court Erred in Finding the Statute Ambiguous 
The district court found that the statute was ambiguous because, in the court's view, the 
statute could reasonably be interpreted three ways. In addition to the interpretation advanced by 
the Plaintiffs, the district court posited two alternate interpretations. First, the district court 
stated that the statute could be interpreted to mean that the Manager could distribute dividends 
only to the larger policyholders because they are the only ones "properly entitled" to receive a 




reads "[the Manager] may in his discretion, credit to each individual member [a dividend]." I.C. 
§ 72-915 ( emphasis added). This language indicates that all members who meet the longevity 
requirement are entitled to receive a dividend. The district court's emphasis on the language 
"properly entitled" is misplaced, as that language relates to the requirement that the dividend be 
distributed pro rata "having regard to [the policyholder's] prior paid premiums." See id. 
Second, the district court asserted that the statute could be interpreted to mean that each 
policyholder is entitled to a dividend, but that the dividend need not "be in direct proportion to 
the amount of premium the [policyholder] paid relative to the whole." Again, this interpretation 
is not supported by the plain language of the statute. Should a dividend be declared, the statute 
provides that each policyholder who has been a subscriber for at least six months prior shall be 
credited "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior 
paid premiums." LC. § 72-915. The inclusion of the words "proportion" of the balance, and 
"having regard to" the policyholder's "prior paid premiums" can only mean that the distribution 
of dividends must be done on a pro rata basis. Id. The language is not ambiguous as to this 
requirement, and the district court erred in finding it ambiguous on these grounds. 
Instead, the plain language of LC. § 72-915 demonstrates that the statute grants the 
Manager discretion to distribute a dividend when "there is an aggregate balance remaining to the 
credit of any class of employment or industry" and the Manager deems that the aggregate 
balance "may be safely and properly divided." The Manager's discretion is therefore limited to 
the decision of whether or not to distribute a dividend in the first place. The remainder of the 
sentence sets forth the method by which dividends are to be distributed, requiring the Manager to 
"credit to each individual member of such class" who has been a policyholder for at least six 
months "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior 
paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates." Id. The phrase "any class of employment or 
industry," when read with other statutes related to worker's compensation insurance, refers to the 
class to which each policyholder belongs for purposes of determining the rate paid for worker's 
. 5 compensation coverage. The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance 
5 The district court erroneously held that the word "or'' rendered the phrase ambiguous. Originally the Manager 
divided different employments into classes and, after taking into consideration the hazards of the different classes, 
fixed the premium rates for each class. See J.C. § 72-913. However, in 1961, the Legislature set up a system in 
which every insurer that writes worker's compensation insurance in Idaho, including the Fund, must be a member of 
a ratings organization. J.C.§ 41-1615. The ratings organization then establishes classes of employment or industry 
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proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to all paid 
prenuwns. To argue that this language could be construed to somehow grant discretion 
regarding how to calculate the distribution makes no sense, and would require this Court to 
stretch the plain language beyond its obvious meaning._ Finally, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature 
passed House Bill No. 511, an appropriations bill, which casts further doubt on the Fund's 
proposed interpretation of J.C. § 72-915. H.R. 511, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002). The 
bill provided that the Fund would distribute a specified amount to state agencies as 
policyholders, and that "[t]he balance of the dividends shall be credited to each individual 
agency proportionally in accordance with Section 72-915, Idaho Code." Id. This language 
demonstrates that in 2002, the Legislature viewed section 72-915 as requiring a pro rata 
distribution of dividends. 
2. The Fund's Argument for Interpreting the Statute is Unpersuasive 
In addition to relying on the district court's reasoning, as discussed above, the Fund 
argues that reading I.C. § 72-915 together with LC. § 72-902 makes clear that the Manager has 
the discretion to determine how to distribute the dividend. Section 72-902 reads: 
The board of directors ... shall appoint a manager of [the Fund], whose duties, 
subject to the direction and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the 
business of [the Fund], and do any and all things which are necessary and 
convenient in the administration thereof, or in connection with the insurance 
business to be carried on under the provisions of this chapter. 
LC. § 72-902. The Fund argues that the Manager's power to "do any and all things which are 
necessary and convenient" includes the discretion to determine how to distribute a dividend. The 
Fund also argues that LC. § 72-901(3) provides that the Board has. a duty "to direct the policies 
and operation of the [Fund] to assure that the [Fund is] run as an efficient insurance company, 
remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the [Fund] was created." 
However, sections 72-901(3) and 902 are general statutes, while section 72-915 is a specific 
and fixes rates. I.C. § 41-1620. The effect of the later-enacted statute is that "[t]he powers granted to the [Manager 
of the Fund] under sections 72-903 and 72-913 ... shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter." I.C. § 41-
1618(1). Therefore, the Manager no longer has unfettered power to determine rates. See; Id. The ratings 
organization establishes different classes to which each policyholder is assigned to det.!mlrine the rate for purchasing 
worker's compensation insurance. To illustrate the class system used by the current ratings organization: the 
foUowing are examples of classes: "landscape gardening and drivers," "fruit pai::king," "printing," "bookbinding," 
"hotel: restaurant employees," and other classes that define specific classes of employment or industry. See Idaho 
State Insurance Fund, Rates, http://www.idahosif.org/Rates/rates.aspx (lasfvisited March 3, 2009). Because there is 
no other possible meaning of the phrase "class of employment or industry" it is unambiguous. 
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statute. Therefore, the more specific statute controls. See Shay v. Cesler, 132 Idaho 585, 588, 
977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). As discussed above, section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for 
determining how the manager is to distribute dividends. 
Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consider the plethora of evidence 
and testimony provided by the Fund to support its argument that the Manager acted reasonably in 
choosing to distribute a dividend only to those policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in 
annual premiums. The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be 
better targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law. No matter the 
number and persuasiveness of the Fund's arguments, this Court's role is to interpret the law, 
which in this case was unambiguously established in 1917. See In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 
Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992) (stating that "[t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature alone") ( citing Berry v. Koehler, 84 
Idaho 170,177,369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)). If, in the intervening time, it has become prudent 
to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper 
remedy is to approach the Legislature to change the law. 
C. The Fund's Interpretation of the Statute is not Entitled to Deference 
The Fund argues, in the alternative, that even if the district court's reasons for granting it 
summary judgment are determined to be incorrect, this Court should affirm the judgment based 
on the principle of agency deference. An agency's interpretation of its enabling statutes is 
entitled to deference if a four-pronged test is satisfied. Pearl v. Bd of Prof'/ Discipline of Idaho 
State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 107, 113, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 857-59, 820 P.2d 1206, 1214-16 (1991)'. First, the agency 
must have been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue. Id. Second, 
the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable. Id. Third, the court must determine that 
the statutory language at issue does not treat the precise issue. Id. Fourth, the court must ask 
whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present.6 Id. If the test is met, 
t'tuo-.'l 9fT191QU2 ~I tc, i19l;) JIO'(OOJf ,·/ '•Jr1,;'ll2 ,I 
9111 r,.:lt ~tm«> ~dtw,o ob ,0,11,bf 1 ... .,, ·,; ..,,,r ~o 
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no won &t:ifille~OltiMlluiJ~l.~J(.11iJUblic. g,-~' reliance on the agency's interpretation over a period of time; (2) the 
agency's interpretation ~~9fft5 a, i'pgwtical" interpretation of the statute; (3) the Legislature is charged with 
__nu&ftalllttjg~ atu11mate~•~1f7\ed, and thus when it does not alter the statute, it presumably sanctions the 
' agency's, interprc;ta~9n; ,(4) the agency's interpretation is entitled to additional weight when it is formulated 
contemporaneously with the passage of the statute at issue; and (5) courts should recognize and defer to the agency's 
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the court must give "considerable weight" to the agency's interpretation. Id. Without 
considering the first and fourth prongs, we hold that the second and third prongs are not met, and 
therefore no agency deference is warranted. 
The Fund argues that the second prong is met because its Manager testified that the 
Fund's practice conformed to industry practice and was consistent with the goal of running the 
Fund as an efficient insurance business. The Fund further asserts its position is similar to those 
held by sister states, which is evidence of its reasonableness. See Cantry v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 59 P.3d 983 (2002). However, the sister states that the Fund 
emphasizes do not have statutes that are comparable to Idaho's statute. Montana specifically 
allows the board of its state insurance fund to "set a minimum [premium] amount below which a 
dividend shall not be payable to an individual policyholder." MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.55.502 (2006). 
Similarly, North Dakota has a rule that specifies that small accounts are ineligible for dividend 
payments. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-55 (2005). Therefore, no reason exists to 
compare Idaho's statute authorizing dividends to the markedly different statutes of Montana and 
North Dakota. 
As to the third prong, the Fund asserts that because the statute is ambiguous, the issue of 
how to distribute dividends is not precisely treated. Based on the above discussion, noting that 
the statute unambiguously requires the Manager to distribute a dividend pro rata to all 
policyholders should he decide in his discretion to distribute any dividend, the issue at hand has 
been precisely treated. 
Since the second and third prongs are not met, the Fund has not shown that its 
interpretation of J.C. § 72-915 is entitled to deference. 
III. 
The district court's order granting summary judgment to the Fund is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to Appellants. 
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J. JONES, Justice 
This class action lawsuit arises out of a decision by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (the 
Fund) to distribute dividends pursuant to LC. § 72-915 only to those policyholders who paid 
more than $2,500.00 in premiums. The Plaintiffs - those policyholders whose annual premiums 
0001.49 
were $2,500.00 or less - sued the Fund, its Manager, and its Board ofDirectors1 for damages and 
injunctive relief. Both parties moved for partial summaryjudgment regarding the interpretation 
of LC.§ 72-915. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion and granted the Fund's motion. 
We reverse and remand. 
I. 
The Fund was created in 1917 to provide worker's compensation insurance to Idaho 
employers, particularly those employers who could not othetwise obtain insurance from private 
carriers. See I.C. § 72-901. The Board of Directors sets the Fund's policies while the Manager 
conducts the Fund's day-to-day operations. LC. §§ 72-901 & 902. Since the Fund's inception, 
the Manager has, on occasion, distributed a dividend to policyholders pursuant to LC. § 72-915. 
This dividend is different from the dividend issued to stockholders of a corporation and is instead 
a refund based upon a rate readjustment. From at least 1982 until 2003, whenever the Manager 
decided to distribute a dividend it was distributed to all policyholders who had paid premiums 
for at least six months prior to the distribution.2 The amount of dividend each policyholder 
received was determined based on the premium amount the policyholder paid. Beginning in 
2003, however, the Manager decided to calculate the dividend by splitting the entire surplus 
between those few policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in annual premiums to the 
Fund.3 This practice continued during the following years' distributions as well. 
The Plaintiffs of this class action lawsuit are those Idaho employers who paid annual 
premiums of $2,500.00 or less to the Fund for worker's compensation insurance from the policy 
year beginning in 2001 onward. These class members comprise the majority of the Fund's 
policyholders.4 Both parties moved for partial summary judgment regarding the proper 
interpretation ofI.C. § 72-915. The Fund argued that the statute does not require the Manager to 
distribute dividends according to a set formula, but rather allows the Manager to exercise his 
discretion in determining how to distribute dividends amongst policyholders. The Plaintiffs 
conceded that the statute grants the Manager discretion in making the decision as to whether to 
1 This opinion will refer to the defendants collectively as "the Fund." 
2 The Manager stated in an affidavit that large policyholders were paid a larger percentage dividend than small 
policyholders, based in part on the fact that "certain costs associated with writing a policy are essentially the same 
whether it be for $2,000 or $200,000 policy." 
3 The dividend distnbuted in 2003 was for the policy year beginning in 2001. 
4 The parties estimate that the class may be as large as 30,000 members and comprises at least seventy-five percent 
of all the Fund's policyholders. 
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distribute dividends, but argued that the statute prescribes how to distribute dividends once the 
Manager decides to make a distribution. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment, and instead granted the Fund's motion for partial summary judgment. It 
then certified the judgment for appeal pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b ). 
The Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, reiterating their argument that the statute grants the 
Manager no discretion regarding how to distribute dividends amongst policyholders. 
II. 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for this Court is 
the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. P. 0. Ventures, Inc. v. 
Loucks Family I"evocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). The Court 
exercises free review over the entire record that was before the district judge to determine 
whether either side was entitled to summary judgment. Id. Summary judgment is proper when 
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
In order !o resolve this appeal we must engage in statutory interpretation, which is an 
issue of law over which this Court exercises free review. In re Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677, 679, 
183 P.3d 765, 767 (2008). The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the intent of the 
legislative body that adopted the act. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass 'n v. Bd of Comm 'rs of 
Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). Statutory interpretation begins 
with the literal language of the statute. Paolini v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 Idaho 547,549, 149 P.3d 
822, 824 (2006). Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the 
context of the entire document. Westerburg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 403, 757 P.2d 664, 666 
(1988). The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meanings. Id. It should be noted that the Court must give effect to all the 
words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. 
AmeriTel Inns, Inc. v. Pocatello-Chubbuck Auditorium Dist., 146 Idaho 202,204, 192 P.3d 1026, 
1028 (2008). When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not consider rules of statutory 
construction. Payette River, 132 Idaho at 557, 976 P.2d at 483. Therefore, the plain meaning of 
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a statute will prevail unless it leads to absurd results. Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 427, 80 
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation. Porter v. Bd. of Trustees, 141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671,674 (2004). However, 
a statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because parties present differing interpretations 
to the court. Id. 
B. The Statute Unambiguously Requires the Manager to Distribute the 
Dividend According to the Formula Provided Therein 
The Fund argues that I.C. § 72-915 is ambiguous and, when read together with other 
statutes and laws, the affidavit of the Manager, and holdings from sister states, it grants the 
Manager the discretion to distribute dividends however he sees fit. The Plaintiffs, on the other 
hand, argue that the statute unambiguously requires the Manager to distribute the dividend 
monies proportionately according to the amount of premium paid by each policyholder who 
meets the six-month longevity requirement and who falls within the classes of employment 
sharing in the dividends. 
The statute in question reads: 
DIVIDENDS. At the end of every year, and at s1,1ch other times as the manager in 
his discretion may determine, a readjustment of the rate shall be made for each of 
the several classes of employments or industries. If at any time there is an 
aggregate balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry 
which the manager deems may be safely and properly divided, he may in his 
discretion, credit to each individual member of such class who shall have been a 
subscriber to the state insurance fund for a period of six (6) months or more, prior 
to the time of such readjustment, such proportion of such balance as he is properly 
entitled to, having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of 
rates. 
I.C. § 72-915. 
1. The District Court Erred in Finding the Statute Ambiguous 
The district court found that the statute was ambiguous because, in the court's view, the 
statute could reasonably be interpreted three ways. In addition to the interpretation advanced by 
the Plaintiffs, the district court posited two alternate interpretations. First, the district court 
stated that the statute could be interpreted to mean that the Manager could distribute dividends 
only to the larger policyholders because they are the only ones "properly entitled" to receive a 
dividend. However, a careful reading of the statute does not support this conclusion. The statute 
4 
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reads "[the Manager] may in his discretion, credit to each individual member [a dividend]." LC. 
§ 72-915 (emphasis added). This language indicates that all members who meet the longevity 
requirement are entitled to receive a dividend. The district court's emphasis on the language 
"properly entitled" is misplaced, as that language relates to the requirement that the dividend be 
distributed pro rata "having regard to [the policyholder's] prior paid premiums." See id. 
Second, the district court asserted that the statute could be interpreted to mean that each 
policyholder is entitled to a dividend, but that the dividend need not "be in direct proportion to 
the amount of premium the [policyholder] paid relative to the whole." Again, this interpretation 
is not supported by the plain language of the statute. Should a dividend be declared, the statute 
provides that each policyholder who has been a subscriber for at least six months prior shall be 
credited "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior 
paid premiums." LC. § 72-915. The inclusion of the words "proportion" of the balance, and 
"having regard to" the policyholder's "prior paid premiums" can only mean that the distribution 
of dividends must be done on a pro rata basis. Id. The language is not ambiguous as to this 
requirement, and the district court erred in finding it ambiguous on these grounds. 
Instead, the plain language of I.C. § 72-915 demonstrates that the statute grants the 
Manager discretion to distribute a dividend when ''there is an aggregate balance remaining to the 
credit of any class of employment or industry" and the Manager deems that the aggregate 
balance "may be safely and properly divided." The Manager's discretion is therefore limited to 
the decision of whether or not to distribute a dividend in the first place. The remainder of the 
sentence sets forth the method by which dividends are to be distributed, requiring the Manager to 
"credit to each individual member of such class" who has been a policyholder for at least six 
months "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, having regard to his prior 
paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates." Id. The phrase "any class of employment or 
industry," when read with other statutes related to worker's compensation insurance, refers to the 
class to which each policyholder belongs for purposes of determining the rate paid for worker's 
. s compensation coverage. The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance 
s The district court erroneously held that the word "or" rendered the phrase ambiguous. Originally the Manager 
divided different employments into classes and, after taking into consideration the hazards of the different classes, 
fixed the premium rates for each class. See J.C. § 72-913. However, in 1961, the Legislature set up a system in 
which every insurer that writes worker's compensation insurance in Idaho, including the Fund, must be a member of 
a ratings organization. I.C. § 41-1615. The ratings organization then establishes classes of employment or industry 
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proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to all paid 
premiums. To argue that this language could be construed to somehow grant discretion 
regarding how to calculate the distribution makes no sense, and would require this Court to 
stretch the plain language beyond its obvious meaning. Finally, in 2002 the Idaho Legislature 
passed House Bill No. 511, an appropriations bill, which casts further doubt on the Fund's 
proposed interpretation of J.C. § 72-915. H.R. 511, 56th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2002). The 
bill provided that the Fund would distribute a specified amount to state agencies as 
policyholders, and that "[t]he balance of the dividends shall be credited to each individual 
agency proportionally in accordance with Section 72-915, Idaho Code." Id. This language 
demonstrates that in 2002, the Legislature viewed section 72-915 as requiring a pro rata 
distribution of dividends. 
2. The Fund's Argument for Interpreting the Statute is Unpersuasive 
In addition to relying on the district court's reasoning, as discussed above, the Fund 
argues that reading J.C. § 72-915 together with J.C. § 72-902 makes clear that the Manager has 
the discretion to determine how to distribute the dividend. Section 72-902 reads: 
The board of directors ... shall appoint a manager of [the Fund], whose duties, 
subject to the direction and supervision of the board, shall be to conduct the 
business of [the Fund], and do any and all things which are necessary and 
convenient in the administration thereof, or in connection with the insurance 
business to be carried on under the provisions of this chapter. 
J.C. § 72-902. The Fund argues that the Manager's power to "do any and all things which are 
necessary and convenient" includes the discretion to determine how to distribute a dividend. The 
Fund also argues that J.C. § 72-901(3) provides that the Board has a duty ''to direct the policies 
and operation of the [Fund] to assure that the [Fund is] run as an efficient insurance company, 
remains actuarially sound and maintains the public purposes for which the [Fund] was created." 
However, sections 72-901(3) and 902 are general statutes, while section 72-915 is a specific 
and fixes rates. I.C. § 41-1620. The effect of the later-enacted statute is that "[t]he powers granted to the [Manager 
of the Fund] under sections 72-903 and 72-913 ... shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter." I.C. § 41-
1618(1). Therefore, the Manager no longer has unfettered power to determine rates. See Id. The ratings 
organization establishes different classes to which each policyholder is assigned to determine the rate for purchasing 
worker's compensation insurance. To illustrate the class system used by the current ratings organization, the 
following are examples of classes: "landscape gardening and drivers," "fruit packing," ''printing," ''bookbinding," 
"hotel: restaurant employees," and other classes that define specific classes of employment or industry. See Idaho 
State Insurance Fund, Rates, http://www.idahosif.org/Rates/rates.aspx (last visited March 3, 2009). Because there is 
no other possible meaning of the phrase "class of employment or industry" it is unambiguous. 
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statute. Therefore, the more specific statute controls. See Shay v. Ces/er, 132 Idaho 585, 588, 
977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). As discussed above, section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for 
determining how the manager is to distribute dividends. 
Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consider the plethora of evidence 
and testimony provided by the Fund to support its argument that the Manager acted reasonably in 
choosing to distribute a dividend only to those policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in 
annual premiums. The arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be 
better targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law. No matter the 
number and persuasiveness of the Fund's arguments, this Court's role is to interpret the law, 
which in this case was unambiguously established in 1917. See In re Permit No. 36-7200, 121 
Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992) (stating that "[t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature alone") ( citing Berry v. Koehler, 84 
Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)). If, in the intervening time, it has become prudent 
to alter the statutory language related to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper 
remedy is to approach the Legislature to change the law. 
C. The Fund's Interpretation of the Statute is not Entitled to Deference 
The Fund argues, in the alternative, that even if the district court's reasons for granting it 
summary judgment are determined to be incorrect, this Court should affirm the judgment based 
on the principle of agency deference. An agency's interpretation of its enabling statutes is 
entitled to deference if a four-pronged test is satisfied. Pearl v. Bd of Prof'/ Discipline of Idaho 
State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 107, 113, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002); J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho 
State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 857-59, 820 P.2d 1206, 1214-16 (1991). First, the agency 
must have been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue. Id. Second, 
the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable. Id. Third, the court must determine that 
the statutory language at issue does not treat the precise issue. Id. Fourth, the court must ask 
whether any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. 6 Id. If the test is met, 
6 The rationales include: {l) public groups' reliance on the agency's interpretation over a period of time; (2) the 
agency's interpretation represents a ''practical" interpretation of the statute; (3) the Legislature is charged with 
knowledge of how its statutes are interpreted, and thus when it does not alter the statute, it presumably sanctions the 
agency's interpretation; (4) the agency's interpretation is entitled to additional weight when it is formulated 
contemporaneously with the passage of the statute at issue; and (5) courts should recognize and defer to the agency's 
expertise. J.R. Simplot Co., 120 Idaho at 857-59, 820 P.2d at 1214-16. 
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the court must give "considerable weight" to the agency's interpretation. Id. Without 
considering the first and fourth prongs, we hold that the second and third prongs are not met, and 
therefore no agency deference is warranted. 
The Fund argues that the second prong is met because its Manager testified that the 
Fund's practice conformed to industry practice and was consistent with the goal of running the 
Fund as an efficient insurance business. The Fund further asserts its position is similar to those 
held by sister states, which is evidence of its reasonableness. See Cantry v. Idaho State Tax 
Comm 'n, 138 Idaho 178, 59 P.3d 983 (2002). However, the sister states that the Fund 
emphasizes do not have statutes that are comparable to Idaho's statute. Montana specifically 
allows the board of its state insurance fund to "set a minimum [premium] amount below which a 
dividend shall not be payable to an individual policyholder." MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.55.502 (2006). 
Similarly, North Dakota has a rule that specifies that small accounts are ineligible for dividend 
payments. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 92-01-02-55 (2005). Therefore, no reason exists to 
compare Idaho's statute authorizing dividends to the markedly different statutes of Montana and 
North Dakota. 
As to the third prong, the. Fund asserts that because I.C. § 72-915 is ambiguous, the issue 
of how to distribute dividends is not precisely treated. However, we have determined otherwise. 
The language of the statute unambiguously provides the manner in which any declared dividend 
is to be distributed. Furthermore, no language in I.C. § 72-915 permits the imposition of an 
arbitrary $2,500 premium-payment threshold for entitlement to a dividend. 
Since the second and third prongs are not met, the Fund has not shown that its 
interpretation ofl.C. § 72-915 is entitled to deference.7 
7 It might be observed that, as a general proposition, an agency has a more difficult task arguing for deference to its 
interpretation of a statute when the agency's interpretation of the statute has changed without a change in the statute. 
I.C. § 72-915 has not been amended since 1941. The $2,500 premium-payment threshold was not imposed by the 
Fund until 2003. No such threshold existed between 1917, when LC.§ 72-915 was enacted, and 2003, when the 
$2,500 threshold was adopted. While the Fund argues strenuously for its current interpretation, the Plaintiffs could 





The district court's order granting summary judgment to the Fund is reversed and the 
case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to Appellants. 
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REMITTITUR T RANDALL, DEPUTY 
Supreme Court Docket No. 35144-2008 
Canyon County District Court #06-7877 
TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CANYON. 
The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 5, 2009, which was 
withdrawn May 5, 2009, and having announced its Substitute Opinion May 5, 2009, and having 
denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on May 12, 2009; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with the 
directive of the Substitute Opinion, if any action is required; and, 
IT FURTHER IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' memorandum of costs on 
appeal filed March 16, 2009 in the amount of $651.00 be and hereby is allowed. 
DATED this 2ih day of May, 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
REMITTITUR - Docket No. 35144-2008 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 
REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. CV 2006-7877*C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON 
PLAINTIFFS' REVISED SECOND 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ooois9 
On July 16, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a renewed request to the Court asking that partial 
summary judgment be entered upon their revised second motion. Specifically, they seek a 
holding as a matter of law that: 
1. I.C. §72-915 clearly and unambiguously expresses a legislative 
intent relative to the calculus to be employed for allocation of 
any amount which the manager, in his discretion, determines 
should be distributed as dividend; 
2. That the legislature intended by the language that it used in LC. 
§72-915 to provide that, after excluding policyholders who do 
not meet the longevity requirement and who are not within the 
classes of employment sharing in the dividend, any dividend 
which was declared must be distributed among all remaining 
policyholders in direct proportion to the amount of premium 
each paid in the dividend period. 
In its opinion filed May 5, 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court did specifically find that 
"section 72-915 sets forth a specific method for determining how the manager is to distribute 
dividends." Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P.3d 289,295 (2009). 
Further, the opinion set forth that "the Legislature viewed section 72-915 as requiring a 
pro rata distribution of dividends." Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. That is "[T]he statute contemplates 
dividing the aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid 
premiums relative to all paid premiums." Id. Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "[T]he 
inclusion of the words 'proportion' of the balance, and 'having regard to' the policyholder's 
'prio·r paid premiums' can only mean that the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro 
rata basis." Farber, 208 P.3d at 293. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Idaho Supreme Court established that once the manager 
declared a dividend, the distribution of the dividend to policyholders shall be in direct proportion 
to the amount of premium each paid in the dividend period. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 




The defendants argue that once each policyholder's account is given credit for it's pro 
rata share of the declared dividend, then the SIF should be able to evaluate each account to 
determine what amount each policyholder is properly entitled to by taking into account the losses 
and expenses. 
This Court disagrees with SIF's interpretation that it has the ability to go beyond a simple 
pro rata distribution of the dividend based upon premiums paid. In so finding, this Court refers 
to the language of the Idaho Supreme Court which stated that "[T]he Manager's discretion is 
therefore limited to the decision of whether or not to distribute a dividend in the first place." 
Farber, 208 P.3d at 294. Also, the language that the "statute contemplates dividing the 
aggregate balance proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative 
to all paid premiums." Id. 
Thus, the proper method of calculation is as set forth in subsection "B" entitled "The 
Applicable Formula Governing the Pro Rata Dividend" contained in pages 4 through 9 of the 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Renew Plaintiffs' Revised 
Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, or In the Alternative, Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 4"""'- day of November, 2009. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 
REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY WDGMENT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum 
Decision Upon Plaintiffs' Revised Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was forwarded 
to the following persons via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this l--:\ day of November, 2009. 
Donald W. Lojek 
Lojek Law Offices 
P.O. Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Philip Gordon 
Bruce S. Bistline 
Gordon Law Offices 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702 
Richard E. Hall 
Keely Duke 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton 
702 W. State St. Ste. 700 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
MEMORANDUM DECISION UPON PLAINTIFFS' 
REVISED SECOND MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
William H. Hurst 





LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD 
623 West Hays Street 
PO Box 1712 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: 208-343-7733 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Philip Gordon ISBN 1996 
Bruce S. Bistline ISBN 1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: 208/345-7100 
Facsimile: 208/345-0050 · 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Class 
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DEC O 4 2009 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
K CANNON' DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
RANDOLPH E. FARBER, 
SCOTT ALAN BECKER and CRITTER 
CLINIC, an Idaho Professional Association. CASE NO. CV06-7877 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
JAMES M. ALCORN, its Manager, and 
WILLIAM DEAL, WA Yl~E MEYER, 
MARGUARITE McLAUGHLIN, GERALD 
GEDDES, MILFORD TERRELL, JUDI 
DANIELSON, JOHN GOEDDE, ELAINE 
MARTIN, and MARK SNODGRASS in their 
capacity as member of the Board of Directors 
of the State Insurance Fund 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR 
BIFURCATION OF CLASS 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs and the Class they represent, by and through their 
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undersigned counsel ofrecord, and respectfully move the Court for a reconsideration of the Order 
entered by Judge James Morfitt dated April 30, 2007. 
The Plaintiffs and the class they represent maintain that a five-year rather than a three-
year statute of limitation should apply in this case from the date of the filing of the Complaint. 
This motion is brought pursuant to Rules 1 l(a)(2) and 54(b), Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure and is supported by a Memorandum of even date and the Affidavit of Donald W. 
Lojek, both filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Alternatively, the Plaintiffs and the Class they represent move for a bifurcation of the 
certified Class into two sub-classes. The first class would be composed of those employers who 
purchased a policy of insurance with the State Insurance Fund on or after July 1, 1999 and before 
July 1, 2001, who paid annual premium for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than 
$2,500 for one or more policy years beginning on or after July 1, 1999 and before July 1, 2001, 
and who did not receive a dividend from the SIF relating to those two years (Sub-Class #1). 
The second class would be composed of those employers who purchased a policy for 
worker's compensation insurance from the SIF on or after July 1, 2001, paid an annual premium 
for such insurance to the SIF which was not more than $2,500 for one or more policy years 
beginning on or after July 1, 2001, and did not receive a dividend since July 22, 2003, from the 
SIF during any respective subsequent year that dividends were paid to other policyholders (Sub-
Class #2). 





RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this_--,,_ day ofNovemeer, 2009. 
LOJEK LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
GORDON LAW OFFICES 
By:b~s.~~ 
Bruce S. Bistline 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of~09, a true and correct copy 
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